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~MERICA_N COPPER r.OMPAl'UE_S _1>'f:D THE CH:~LF,'\N _GO'JER.;.:JMEWf, 1920-1967. 
PROFT.I,E 0, .. LN. :':!:.XPC.S .. SEC'.l'OB 
"He who co~troln r opp er ..:rJntY·oJ 5 Chilo.. 11 
Radomir:'J ':::'o:c.;_c, Ac,bassado1 to th:.: u. s., 
f_c_nate 1965, p .55 .. 
''An&c.:;nd,· Oi·.,:rc: haL: of Cbile. ;, C£ntrc:ras 
Labarc'. _:;er~a-;,:;:., 1965, V· 36, 
After a decade of stag1wf:ior ;::;: c Chilean ~conomy ·mteredi in 1960, a 
period of healthy grm·1th, '.'h _ Clir::.s ...an Democratic p~rt~ which took 
control of the government m.:chiner:, or. Sev;:2mb:::r l.:. ~.964, ·'las been contem-
plating wide-scale reforms in ·-m effr::rt to 3ccelsrate this growth by 
removing the existing structural bottlene:ks, The Hew Copp1=:r Laws, which 
would introduce an uutput exp:msion .:md jo:.nt ownership by th1;, Chilean 
1 ,; 
government and the American-owned ;;ra:1 Mi1.er1a, ·· are a cornerstone of 
these reforms. 
*The Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Radomiro Tamie and Raymond 
Mikesell read and made useful comments on an earlie:: draf:: of this essay. 
also benefited from interviews with functionaries of the Anaconda and 
Kennecott, the two American Companies, which up to 1966 had exclusive 
control and ownership of Chilean la:r.ge.. scale copper mining, 
1The Spanish version of the first quote is "E~. que controla el cobre 
controla Chile1 II and cf the second, 11La Anacor:da cs <luena de media Chile. If 
2For simplicity reasons, th 1 : lnree~scaJc foreign.-owned Chilean copper 
mines will be refer~ed to in th~ ~uture aP ~ran Minerfi the way they are 
commonly known in Ch~.le, AJ..c:c, v1he1, v7t, talk c1bout mining in the second 
and third parts of tl,e ::ssa 1 ,,,e w ·_i:. hr•v ~ the Gn:n Min2ria in mind. 
I 
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The New Copper Laws, which by August 1967 have been approved both by 
the House and the Senate, are the most recent rungs in the ladder of Chilean 
mining and overall economic development. As a phenomenon, they have to be 
viel-1ed as part of the long-run historical scene and development efforts. In 
this essay I will present what I consider to be the highlights of the rela-
·' 
tion between government and the Gran Mineria, and the most important aspects 
of the relation between mining and overall growth. 1 
The essay is divided into three parts. In the first, which is mainly 
historical, the treatment of copper mining is traced through three different 
stages. In the second, the relation of copper mining and growth and the 
government's influence on this rel~tion are presented. The third part 
2relates copper mining to the savings - investment process. 
1Large scale Copper Mining (Gran Mineriil) was defined in Article 1 of Law 
11. 828 of May 1955, signed by President Carlos Ibiliez del Campo, to include 
those firms producing not less than 25,000 metric tons annually of blister, 
fire-refined or electrolytic copper. The only firms possessing these 
characteristics are the Chile Exploration Company, which exploits the 
Chuquicamata mine; Andes Copper Mining, Hhich was exploiting the mine at 
Potrerillos and currently, that of El Salvador; and Braden Copper Company, 
owner of El Teniente Mine. 
2The documents used most extensively in the present essay are the follm·1ing: 
Repciblica de Chile, Boleti~ Num. 21.773, Senado. Informe de las Comisiones 
de Hacienda y Hineria, Unidas, Recaido en el Proyecto de Ley de la Honorable 
Camara de Diputados, quc establece Normas Sohre Produccion, Manufactura_~ 
Comercio del Cobre (Santia30, Chile: Institute Geografico Militar, 1965). 
Pp. 1-95, and Apendices, Pp. 1-157. This document, which will be referred 
to henceforth as Bolet{n Numero 21. 773, Senaclo, contains the most complete 
official statistical information concerning copper and large scale copper 
mining ever published in Chile. It also includes very informative Senate 
discussions, detailed projections for copper output, and an hi,torical , 
review of the copper industry. Mario Vera Valenzuela, La Politica Economica 
del Cobre en Chile, (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Chile~ 1961), PJ· 1-223. 
This study, which will be referred to in the future as Politica Econ.omica, 
analyzes all the problemc facing the Gran Uineria and offers an unma~ed, 
up-to-date amount of info11nation about the copper industry. 
Vera's book, which is of polemic nature, attempts to prove that the Chilean 
3 
2 (Continued from preceding par;,:,) government I s copper policy, both in the past 
arid in the present, has been inefficL:,nt and detrimental to the economy. It 
is indispensable for a :.:-eacler uho tJants to fo:.:-m an objective vie,-1 of the 
problems of .i\meric.:m-01:med copper mining, to compa1.·e and contrast Vera's 
"Chilean view" with the orti.10dox view presented by Clark Reynolds in 
"Development Problems of an Export Economy; The Case of Chile and Copper;;' 
N:. 1'1amalakis and Cla:d~ n.eynolds, Essays on the Chilean Economy (Homewood, 
Illinois~ Richard D. In1in, Inc., -J.965),pp. 201-398-.-Thls7ssay contained, 
up to the publication in 1965 of the Bolet:l.n Num, 21. 773, Senadc, the most 
complete time eeries information concerning the Gran r-1inery;:--In the 
future it ,·Jill be referred to as Cop~. Essays. .Although the majority 
of the statistica~ information used in this present essey has been extracted 
from the official document Boletin
/ 
Num. 21. 773, Senado, I have crosschecked 
it Hith the Reynaldo informati~-and found only ;; fe,, discrepancies. The 
Reynolds ess2y, t1ith its large c1escriptivG section, is indespensable for 
those who cimnot read the extensive and h::.'.;:1 !.;uality Spanish literature and 
also brings to th2 English audience ~he lcng-celebrcted Ch~lean concept of 
,;returned value 11 (retornos). .Uthough my statirtical appenc1ix on mining, 
ancl especially its sectio:1 on copper (see tlie forthcoming H~storical 
Statistics of Chile, 1Gl:.0-1S'65), contain '..;~1E, r:ioct co!!l~)let:: ::iggregative 
statisticai· :i.nform;t:i..on avai!.E1bls fer '.':he resper:ti.ve sector:;;, the :teynolds 
essay remains ~he majo.:- sou::ce of disa2c:;re;:;;:1tive statistic[; covering the 
three large-scale. k:ne:ric:::m-o,med cor,pc:c compac1ies up to 1959. 
Futhermorc, an adec.:uate u:1de:cstanding cf the 11 coppe:.: problem 11 will be 
facilitatE:-d by re-'.:di,.,;:; Anibal Pinto Santa C:..:uz I s Chile, Un Caso de Desarrollo 
F:custradc (f>anti1:go de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S, A. 1962) uhich is 
a treatise of Chile's lon3· run development problems: and Markos Mamalal~is 1 
"Public Policy and Sectoral D2velopment. .A Case Study of Chile, 1940-1958n 
in Essays on the Chilean Economy, ~12· __ c_i_~., pp. ]-,200, to be referred to 




Freedc!I', Dis~1ination, Equity: The Shifting Game 
Pattern betv1een Government and the Ame,.-ican Copper Duarchy 
The history of copper mining is presented here mainly from the stand­
point of the treatment this sector received by government. The major 
:rnlevant highlights of overall economic grm1th a1.-e also presented, especi-
t' , ally if they are akin to tbe "copper issues '1. 
The relationship betueen government and copper mining has pass·ed 
. ~ • 1
through three distinct phases: t he 1_a1.sse~-:ca1.re one , the period of 
2
disc::imination, ancI more recently, the one of equitable treatment. 
First Period: Laissez-faire. lSG0-1939 
At the very beginning of this period, Chile ceded its place as the 
uorlc1 1 s most iraportant coppe:: producer to the United States, and, on the 
domestic scene, coppe:c ,·18S replaced as expol."t commodity number one by nitrate. 
The ·:iar of the Pacific coincided with the slou exhaustion of the rich 
copper ores found in the country's Central legions and marked the beginning 
of a prolonged decline in nationally produced copper output; the mediana 
(medium) and pequei.i.a (small-scale) miner{as of copper were unable to pass 
to large scale production and stagnated. Lack of internal technological 
change, absence of a modern, technology-oriented capital goods sector, 
1Fo:c a highly competent analysis of the copper sector during this period 
see Santiago Macchiavello Vara~, El Problema de la Industria del Cobre en 
Chile y sus Proyecciones Econbmicas y Sociales (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta 
Fiscel de la Penitenciaria, 1923) Pp. 1-348. 
2The three-phase analysis of the sector adopted here replaces the six-phase 
analysis first introduced in the publication by the Departamento de Cobre, 
Asesoria Comercial, El Cobre en Chile (Santiago, Chile: Depto de Cobre, 1961), 
and also used by Clark Reynolds in Copper. Essays, ~- cit., p. 209. 
t 
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limited capital markets and, maybe even lack of organizational capacity on 
the part of the Chileans gave rise to what Adria~ Palomino and Santiago 
1Hacchiavello have called a 11denationalization 11 of the industry; ownership 
uas transferred from Chileans to, mainly, Americans in a pattern inversely 
. 1 2re 1a t e d toteh copper content o f t he minera s. Macchiavello laments the 
11moslem complacency;' of the Chileans with respect to the denationalization 




in attributing it to the 
{ · lack of "men and will poi·1er". 3 
Large-scale copper mining which was only slowly established after 1910, 
had led by 1918 to a reduction of the Chilean-owned share of copper produc­
tion to an incredibly low 4.47 per cent, from a level of 90 per cent in 
Still, copper did not loom large in the Chilean economic profile, uhich 
was totally dominated by the nitrate bcn~nza; this was indeed the nitrate 
era. The developments in this key export sector shaped the economic, insti­
tutional, and social structure of the country, and had an unmistakenly 
profound impact upon the governmental treatment of copper mining folloi:-,ing 
the Great Depression~ 
Mining carrie~ mainly as a result of the nitrate boom, functions 
p,:eviously, or in other historical experiences, born by agriculture. It 
1see Santiago Macchiavello, .££.· cit., pp. 105-117. 
2 see Santiago Macchiavello, QP; cil·• pp. 105-117. 
3on page 111, Macchiavello quotes Mar{n in saying: "no sean capitales los 
que faltan, sino hobres y decision" (it is not so much the lack of capital 
as that of men and Hill power). This transfer has to be, nevertheless, ex­
plained as a result of the numerous forces including lack of capital and 
contact with international investment consortia. 
l;.See Santiago Macchiavello, Ibid., p. 106. 
1 
- 6 -
provided between 1880 and 193~ directly or indirect!~ the lion 1 s share 
of government revenues; and, unwittingly, by contributing as much as 75 per 
cent of the total revenues, it established a tax freedom, or stated better, 
immunity of, the previously burdened agriculture and other sectors an 
I 
immunity Hhich they subsequently refused to surrender. Even the Gran Mineria 
of Copper paid only a token amount of taxes and was subjected to a minimum 
of government intervention. On the positive side, the release of the vast 
product "surplus" of the nitrate sector through taxation and voluntary 
saving led to high government investment and establishment of an infrastruc• 
ture in transportation, utilities, and education. 
Furthermore, mining acted as the agent earning foreign exchange to 
be used in satisfying the country's import needs. As a percentage of domestic 
product mining exports amounted to almost 30 per cent, and were also 
unusually high in absolute value; and the country's capacity to import 
uas further strengthened by heavy, nitrate-induced capital inflm-,s to both 
the private and public sectors. Mining, thus, rather than agriculture, served 
as the link between the Chilean inccmplete system, which was forced to 
import an increasing amount of capital goods (practically all machinery and 
equipment), and the capital-goods-exporting developed complete systems. 
By making available the foreign exchange nee~ed for such purchases, it 
functioned as a quasi-capital goods sector. 
Cum multis aliis, mining was a m9 jor and rising employment source. Its 
boom gave rise to a labor shortage in the economy as a whole and to ccmplaints 
of rising labor costs following labor migration out of other sectois.l It 
1see Santiago i:1acchiavello, 2£_• cit., p. 223. 
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Has not only an export sector but also a leading one which, with the very labor 
intensity of its operations, had a tMjor employment -=:£feet, and ;iccountcd for 
the extensive linkages with the rest of the economy. 
Nothing, however is costless and the direct price Chile had to pay for 
the mining export boom was reflected and measured by the high factor income 
paid abroad. Fortunately the laissez-faire system permitted the estaulish­
ment of a triangular relationship between exports, £actor payments abroad, 
f 
and capital inflm·rn; this relationship was strong, sustainable, and in many 
uays beneficial to Chile. The export boom uas associated with high profits; 
these, in turn, were automatically linked with high repatriated payments to 
+
Lead1ng to Fore!~~Exports )-------------- ---- - ----------7 r~.::1Jlta l




tc, /~m-•ce: lat ion





foreign factors of production. Thus, the beneficial effects of the influx 
of export revenues were strongly mitigated by the severe "factor income" 
leakage1 from the Chilean economic organism. But, furthermore, booming 
11n his Monetary Problems of an Export Economy, Henry Wallich argued that in
nai1 export economy•••• exports and imports respectively assume the roles
that, in an investment economy like that of the United States, are played
by investment and saving. Exports rather than investment are the main
generating force in the national income; imports rather than saving repre­
i::e,1t the main leakage froIT'. the income stream. 11 p. 16. In the model of the
present essay, the major leakage is factor payments abroad, and not imports 
l 
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exports and profits created the climate and incentives for heavy foreign 
capital inflows, which to a largl~ extent offset the negative impact upon 
imports of the leakage related to payments to Bricish and American capital. 
In a 't'7ay, and especially during the 1920 1s, heavy factor payments were fa~ 
cilitated by the equally heavy nitrate-induced inflows of foreign capital. 
Last, but not least, important has been the vast unilateral trans fer 
of resources from the No,.:-th, where the nitrate oficinas were located, to 
the Center of Chile. This L€Source surplus transfer p~rmitted the 
development of an urban-service econcmy and establishment of a prosperous 
middle-class living beyond the means of the Center hut w:i.thin the means 
of the country. 
The laissez-faire period came slowly but steaoi.ly t·:i c!'_1 enc1 in the 
pe::iod following the G:ceat Depression 0£ the 1930 1 s, Govr.::·nment face-i o. 
new situation. Nitrate collapsed and permanently disappeared from chr 
scene as a major export sectoi· and, along uith it, term:inated the period 
of easy government revenues and heavy forei3P private capital inflous. 
Second Period: Suppression and Discrimination. 1940-1955. 
During the early nineteen thirties, coppe:: eclipsed nitrate as the 
majo:: export indust:cy, an::!, in th2 early forties, aG the single most impor­
tant source of government revenue. The collapse and permanent stagnation 
of nitrate signalled the end of the era of large and easy foreign exchange 
and government revenues, ubich started with the T,iar of the Pacific. More-
over, the economy experienced a ])Opul3tion explosion, -accelerating inflation 
1 (continued from precedins page) in general. Furthermore, although I agree 
that exports assume tbe :c:ole of investment in "dependent economies" under a 
~old-standard or :celatecl system, in the lar3er Latin Ameri.can econcmies that 
have been plagued by inflation since 193~ and especially in Chil~ the roles 
~m=~ functions of the export sector are fa:r more complicated as it will be 
pointed out in the second and third parts of this essay. 
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and an increasing dee;ree of go·vernment. "intervent:-..on. 
As regards large-scale copper mining, the most important event was the 
increasing descriminatiun to ,1hich it \·Jas subjected as a result of govern­
ment 1s efforts to accelerate growth through industrialization. The coali­
tioi.1 between Government, Central Bank, and the industrial consumer goods 
sector led to suppression of mining and eruption of what the present author 
1has called sectoral clashes. 
l The nature, strength and growth inplications of suppression2 of the 
copper sector uill be analyzed later in this essay. At this moment, \·re only 
p::esent a summary of the social, polit-.ical and economic underpinnings of 
discrimination. 
1Foz a complete presentation of the theory of sectoral clashes see the 
p:,:esent author I s La Teor{e. de los Choques entre Sectores (Santiago, Chile: 
--;,-- ·-----·•·----..Institute de Econon11.2, Univers:~dad d, Chile, March 1966); and also Markos 
Mar.1alakis, "La Teoria de ~.oE Cheques Er,t;:-e Sectores 11, El Trimestre Econ6mico, 
Vol. 130, Ap:::il 1966. 
2f,ccording to the fol'eign cap:'"tal and conse1·vative ·viei,point, the copper 
companies ,-,ere ChiL~ 's "uh if ping boy11 . Cn the other extreme, the .American 
copper sector in viewed "'E gn ::igen": o~' imperialism exploiting poverty­
stricken Chile. As it is normally the case, the truth lies in the middle. 
The foreign-owned copper concerns have ·;,y means been used a scape-no as 
goat for all of Chile's economic ills, even though suppression of the secto~ 
as defined in the theory of sectoral clashes, was present during most of the 
1940-1955 period Futhermor~ Even today they operate as agencies or 
subsidiaries of foreizn ccr.1panies ~-rith a legal status that gives them a 
p-riviliged position in the financial, foreign exchcnge and administrative 
ciornains. Suppression, by Chile as well as the United States, involved an 
income loss but never encroached upon th~ Ccmpanies special legal status. 
The size of the minin3 sector's resource surplus (oitrnte and copper) 
that went to the rich Colossus of the North and England during th~ last 
nine decades is ~normoi::s according to ar.y standards. To call, hoHever, 
the copper investment just a means of exploitat:.on ignores the funda­
mental truth that the Americana turr;ed i.nto 01.:1ses the desolate regions 
of the Chilean North and elso the copper secto.c I s manifold contributions 
described in Parts II anG lll of the present essay. 
I 
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As already noted, government faced a ;; C:ollar and peso" revenue problem 
once the nitrate collapse C:eprived it of its majm..· and easy revenue source. 
The post-depression wave of expenditure-raising, import substitution 
policies and concurrent rise in the government's investment program only 
~,osed additional problems. Government could raise taxes extracted from 
other ::iectors.-. raise indi:cect taxes, resort to inflation, borrow from over­
seas, and increase mining taxes - assuming it was unwilling to curtail 
expendit:ures. In practice it did pursue all these alternatives up to a 
point~ but above all, it raised taxes on copper mining. 
Pragr:·at~.. C; political, and emotional factors turned copper mining into 
a nat. 1iral t:irget for excessive taxation and ether discrimination. A ~-,ave 
of nev taJres u.::is imposed ,7ith the advE:nt nf the Popular F:cont headec.l by 
Pedro Aguirre and sstablish~en~ of the 8hileen Development Corporation in 
1939. 
A stumbling block in tbe government's efforts to establish new sources 
of revenue ~-1as the tax immunity of many economic sectors gained during the 
nitrate era. Value added in agricultur~ which was less than 18 per cent of 
total value added in 19l:.0, provided only a limited '1taxable income,;; more­
ove;:-, Pedro Aguirre anc:'. his associates who ,,ere either linked Hith or belonged 
to the landed aristocrac~~ had little desire to re-establish agriculture as 
tbe main tax contributor. Any attempt to raise income taxes and siphon 
auay the "surplus" of the u;:-ban service secto~s uoulc1 be too risky politi­
cally, require a change in tradition, and become effective too late for the 
country's immediate neeC::s. The alternatives of raising indirect tmces and 
using inflationary credit existed and were pursued, but failed to deliver 
the hard currency needed fo:;_· the import component of the investment program; 
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only dollar copper taxes could provide the guarantee needed for incernational 
bo:.::::owing. 
The insturments used by government to e,:tract resources out of copper 
mining included taxes, the foreign exchange :tate, import duties, deprecia­
tion allO'wances, aad aoministrative devices. Some or all were discriminately 
directed against copper mining during some o:: all of the ·_period. The fac­
to::..-s earlier mentioned C:o not explain the government's propensity to ove1·tax 
the sector, or the use of foreign exchange rates to suppress :it ~nc e::t:cact 
resources that did not accrue to government. Such apparently i.,:r,:tio~rnl 
01· inefficient strategies can be explained, 2nd tben on:!..y in part, by 
focusing attention on other, not always econcnic, factors.. Ecrc~ ;_-:: ·:1:wse 
a:i:-e listed belou. 
The high level of c:-emJ ttances by the copper firr.1s during t:'!:·~ lai.ssez­
faire period, 1·Jhic:1 has been repeatedly terraeci imperialistic 2:xpioI·;:at:ion, 
uas lamented during the i,ost-depression pe:,:iod. An ever-present but never 
clearly formulated desire for corrective acticn gave rise to a qu:.'..d-_E_E.O• 
quo formula uhich ca:cefully balanced the quf_£ of r,10rc-than··normal repat;:-iatecl 
profits of the laissez-faire period with the ~ of more-than-normal 
participation of Chile to coppe;_· :revenues since 19i'.}0. Part of today'£: taxes -
the discriminatory part - reflected, in the minds of the Popular Front 
::;overnment, the fair but not yet realized contribution of the Gran 1'-liner{~ 
to the Chilean economy. It ~-,es probably i:cTelevant to government that many 
firms uhich had "exploiteci" Chile during the laissez-faire period had, in 
the meantime1 disappeared, that government uas as responsible for the 
laissez-faire period I s 11rules of the same II as ~-,ere the foreign companies, 
and that application of such a compensation principle was not really 
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compensating but was punishing Chile along uith the copper firms. 
Even today there exists no study givins an optimum rate of copper taxa-
tion. Thus, it should not be surprising that maximum taxation became the 
gove:mment'- s de facto policy. Such a strate3y uas justified by certain 
jarson arguments that are still as populn:c to many today as they were in 
19l:-O, .nnd are simple, clear, and ,-,henever mo:-e documented analysis is 
missing, extremely convincin0• 
Discrimination ,-,as thus advocated because the copper sector's orienta­
tion was towards the developed metropolis, 1 of which it is an integral corn-
ponent, 2 rather than Chile; because by withdrawing profits and quasi-rents 
it contributes less to the country's capital than national enterprises; 3 
because it made possible for power groups to use revenues earned by the 
mining sector to import nanufactured goods,which they would otherwise have 
been forced to produce within the country limits ;lf because without government 
discrimination there uculd develop a socially intolerable wage differential 
between copper ~ining and the rest of the economy; and because the United 
States discrimir.ated against Chile during ~forld War II through copper price 
fixing. 
There is little to be gained from critically reviewing each argument. 
Instead, we deal with two of these points only. 
1Mario Vera Valenzuela, Politica Econo~ica, ~- cit., p. 17. 
2Mario Vera, ~-, p. 18. 
3niscrimination of the foreign mining rather than the foreign non-mining 
sector is advocated for the reason that it contributes less to national 
capital than the non-mining as i~ withdraws higher profits and quasi-rents. 
Mario Vera, Ibid., p. 18. 
{,_ 
'Na:cio Vera, Ibid., p. 19. 
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It is obviou3 that the United States' action of fixing copper prices 
at 12 cents per ?Ound during the Second World War induced Chile to impose 
higher taxes on the Gran Hir•~ri~- 1 But, even though the government I s 
action might have been justified, the other undeniable fact is that the 
American concerns were caught in the middle, and that Chile suffered in 
the long-run as a result of induced copper stagnation. 
Third Period: Equ~table Treatment. 1955-65. 
By 1955, Chile had been over-compensated by the Gran Mineria for the out­
flow of resources to Great Britain and the United States durin~ the nitrate 
epoch. Declining copper production since the late forties, and diminishing 
importance of Chile as a uorld copper producex, made a reassessment of the 
government I s _de,.. fac!_£ coppe1.· "pol icyri irrf·erat ive" Inflation, stagnation, 
and population 1:xp} os ion p:...·oved, ~or different re aeons; thai:: the economy 
could ill-af.:ord to maintnin pc1t:entiy in::aticnal policies. 'Fie upshot was 
the New Deal Lav r,f 1955 ~:hich ir,troduced, first, an equitable treatment 
of the sccto:· and, sec')ncl. 0rcater s•.Yol-ii.stication on the govern::ient ',:; part 
in its dealings with the ccppFr companies. 
In spite of the improvements i::1 copper legislation and better under­
standing of the sector?s functioning, all copper projects, including the 
one passed in 1966, have struck me as dangerously sLnplistic. It is true 
that both Chile and the foreign enterprises, but mainly Chile, have lost vast 
riches from the lack of a proper copper policy. 2 
1i,Iost of the Chi:Leans pbce the price-fixing issue in the forefront of the 
causes that have induced (;bile to discriminate against the American-owned 
mines. It is important to mention that the copper sector has not been dis­
criminated only by Chile but also by the United States Government through
its price-fixing policieA. 
2In the New Copper Lm\; every attempt is made to safeguard the investors 1 
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Even the latest coppe;: law appears to be the product of rush rather 
tban intensive study and thought, and includes some provisions that all but 
completely strangle the policy maker's freedom. It is ignored that a copper 
policy is a multi-faceted one, and that any across the board provisions, 
besides being unnecessary, are detrimental. 
The following quotation from Senator Palma 1s Senate speech accurately 
serve as anreflects the state of affairs of the copper policies and could 
epigraph to any study on copper: 
"••• Chile, which lives from copper.•. has never developed 
a policy for the sale of this metal nor has ever attempted 
to understand, f:rom inside, the copper industry, but has 
instead maintained a position of vigilance and tax expecta­
tions and of critique of any related policies undertaken by 
the Companies .••• ". S'enate, p. 55. 
Some major roles and distinguishing characteristics of the mining 
sector remained intact throughout its 1880-1967 history. Mining was and 
still remains the per excellence export sector; mining also was and still 
:;:emains the high productivity sector that generates a massive resource sur­
plus w·hich is divided bet.-1een the developed nations 
I capitalists and Chile 1 s 
Central Valley population. And, ironically, the gradual substitution of 
natural by synthetic nitrate starting in 1917, and the eventual collapse of 
the nitrate industry in the decade of the thirties, does not seem to have 
been a bitter enough experience to provide a lesson for the future. The 
country still puts too many of its eggs into the copper basket, even though 
the copper market is steadily eroded by such substitutes as aluminium and 
to2 (continued from preceding page) interests Hithout any evident attempt 
p;:otect the host state's interests. A. A. Fatouros reports that there is 
See A. A. Fatouros, Governmentan international trend of this nature. 
Guarantees to Foreign Investors (New York: -:::olumbia University Press, 1962). 
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tbe nmineral II of the future: synthetics. 
Change, however, has come in one respect. During the laissez-faire 
pe~io~ the resource surplus generated by the nitrate bonanza went either 
to England or national investment but did not move into the mineral of the 
future, namely copper. As a result, Chile, even though it had abundant 
11nitrate-generated" capital at its disposal, missed a unique opportunity 
/ 
to take control of the mining sector. The neH mixed companies of Exotica 
,,, 
1 
, and El Teniente, houever, use for the first time the copper-generated 
resource surplus to increase Chile's committment in its own mineral resources. 
As a consequence both the absolute surplus generated and Chile's share are 
expected to increase dramatically in the immediate future. 
Traditionally, the export sector's contribution to its country I s 
economic development has been viewed in terms of linkages. 1 In sections 
II and III of this essay I present a systematic analysis of the effects 
and contributions of copper mining within a generalized model of the export 
sector. The present model is vieHed to be a general one and is thus expected 
to provide better insights than the existing partial ones. 
1 one of the better treatments of the role of the export sector is found in 
Jonathan V, Levin's The Export Economies. Their Pattern of Development in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University, 1960) Pp. l-3l1-7. 
See especially Chapters I and IV, pp, 1-24 and 165-202. The Levin model, 
1iliere the producing country's share in export proceeds is dissipated in 




Copper ~rining and Economic Development 
Copper mining has been the Chilean export sector since 1935. The 
:relation of its mm perfon,1ance to overall Chilean economic growth and 
goverru,1ent policy can be aualyzed from a number of different angles. 
Here I will_ distinguish three different effects which the sector can 
have. 1 They are: 
A. The Resource Availability Effect, which relates to the supply 
of resources made available to the economy. There also exist four contribu­
tions of the sector to grouth underlyinr, this effect. These are the: 
1. Foreign E~:change Contribution 
2. Government Revenue Contribution 
3. Capital Inflow Contribution 
'-'.-. Capital Goods Contribution 
B. The P:cofitability Effect, or, r;,_ore properly, the investl!lent 
profitability effect, which measures the increased demand for outpu~ and 
the potential increase in investment as a ::esult of the copper sectoi: 1 s 
grouth. The contributions of the copper Deeter to s;:m·1th underlying this 
effect are the: 
1The present classification of functions, or, stated differently, of effects 
and contributions of the mining sector has some points in common with Simon 
Kuznets I tripartite classification of contributions of agriculture in his 
essay 11Economic Grouth and the Contribution of Agriculture: Notes on 
i1leasurement, " in Agriculture in Econcmic Development ed. by Carl Eicher 
anc' Lawrence Witt (Neu Yorl~: McGraw Hill, 196l:-) pp. 102-119. 
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l. i-'.a:.:-ke·~ Size Cout:cibuti'Jn 
c. The Facto~ E"":;JJ:.:,ymenc Eff':_.~.~' t·1hich :refers to the direct and 
indirect de~and for labor and capital goods 3enerate<l by the mining sector. 
The underlying contributic:1.s are the following. 
1. Le:b0:: Employrn2nt Contribution 
;;i. Empl~ym-c!nt of National Labor 
i. TJnsk!:..lled. 
b, EmpLoyment of Immigre~t Labor 
In the :fol_:;_owinr; t"b~ee 3c;:t:;.ous en atter.~pt is r:i.ade to rr.easur:e the. 
magnitude of these t~ree ~ffects gener~ted by th0 Chilean GrAn Miner{e of 
copper and analyz•c t~1ei:c relation to groTJth and governmental policy" ,!e 
sta1.·t with the avr1ilab.~lity cf.feet, ti1e discussion of which uiU fonn the 
core of the prerent escay• 
.L, The 3.esource !-,vailability Effect 
Export mining, speciiically copper export mining, makes ~vailable to 
the Chilean econoray a volume of resources potentially convertible into 
consumer and capital goods. We call this phenomenon the availability 
c. ·-1:fec ·-
'I 
'There . :dst thr2e different variants of the av.:iilability e: ffect. ... The 
fi ~st :t ·• th'" gross availability effect, which reflects the total amount of 
:::esourc-:-n a•1c1ilable to the sector as a resul': of its activities. The effect 
i.:; "gr,:.,sf'" :.'.n two :,:,~spects: it reflects the resources available to the 
-:oppe•~ w~ct:·--: and the economy for payments to factors of production .!'!s uell as 
i.nte:>.in<;L: at.~ products, and, further.mer~, it reflects the resources e.vailable 
t:o pa) .b:~ : :1e use. of Chilean an uell as foreign factors of production and 
:i.ntenned~.a·:0 prod11:::s. The gross e:"'fect is measured by the total value of 
copper prJduction. That is, 
(1) A = p 
e C 
'\·7he:::e, A, stands for availability, P, for production, and the subscripts 
e and c :i:efer to "effect"and copper respectively. 
Inso:~ar as total production is exported, production can be substituted 
by expor::s and equation (1) becomes 
(1. 1) A = E 
e C 
uhere, E, stands for exports. 
1The present analysis and framework is an extension of the theoretical and 
empirical research that has appeared first in: Markos Mamalakis "Forced 
Saving in Less Developed Countries: A Rediscovery or a Misapplication of 
a Concept, " Economia Inte:rnazionale, September 1964; and then in, Harkos 
i•Iar..1alakls Public Policy Essays, ~· cit., pp. 52-SL~, 76-82, and Chapter l:.• 
The exp:i:ession "availability effect II was chosen in order to deliberately 
distinguish it from the income effect. Part of the availability effect 
does not reflect value added in mining, and if it does, it is value added 
not always belonging to Chile. 
2
1-0 - ..L. 
resources the :...ectcr rna':es available to Chile, ue '.:urn to the seconr; and 
raore relevant net availability effsct. T~is is measured by the total value 
of copper production (or eJ~orts) minus factor and intermediate product 
payments abroad by the sector. Thnt is, 
(2) An= E F 
e C C 
uhe;.-e, n, stands for net and, F, for payments abroad. An estimate of An 
e 
according to eq,rntlo, (2) is impossible ,_:ue to the lack of reliable statis-
tical information conccrnin:_:; payr,1ents abroad. 
A second way of rneasurin3 the net availability effect is through the 
balance of payments effect Fhich is defined as, 
(2. 1) P = (S,. -:- Ii) - ( Ti+ i + k) 
e I .1. 
\-Jhe:re P stands for balance of payments effect, S, for sales, the subscript 
e 
f fo:..- foreign, I, for investment, and, -t,~ , i, and k for profit, interest 
and capital payments abroa~ respectivel}'• Ti1e rnagnitude of this effect has 
been calculated for the 1952-196l:- period with a summary presented at the end 
of the essay. The Index of this effect shoHs a constant improvement since 1953 
uhen its value ·was l:-1. 96 as ccmpared to 100 fm: 1961. This improvement, 
1
houever, has only been a minor one since 1960. 
The index of the balance of payments effect can easily lead to erroneous 
conclusions for a number of reasons. First, 1 -~ i, and k reflect only part 
of payments overseas. If other payments overseas are significant, the net 
foreign exchange contributed by the copper sector to the economies may be 
substantially smaller from the one measured by the balance of payments effect. 
The index is likely to be affected if these payments behave differently than 
the items reflected in it. Second, deductin::; all payments abroad £rem the 
value of sales is inpossible because of insufficient statistical information. 
Third, payments abroad include purchases of investment goods, which are 
included in the first part of the equation; it would thus be absurd to deduct 
those expenditures. Fo:: .-:1ore detailed sta·~istical evidence see appendix 
table on the Balance of Payments Effect. 
1
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Because of the statistical and conceptual difficulties that beset 
versions (2) and (2,1), the net availability effect was redefined in an 
ope::ational way as the sur,1 of expenditures of the copper sector in Chile. 
That is, 
(2. 2) An = L + T + I + d e C C C C 
uhe:ce, L, stands for legal cost of prcduction, mainly Hages and salaries, 
T, stands for direct taxes, I, for investment, M, for miscellaneous local 
J. 
expenditures, and, :;], fo:c returned revenue. 
Finally, ,·1e propose a third variant, to be cal led the net overall 
1·esource availability ef:Eect, ,-1hicb differs from the gross and net effects 
in that it takes also into account ~he amount of resoutces the copper sector 
makes available to the Chilean economy -:ndirectly by establishing or contri­
buting to a "business climate" favorable to the inflow of foreign capital, 
This effect is measured by the sum of local expenditures (returned revenue) 
of the copper sector plus the capital inflm-rn induced by the sector. That is, 
0
(3) A = R + C 
e C 
where, o, stands for net overall anci, C, fo;: induced capital inflous. 
1. The statistical evidence on the availabiVty effe':.~· The mar;nitude 
of the gross availability e £feet, t1h1.ch j s [!;ea sured by the total value of 
copper production, is prec2,1ted in ':('able 1. In order to eliminate the 
impact of price movements, the current prices '"igures were de flateci by the 
U, S, wholesale price index and series· in :.9Gl constm1.': prices were obtained. 
1The "domestic effect" measu:::e proposed by the Univers~.ty of Oregon group is 
almost identical TTith the measure pr:pos~: here. lhe difference between the 
tuo lies in that equation (2. 2) include:, r,1o_scellanQous locc::l expenditures 
.-1hich the Oregon measu::e excludes, anu c,oe:o not J.ncludc domestic sales, which 
the Oregon formula does include" 
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Table 1 
Gross Availability Effect of Large-Scale Copper Mining 
As Measured by the Value of Production. 
Value of Production 
(Millions of U.S.$) 
Current 1961 Constant 
P:dces Prices 
First 
Period: 1930-39 Total L:.92. 9 1140.7 
,I 
I Average l:9. 3 llL,. 1 
Second 
Period: 1940-5L: Total 2188. 2 3004.5 
Average lL:-5. 9 220.3 
Third 
Period: 1955-6.!, Total 3095.6 313l:.. 9 
Average 309. 6 313. 5 
Source: Appendix Tables A and B, 
There is a definite upward trend underlying this effect. During the 
First Period, when the sector uas suffering from dep:cession-induced lou 
;,irices and output, the value of production, in 1961 constant prices, uas a 
::espectable $11l:. million a year. During the Second Period, when the secto:...· 
Uc:!S supp:cessed, average exports - or production - reached neu highs. These 
ave::ages obviously conceal large variations uithin the period considered. 
The symptoms of sta3nation and ::esults of disc:dmination are found in the 
decline of production value after 1948 anG up to 1953, 1 and the substantial 
decline in quantity p:,:-oc1ucec1 after 19L:l: and until 195L:. ~-)hat really shocked 
Chileans into recognizing @ining stagnation, and the need for constructive 
1
The value of copper p:rnduction :i:-eached $215. 5 mill ion in 1948, and had 
fallen to $113. 9 million in 1953, before 1t cecovered to $220. 8 million 
in 1954. The 0:coss availability effect is determined by the level of 
;_:.·.:eduction; if production and exports are identical, the latter could 
also be taken as a measure of the availability effect. 
l 
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pclicies, \·rns the ceclining importance of Chile as a coppe:: producer in the 
uo·:..•ld ma:cket. The Chilean share in ·do:i:-ld coppe1· output, the then Senato:.'.' 
anci noH P:cesident Edua:cdo F;:ei pointed out in 1952, had been reduced L·oi:1 
an all-time high participation of 44 per cent betHeen 1860 and 1870 to a 
meager 13 per cent in 1952. 1 Chile could hardly affoLd the revenue losses 
arising from such an adverse situation, and manifold corrective policies 
have been both suggested and implemented eve:i.· since. 
Hith the onset of the Third Period in 1955, the gross availability 
effect started rising and :ceal value of production soared to a yearly 
ave:cage of $313.5 million; quantity produced also reached all time highs 
in 1959. 2 
B. The Four Contributions Underlying the Availability Effect 
As already mentioned, government never really had a de jure copper 
policy, and its de facto policies can only be traced through the net impact 
of numerous, often conflicting, government actions. Even in its short-term 
actions, government never really thought in terms of or directly worried 
about the availability effect. Instead, it was interested in what the sector 
could contribute in such specific terms as taxes and foreign exchange. Since 
1 /
See "Repuesta del Senado a la Consulta Respecto al Cobre", Panorama Economico 
/ / 
pp. 854-859; and Boletin Num. 21. 773, Senado, 
ln:forme de las Comisiones c'.e Hacienda y Mineria, Unidas, El?_• cit., pp. l?--6. 
2
Hum. 92, December 18, 1953, 
/ 
still, the physical output increase cannot be termed as spectacular under 
any criterion. In 1960 it uas barely higher than in 1944, and the output of 
1162. 8 million pounds in 1964 (the highest up to that year) was not even 15 
per cent higher than that in 1944; and all this twenty years after the out­
put peak of the forties and ten years since the celebrated New Deal. See 
Historical Statistics of Chile 1840-1965, .£E_• _Elli 
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its strategy, and thus policies, aimed at these specific contributions, it 
appears efficient to analyze these contributions directly and deduce evidence 
indirectly from them about the availability effect. The explicitly considered 
contributions by government have been the foreign exchange (gross and net) 
and the government revenue ones; in addition, in this essay we uill 
consider the capital inflou and capital goods contributions which, even if 
they have not always guided the governments thinking, behavior and motivation, 
l 
f 'I should do so in the future because of their direct impact on economic growth. 
i-'iay ,;-1e point out at this moment that government has been increasingly pre-
occupied l·Jith obtaining maximum foreign exchenge and government revenue 
contributions, but has either ignored or curtailed the two other ones. 
1. The gross forei~n exchange contribution. The foreign exchange 
contribution has two variants, a gross and a net, corresponding to the gross 
and net availability effect. The gross concepts are related, as already 
mentioned, to the value of total copper exports. 1 
Government has, in.recent years, proceeded to maximize this contri­
bution by formulatin'.; and pursuing efficient (a) production, (b) commerciali­
zation, and (c) manufacturins policies. Quantit¼ price, and domestic 
value added have been the respective targets. 
The emphasis on an adequate production policy started once Chileans 
realized that their worl~ share and physic~l output were declining. Before 
19l:-0, government just paic'i nno attention" in its belief that "le moncle va 
de lui mtme. 11 Once the nitrate collapse shocked government out of this 
"no attention phasen, Chile shifted to only a slightly more efficient 
1
The difference between the availability ef~ect and the foreign exchan8e con­
tribution is determined by the difference between production and exports. -As 
long as production is partially channellec1 into domestic activities the size of 
the gross availability effect uould be lar~er than the gross foreign exchange 
contribution. 
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policy of obtaining a maxioum resource release for any given output level; 
the de facto policy, uhich uas established through inertia on some f:conts and 
action on others, and can be best described by t!1e 11get-what-you-can-not-1 11 
motto, lasted until 1955. Oaly then did government attempt to obtain a larger 
gross foreign exchange contribution through a production policy having 
"c~cports" as its maximand. An export-oriented production policy also 
provided the cornerstone for the 1966 copper agreements. 
No major stumbling blocks are found on the path tm-1ards an overall 
production policy agreement between government and Companies. The Chilean 
government has also made clear that it's main objective in 1965, for the 
futur~ is a copper output increase, without forgoing any market dicteted 
price rises. In this ::espect, there exints little conflict between the 
production plans of government and CoQpanies, 
In spite of the good 11ill of the parties involved, it should be men­
tioned here that the latest (1%6) Copper Agreements hardly establish a 
production policy providing a "livin3 arrangeuent" between Chile and the 
Compcmies, As ,1as the case :for all previous c:rrangements, incentives are 
provided for a once-and-for-all investment and output increase rather than 
their continuous risin3 flou over time. Output is expected to rise up to 
11970 and maintain a stationary value up to 1985. 
The price variable, uhich in ra,-1-materials producing countries such as 
Chile is almost aluays the center of controversy, has been an intesral 
see R. Saez, op. cit., Table Ill, p. 7. Tl1e level of technical compe­
tence that has gone into !.)lanning and p.:-epe.1.·ing these projects from the 
Chilean side has been lo,r. They thus pror.1ise to be anothe::.: fiasco ii.1 
Chilean economic development, See also t'.1e ::,rejected output figures. 
1 
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component of the 11co□mercializ::ition 11 polic~1• A cor:imercislization 1101 icy is 
C::.efinable as the comp le::~ of the st2ps and st:categies adoptec. to re, :se the 
p:rice of a given quality of ccpper exports. These mcves h;ivc 5.ncleded 
bilateral pric(>-fixing c1ul'.'ing Eodd Uar II, take-:1ve ~ of all copper sales 
by the C2ntral Bank (e,,rly fifties), and ca:ttel-like price rises by Chile 
an:1 Zambia du:ring 1%6. 
The most strongly advocated measure to raise copper export prices has 
been a Chile-enforced equalization between the New York and London Netal 
,.. ·, 
Exchange (~IJ1E;)prices, This objective was fi:.:st partially fulfilled in 
1966, for Chile's exports at least, when the Departamento de Cobre raised 
the per pound price from 42 to 62 cents. A more subtle way of enlarging 
the share passing through the London marlcet-ah,ays assuming the London 
ma::ket, such a strategy is feasible primarily during periods of general 
copper shortage. 
Even if not always explicitly stated, 2 major aim of the commerciali­
zation policy has been to make the copper sector independent of the United 
1
States, a course strongly advocated by Senato~ Frei. Furthermore, because 
the Gran Mineria never sold to Eastern Europe, an alternative repeatedly 
endorsed by numerous politicians, 2 Chilean policy makers believed that 
1::eenRes{i)u.e:st.a del Senado a la Consult a Respecto al Cob re", Panorama Econo­
~ico, No, 92, December 18, 1953, p. 858. 
A fervent advocate of a national copper policy and unrestricted trade con­
tracts has been Radomiro Tomic, uhose views &re sur.mi.srizr:d in the manifesto­
like speech r;The Copp et' is Chilean" made in the Chilean Senate on July 18, 
1%1. See Republica de Chile, Diario de Sesiones del Senado, Publicacion 
Oficial Legislatura Ordinaria, Sesion 20a, en oartes 18 de Julio de 1961. 
Apartado "El Cobre 'es Chileno 11 Pp. 3-20. According to this speech, for the 
Christian Democrats, the Chilean Copper Policy must incorporate the follouing 
fundamental strategies: I, The l;•Jhole globe as market for Chilean coppe:i:-. 
II, Chilenization of International Trade of such copper. III- Complete 
2
compensaticn i·,as clL:C', e::. ~;e:r by the Ccnpanies o:..: the United States Govern-
rc1ent for the in.ccme loss :i.ncur:ced, The most extreme and. profitable move in 
rnanipulatinr coppei.· prices came with Vm 10255 of February 1952, i·1hich 
charged the Cencra' Bank uith the purchase and sale of the metal and netted 
the government on unprecedented amount of :revenues. 1 The persistent demand 
for Chi~.ean commerci-:1lization of all copper exports, ·uhich is extensively 
satisfied in the Copper Association Agreements, is based on the desire to 
obtain a maximum gross foreign exchange contribution by diversifyine; exports 
in a T·Jay uhtch uould reduce the American influence on price determination. 
Chilean attempts tu :c.:iis0 p,.-ices uithout a change in the product mix 
have brought into the ope:, the underlying conflict between the United States 
and Chile, two sovr-.:ceign states. The United States Government, being a buyer, 
has resented pri,:e ino:eases in copper because this is a strategic material 
am:: the increase2 tend to shoi:r up during tension periods, such as the Korean 
or the Vietnamese Fa-.:-s, when the American government is oversensitive to 
p:rice rises, Chile complains, neverthele3s, that the United States Govern­
ment is asy1nmetrically sensitive to price chanzes; on one side it flatly 
,.003ects to increases and f • · ·1· 2 bgoes as ar as to impose price ce1. 1.ngs ut on 
2 
(continued from preceding page) refining oi copper in Chile. IV. Elabora­
tion of a reasonable pe:-~centage of coppe:: that is being exported. v. Chileni­
zation of large scale copper mining. See R. Tamie, Ibid.., p. 7, As of 1967 
only the second st~ategy hac come completely under Chilean initiative. From 
the rest, only objective o:: strategy No.. V has been partially pursued and 
implemented, 
1The output of the small and r,1edium-scale mining has been almost aluays sold 
at the higher price in Europe. 
2
The three most frequently cited instances of price fixing by the U. s. Govern-
r..1ent are the follouin::;. P:._·ices \Jere nunilaterally" fixed at 12 cents pe;: pound
(pu-.:-chase •nonopoly by u. s. Commercial Co,) du:ring Horld Har Two; prices uere 
fixed at 24.5 cents in 1950 through an agreement between the companies and the 
United States gv.re:rnr,1en:-; and then a su:rp;.:-ice (sobre-precio) of 3 cents per 
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the othe;_· s:·dc, 1,·'.w2, Jnfa:1vorable to Chile price declines to be determined 
hy an ir.1perf,::c;: intc.:.:n~,_iona·~ pr::i.ce mechanisu. The final outcome of this 
North and pern,ar.·:or1t .1..ossb t.'.) ro,e ·ty, strilcen Chile. Uhy should Chile, 
uhich p:..·o,iuc~s ccp_ 2.:.· >~;.';c.,~ to '.;in ,-,ars, suffer du:cing Har Periods, when 
Peru and A::-ge··,t::..;.1c T,115 ~:-- p:::od:.1u agricr 1.turl'l products secondary to the 
1•·1c~:· effor,:• ··•<:>cp ••·:, -,~.-,,('._. d - . .. nainsb" - ..,, J.. .. ..i..., J.. r-d•1d . _... fal •1 ..- • 
A c-:-;:1-::un·er· :· '.°:'J'!J.fl'.::: e:x1sts between Companies and Chilean governr.1ent 
uith respect t~ pri~~ ~ -licy. Since there exist two (if not more) copper 
prices, on~ Jor:!est~ c :.n ':be United States which is artificially low due to 
subsic'i~_es, an:i-t:o:..stirz.; ·Jy thG g~vernment, and releases fror.1 government 
stock piles, ,0 nc: ancthe:r: 5.nte::nati.onal, which is presumably market-dictated 
and high; ~;•.d · ,_ci-.r i~h-::: Gra:. ?-1::ner{a supplies mainly the Horth American 
.'I. 1):i."ice increase is likely to invoke 
the ,-,r.:ith Jf t·· <: ir, ,J::i · 'H. C'on,r~unity, Gove1:nc.ent, and even the President; 
not aJ so of tl._10 c: _:_1,::,(1:: C:.:-0 .>,,rnmer.t and i:he P:::-e:s·C:.clent. The private com-
panies, ubich ha,•::' too <';: cgi:-r.ces, one to their heme government, and 
another to the :::ou:1LYy 0 /·J:.re t-.hey operate, are expected to satisfy tuo 
confL:cting o"Lj::.ctiv~:s - 'Ihe conflict is essentially between tuo sovereign 
states, but the J.ac.k of :-;.:,terr,ational lau for solving it makes it appea:: 
as a "foreigri. firm··g,::ivernmert" conflict. 
(continued :rom rr0c~ain~ ~age)pound of Ctilean copper sold in the United 
States was estabi.ished JD 1-:iay 7: 1951, through the Hashington agreement. 
See Hario Vera, Politica_Economica, op. cit., P• 39. 
11t is il·onic that the TJ~1:.:.:..2.d States should have compromised its relationship 
mainly with those develoving ·:ountries ,-1hich produce "·oar materials". 
2 
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The solution f.:-om the economist's puint of vieu would be to permit sale 
of u. S. produced copper at the government controlled price; sale of Chilean 
produced copper at internatlonal market p:cices, and a United States Govern­
ment subsidy on imported copper <:!qua~. to the international-domestic price 
differential to permit domestic users to pay for imported copper domestic 
rather than international prices. 
Finall~ the gros~ foreign exchange contribution of the copper sector 
rises as the domestic value added increases through processing. Tuo major 
alternatives exist here. First of all, the value of exports can be increased 
by improving the qualjty of exports. In the case of copper, this means a 
change in the product mix exported, uith electrolytic copper, which receives 
a higher price, 1 rising more rapidly tl.,an the loHer quality blister, 2 or, fire 
refined copper. The Chi'.~ean government has a strong preference toua:cds the 
production of electrolytic copper and has voiced its concern throug~ the 
Central Bank over the declL.12 in its relative ir.1po:ctance. 3 Production of 
blister involv,2s A direct: loss to the gross foreign exchange, government 
revenue, and employmer,t contrib 1.1ti:ms since it leads to lm·1er income for the 
1
11.aul Saez, one of Chile I s :'.:oremost copper B:h.1)erts, expresses the government 
vieus Hhen he anticipates ac, increase in the value of exports as a :cesult of 
a rise in average price. See R- Saez, EE.· s_g_., p. 8. 
2
For an analysis of i:his p:cice difference due to quality variation, see 1'iario 
Vera, Politica Economic a, ~- .£!!•, pp. 32-33. In 1960, fire-refined copper 
uas receiving O. 5 cents less than electrolytic in the North American market, 
and O. 375 cents less per pound in the L. 1'1. E. market; a premium of 1. 5 cents 
per pound was paid during the same year for electrolytic copper. See Mario 
Vera, Ibid., p. 330 
3From lf5. 2 per cent of ;:otal production in 19.'.:iO the relative importance of 
electrolytic copper declined to 31. 6 per cent in 1961. See Mario Vera, ~­
ill.·, p. 197, See als-::-i Ibid., p. 34-. 
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subsidiary operating iri Ch:U.e and '.ac,~ o:~ local refineries. The American 
companies have ·;nef~rred pro::lw::-:io:1 of b::.ister because it involves a smaller 
f · 1.nves·.:ment per -· d i :i.zat::.on f · opera-ore1.gn · ·:1..,a1 ~·:on pro u :e~-> cent:ra1· · o re fin1.ng 
tions in the Un:.ted 3tat~~,. smcJlL!r ta.<a.:-i.0~1, :;:id con·;:rol of the destiny 
·, 
of the final oui.:.put.,;.. 1:t is Likei.1 t:ha.::, in view of the foreign firms 1 
multi-plant and n:iu\ti•-.:ountry ,::p~t::it::.ons the optimum '=!xport mix for them 
leads to a less than orn:imum m:·.x from C':: .i..le 's point of view. It is 1,;rorth 
I, pointing out that 1 de~er~oration ~n the quality mix ~s evident not only 
during the ).atte,~ pa:ct o:': th~ Se:·y•d :?e:riod, !)Ut :hat i': continued during the 
Thi:i:d Period ·..vhen r! i_sc ·~irnin 1t:~'.•.\~l 1:lad been reduucd,. 3 
A definite co~fl~ct ~xistn ~c reg2ris the product mix policies. The 
Chilean governr.1e:nt: is i:,·:ei:~st~ci i'1. }r.odu-:ing the type of copper leading to 
the best qua.!.ity .::ir:c~ ::1·•.ghes•: :O:!:":i.ce, :n i :::cmse::iuently provides the highest 
foreign exchange coutc·j'.::,u1:~.0'l· ':'he Ame:c·.ca,~ r.ompaniE.R want to produce in 
Chile what is 0pt5J.:iun, :.r. v~e;-1 of their mu·.ti·--::01mtry and multi-plant 
operations, Ir1 t:his s-::r. ;_c :ly ,:i,~L1 atc, fira1·· hos'. go·1en1ment conflict a solu­
tion is apparent:y reache: tha~ ~r~•'1es f~r a maximum output policy by the 
firms in retu:::-n fc,,:- ::el.at'.:::,.__ fr-2e60' ;_i: .':e'!.cc::in'?; the product :nix. Govern-
ment is t'.lus -:orn1,ensat,.~d :o·:- ::he "u.aJ.i:y loss b:1 a product gain, Since 
private firms ha-1,~ a p0i:1e._ to ·,~et.a).ie'.:e ir. :he governml?nt-company game, a 
solution close 1-_.:, joini'. rnax-Lmi z:itior.. i.s reached. 
The second aiter;,a,':i'T"" goe[; hc•,,.\n< ::he simple change in the product mix 
and involves 1 ocal r.1ar-·1fa-:tm:lng ""nd subsequent export of processed copper 
lM .r al:"l.O Vera, -::.bid,., p, 3Lf, 
2,. .
Har1.o Vera, Ibid_,, p, JL,-35. 
3 · ·· c · · ,. ,· ··See Historical ,.,tatJst1.c; o:,. 1(•1_~ .,965Chl.J.'"•.c u-,__ J-_____ C2I:· cit. Tabl2 titled 1~ro-
6.uction of Copper by typ~ 11 • 
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products. In the Senate discussions this is cited as a hopeful method of 
1increasing the foreign exchange contribution. 
2. The net foreigr, exchange contribution and the two expenditure flows. 
Whatever Chile's apparent interest in the copper sector's gross foreign 
egchange contribution might b~ its real interest does, or shoul~ lie with 
the net availability effect and net foreign exchange contribution. 
Perhaps th£ most important distinguishing characteristic of the Chilean 
copper sector is t~e difference between its gross and net foreign exchenge 
contributions. This difference arises from its foreign ownership and its 
freedom to deal internationally without t~e limitations and restrictions 
imposed on Chilean U.rr:1s. Stated more clearly foreign-·owned copper mining 
has two expenditure and inccme flm-rn: national and foreign expenditures, and 
Chilean and United States income flows,. The expenditure flews include, in 
addition to factor pcyaents, expenditures on intermediate products, transpor-
tation, insurance 2nd so forth. 
The net fore i.gn e·-:change cc::itribution hc1E three cc;:nponentr.: payments 
to Chilean factors of pr"Jduction smployed in mining, payments for local 
intermediate products .::nd services, :md investment expenditures. The two 
latter groups will subsequently form o:1e r,roup called "other expenditures". 
Chilean economists anc1 politicians alilze hBve, for more than half a 
century, used the term "retornos 11 to desr.ribe the part of export revenues 
returned to the economy. The Economic Commission for Latin America pro-
ceeded to calculate hoth the simple and "returned revenue i; terms of trade, 
See Antecedentes sobre el cesarrollo de la Economia Chilena (Santiago, Chile: 
1
Boleti~ Num. 21. 773, Sena<lo, ~- cit., p. 2, and Annex, p. 10. See also 






t2e latter one takin0 into account the changing share of copper revenues 
acc:.:-uing to Chile. Accordinc; to this study, the simple terms of trade 
changed - with 1937 as a base year - from 102.2 in 1923 to 53.3 in 194~ to 
101. l.,, in 1952. In contrast, the !!returned revenue n terms of trade rose 
/ 
from 95.O in 1928 to 102.3 in 1944, to a spectacular 252.0 in 1952. Anibal 
Pinto also discusses the 11 foreign-national revenue 11 issue in terms of nominal 
relative prices between exports and imports, which do not consider the inter­
country distribution of factor and other payments, and real relative prices, 
which reflect the changin.z participation of the country in the nominal 
value of copper. 1 The ECLA findings have been confirmed by the most recent 
,irnc: systematic disaggregative study of the copper sector I s nreturned revenue 11 
problem by Clark Reynolds. Reynolds, who has translated the term "retornos" 
as 11 returned value", also concludes that the deterioration of the barter tei.."1TIS 
of trade was more than offset, up to 1954, by the improvement in the 11returned 
2
value" terms of trade. 
The analysis of the net foreign exchange contribution is complementary 
l -' 
See Anibal Pinto Santa Cruz, Chile, Un Caso de Desarrollo Frustrado, 
(Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, s. A., 1962), p. 118. 
2 see c. Reynolds, Copper, Essays, pp. 201-350. As the reader may have 
noticed I have here t.:-ans lated the term 11 :.:-etornos rr by "returned revenue" 
,_•ather than the Reynolds term 11returned value 11 • The reasons are the 
following. The 11 retu:cns" to Chile include copper value added by Chilean 
factors of production as •1ell as ~ local expenditures by the sector. 
Fu~thermore, some local intermediate product expenditures have an import 
component, which Hould have to be deducted from the "returns" to determine 
the true overall "returned value", an element which is difficult to deter­
11 11mine. The use of the te:(m revenue , instead of that of "value 11, avoids 
the otherwise unfounded impression that the 11returned valuen refers 
di;:ectly to copper facto:.:· payments and that the indirect foreign expendi­
ture component has been deducted for all steps of sectoral value added. 
Finally, £rem the efficiency point of view, it makes a difference whether 
11:ceturned revenue" rises th:cough higher factoT payments in mining or highe:..· 
local intermediate p:::-oduct expenditures an-:l therefore tHo subconcepts 
should be devised. 
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to the over-analyzed problem of terms of trade. I believe that it shifts 
the emphasis back i1here it belongs, that is to the absolute, rather than 
relative, gains of Chile ~rom the copper sector's growth. As regards the 
copper sector in Chile, the terms of trade issue is intimately connected 
to the distribution of copper resources between Chile and the rest of the 
wol:'ld. It tends to neglect the growth issue which coincides with the dis­
tribution issue only within a range. 
The notion of the net foreign exchange contribution goes beyond the 
11returned revenue II terms of trade issues. It takes into account the 
relative price movement betueen exports ancl imports; it focuses attention 
on both the changing ratio between national and foreign factor payments 
and the changing ratio between national and foreign intermediate product 
expenditures - that is, the intercountry resource distribution problem, and 
finally makes grouth thz main issue by pointing out that the absolute 
amount of resources released by the coppel:' sector of Chile can be inversely 
related - over the long :cun - to the relative (share) amount of resources 
released. 
As already mentioned, the gross differs from the net foreign exchange 
contribution because of the foreign and national components of the sector's 
e,q,enditures. We now proceed to analyze this point more carefully since it 
creates most frictions betueen Government and Companies. 
Copper e~enditures have two components; income payments and other. 
The category "othel:' 11 includes all 11 intermediate 11 expenditures and, some­
times, investment. Both types of expenditu;:es have 11 £oreign 11 and Chilean 
components. Symbolically, these cornpo'l.ents are shoun in the folloHing 
id.entity: 
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(4. 0) E : Y + 0 = (Y + 0 ) + (Y f + 0 f)
C C C en en C C 
uhere, E, stands fo:· expenditure, Y, for factor payments, O, for other pay­
ments, and the subscripts c, r., and, f, for copper, national and foreign 
respectively, 
In the statistical eppendb: we have calculated two versions of the net 
fo::eign exchange co::ttribucion, The first version, 1 to be referred to as 
Type A, is equal to the su~ of taxes paid in Chile (T), the legal cost of 
production (L), and miscell.sneous local payments (0). That is, the net 
foreign exchange contribution is equal to: 
Y +O =T+L+O en en 
whe.:-e Y = T + L, and 0 = o. en en 
The second version, to be referred to as Type B, includes in addition, 
the value of investment (I). In this version O = 0 + I. 
en 
The items normally excluded from the 11 returned revenue" and "net 
foreign exchange contribution" concepts are repatriated profits (including 
" 
in.terest payments) C'fi), deduced amortization (depreciation) (A), and 
1Both my notion of a net foreign exchange contribution as ·well as the 
Chilean one of retornos (returned revenue or value) have been subject to 
erroneous statistical measurement. The item creating difficulties is 
"other foreign expenditu:...·es 11 • From the conceptual viewpoint these con­
sist of revenues returned to Chile and subsequently spent for imports. 
The special status of large scale copper mining eliminates the steps 
involving o sale of foreign exchange to the Central Bank and subsequent 
repurchase for necessary imports. But this technicality does not justify 
the Central Bank's procedure of excluding such foreign expenditures from 
the "retorr10s 11 ; neithe:: cioes it make Reynolds I calculation of "returnee 
value" or mine of the"net :foreign exchange contribution" theoretically 
invulnerable, Although the net foreign exchange contribution has been 
calculated here in a version that excludes nforeign expenditures" of 
the copper sector, these foreign expenditures are incorporated into the 
balance of payments statistics and analysis elsewhere in the author's 
monograph on the Chilean economy. 
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As already pointed out, there exists no~ p~i~E_~ theoreti~al justification 
for not including the iter.1 :;ex;:;·endj i:,_:n,::; outside Chile as part of the 
retornos". 1 
Before we proceed uith -:-:he d~1;:cust;ior: of the majo:· theoretical issues 
surrounding the net foreig:.1 exchange contrib1..1':ion. we µau.s':! for a moment to 
present a summary of the relevant stat.is :ical infort::ation. 
Tab~.e 2 
Net Foreign Exchanp;e Contribution of T.ar,o;e-Scale Copper 
_Minin~ (in Millions -of u. S. $) · 
(Excluding Value of In-✓ e s tment) (Includir,g Value of Investment) 
Current 'l.961 Constant Current 1961 Constant 
First 
P:dces--- ---2.E.+-~~- Pric1~s ..-~---- Prices 
Period: 1930-39 
Total 172. 5 ,'!-01. 3 181:.. £.. 428. 0 
Average 17,3 L:.O. J. 18 I,. ~- L:-2. 8 
Second 
Period: 1940-54 
Total 1399,3 1838, 0 1560. 2 2027.6 
Average 93,3 122.:: 101'.J.. 0 135. 2 
Third 
Pe:.:iod: 1955-64 
Total 1873. 0 1899,3 2113, 7 2ll:-2, L} 
Average 167.3 189.9 211. l:. 2ll:.• 2 
Source: ApJenc1ix Tables A and B. 
1 see the discussion in the preceeding footnote. 
-,...... _, 
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The foreign exchange contribution has been calculated with and t·1ithout 
the value of investment, and in current and constant prices. 
The net foreign exchange contribution shm-,s a marked rise between the 
First and Second Periods as well as between the Second and Third. The size 
of the contribution is higher by around ten pe:r cent for the last two 
Periods and by around five per cent during the First Period if investment 
is included. To a large elctent, this rise reflects improvements in relative 
copper prices rather than increases in physical output. 
The ne:ct step :ts to introduce some majo.: issues related to the net 
foreign exchange contribution along t·Jith the statistical evidence available 
uith respect to its various components. Although ue will thus discuss the 
importance and behavior of the "legal cost of production" and miscellaneous 
local expenditures, the discussio·ri of taxes uill be postponed until the 
next section, 
Chile's social uelfare function ~wuld suggest an explicit interest 
in maximizing the bracket (Y + O ). The alternatives open to a policyen en 
maker interested in maximizing the net foreign exchange contribution.depend 
on the time horizon considered. Obviousl~ in the short-run the most 
efficient strategy for mmcimizing Y + 0 is to adopt measures increasingen en 
its share in total revenue; over a slightly lon~er run, uhen chan3es in 
output are feasible, maxjmization of Y -:- 0 uould be a by-product of en en 
::1aximizing total copper revenues. The conflict between short-term and 
long-term objectives stems from the undisputed fact that a short-run maxir,:mm 
of Y + 0 /E can cause a less than optimum long-run value of Y -:- 0en en c en en 
There must exist, nevertheless, a value - or a ;:an3e of values - fm: 
(Y f/E ) that gives e 1i1axi.i1um long-run value: of Y + 0 •c c en en 
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The aforementioned problem arises because a sectoral expansion cannot 
be achieved unless minimum profit incentives are offered, and, in addition, 
unless foreign companies are permitted to repatriate an adequate dollar 
i:eturn on their investee: capital, For the G:can Nineria, the issue has been 
aluays related to repatriation of an adequate amount of dollar profits to the 
United States. 
The "denationalization11 of the copper industry, ,;-1hich followed the 
f 
'c industry's takeover by the Guggenhe·:.m and later Xennecott and Anaconda 
interests, has been the factor that led to the conflict between the p:dvate 
foreign interests and ~te Chilecn interests; Machiavello Varas, wno 
lamented this denational:Lzation in the earJ.y tuenties, was among the first 
to express the desire to 11 nationalize ;\:he S8ctor, that ifl return copper 
ounership to Chileans. 
1 
- Varas I concept of nationali::;ation coincides ,-1ith 
the Christian~Democratic concept of Chilenization but differs radically from 
the leftist concept of 11natio~alization 11, that is confiscation and expropriation 
of the foreign-ounecl operations. 
The Chilean government 1 s strategiei=:, if t:1e assortment of conflicting 
actions and inertia can be called a strateg~ have increasingly ai~ed 
touards raising the coppe:c sector I s ne:: foreign exchange contribution. 
During the First Pe::ioc1, the ::i.et foreigI' exchange contribution (Type B) 
only twice - in 1930 and 1931 exceeded :!:ifty pe:r cent of production value; 
<luring two years it amounte0 to less than tuenty-five per cent of the value 
of production, uith the :;.·emaining seventy- ave per cent flouing into fo:ceign 
factor and other pByments, 'Tbs ststistical infoi.·mation fo:~ this pccioc'. is 
1santiago l'lacchiavello Va:cas: op. cit., pp. 1-200 
1 
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incomplete in that it does not permit an accu:cate distinction among the 
:forei,:;n expenditu:.:e flcus, Scme evente are, nevertheless, clearly disce:cnible 
a:1:l um:th noting. Even :i.n 1939 the absolute ,,ia~nitude of the net fo:cei:;n 
exc~1ange contribution only slightly exceeded the 1930 magnitude; investment 
di~ not recover its 1930 level even in 1939 - causing the Type B contribution 
to 1:ecover less :;:apidly than Type A; proc~uction and 11 retu:cned revenue" 
u;.1.den-Jent a cycle, uhich has 1932 as its trough, and subsequently rose 
mildly but without a concu,::.:-ent investment booE1; i:1ith the exception of 
1932 and 1933, the Ar.1erican companies enjoyed a positive flou of profits, uhich, 
:fo:: the 1935-39 period ($269. 9 million in 1961 prices), exceeded by arouncl 
ten per cent the con·esponding flm1 of 11returnecl :cevenue 11 ($249. 7 million in 
constant prices); finally, during most of the years, the "legal cost of 
production" contributed as much as ninety per cent of the "returned revenue". 
The copper sector maintained its privileged status as a foreign enclave 
du::ing this period of severe crisis of the Chilean economy. 
The Second Period provides a fascinating contrast to the First: the 
net foreign exchange contribution rises steadily (both Type A and B), both 
in absolute and relative te:i.'"lns; only tuice does it, for either type, fall 
below fifty per cent of production value ancl in 1953 surpasses it by an 
incredibly high percentage - thirty per cent for Type A and fifty per cent 
for Type B. In other uords :3overnment policy succeeds in raising the 
copper sector's net forei3n exchan3e contribution above the gross one by 
1almost fifty per cent. ';)hile during the First Period the difference between 
the gross and net foreign exchange contribution tended to be enormous and 
1
See Columns 9 and 10 from Table F, 
) 
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relatively stable, during the Second this difference not only steadily 
shrinks towards zero but even becomes negative for the years already men­
tioned. Chile's policy seems to consist in bringing the "returned revenue 
11 
as close as possible to the value of production and is so successful that 
it practically kills the goose that lays the 3olden eggs: quantity produced 
declines between 19L:.L;. and 1954-, 
1 and the gross availability effect and 
2
3;:·oss foreign exchan3e contribution are completely stagnant. 
Nay we further note the follouing developments underlying the net 
foreign exchange contribution durin3 the Second ':eriod. The relative 
ir.1portance of the "legal cost of production" rises and stabilizes at a level 
of approximately forty per cent of the value of p~oduction. Since this 
item accounts for such a high share of the net foreign exchange contribution 
it cieserves a more careful examination. 
Table 3 
Le~al Cost of Production 





Total 136. 9 319.8 
Average 13. 7 32.0 
Second 
Period: 19l,0-5L:-
Total 796. 9 · 1068. 3 
Average 53.1 71. 2 
Third 
Period: 1955-6L:. 
Total 861.3 867.2 
Average 06.1 86. 7 
Source: Appendix Tables A and B, 
1 see Historical Statistics of Chile, 1840-1965, ~· cit., Table titled 
"Production of Gran :Hineria ". 
2This is true if the value of production is r!easurcc~ in 1961 constant prices. 
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This item has tuo ma_:j or ccmpcncnts: pu::c:12ses of intermediate goods and 
services uithin the country and 1.·emunerntion of t!age and salary earners. 1 
As the figures of Table 3 illustrote, the pe~ Rnnun dollar v2lue of 
the legal cost of production more tb3n doubl2s durin3 the period of dis-
c:dmination (1940-5lf) as compared uith the c1ecade of the 1930 1s. The 
~igidity in the forei3L exchange rate and the accelerating internal infla­
tion are perhaps the most important factors contributing to this rise. The 
m2tional accounts info:i..-mation availrible to us 2 indicates that, fo;: 1950-60, 
the expenditures on intermediate goods and services, Hhich account for an 
average of 15. 9 per cent of rroduction value, have been the nost important 
3 
component of the legal cost o±: production; Ha3es anci salaries account, 
2 
(continued from preceedin::; ~age) The value of production (Table B, Column 1) 
rose from $198. 3 million in 1940 to a maximum of $211-6. 0 million in 191.:G and 
declined for the rest of the period. The gross availability effect has an 
average value of $200.3 million uith no underlying upHard trend. (See 
Ta::ile B, Column 1, bottom). 
1
1n Chile a very sharp distinction is made amon3 blue and uhite-collar uorkers, 
the former ones being called obreros and the latter ones empleados. The 
enpleados have succeeded, through social anc1 similar legislation, to occupy 
a p.:-ivileged position in terms of unemployment, pension, health, family 
allm·1ance and similar benefits. 
2 
see Appendbc Tables E and F. Even thou8h the national accounts information 
presented in the Appendix ::arely coincides i'Jith the primary information 
presented in Tables A and B (the differences, i1hich are high during 1950-55; 
are reduced markedly durin8 1956-60), quite frequently because of differ­
ences in methodolog~ there exists no reason to question the validity of 
the relative importance of the components of the production account of the 
fo~eign copper enterprises. 
3
The COUFO estimate of the legal cost of production persistently falls short 
of the figure given by the American Companies, the Central Bank and the Depart­
mento de Cobre - sor.1etimes, as in 1953, by one hundred per cent. This case 
provides a vivid example of the difficulties encountered in estimating na­
tional income in an economy that undergoes :.:apid inflation, uhere there exists 
a system of multiple exchange rates, uhere statistical information is not 
made irn@ediatedly available, and the use of different dollar-peso conversion 
rates can give rise to stron3 differences in the estimates of the components 
of value added and intermediate expenditu:ces. i.-.iy guess is that the lack of 
uniformity in conversion ::..·ates is the main factor causing the discrepancies 
mentioned earlier. 
I 
during the same period, for as littl::- as 10. 7 per cent of the value of 
production; and social security coacributions amount to around 2 per cent. 
Since an underestimate of the ,vage b:Ll 1. in the natiortal accounts is very 
likely, we can reasonably assume thac fifty per cent of the legal cost of 
production is value added in m~.ning ,.md the r2st intermediate expenditures. 
BetNeen 1950-60, around 25-30 per cent o::: the 11returned revenue" was uti­
lized to cover such intermediate expenditu.:es. 
Concerning the 81::Cond Period we can make the following concluding 
rema.:ks. The copper sector ,;•1as sup:iressed :Jc cording to two criteria: 
as a consequence of the cvervalu;,:ticn of the peso the ':alue of. production, 
"returned revenue 11, and nat:ton2::. value add'"c in mining, as expressed in 
escudos, have been underestfo:&ted by a me:rc;in risin::; from 22 per cent, in 
1
19l:.0, to 200 per cen 1.-, :i.rt 19L:.8, to 492 per cent :i.n 1952 ; furthermore, 
it has been suppressed ::.n the· sense thrt overt and hidden taxation have 
forced it to release to Ch~le c percentage value of resources exceeding 
any normal yardstick. The statistics provide eloquent support. Returned 
revenue rose in 1953 to an a11-t5.me, ;rnd never forgotten, high of 147 per 
2 
cent of production value; repatriated profit~ declined from $68.8 million 
in 1940, to $44. 8 m:i.llior in 194l•: .,md to as lo,;r a~ $10. S million in 1953; 
su:;_--prisingly, as a result of the Chi.lex Selph:iric plant installed in 
Chuquicarnata, investment experiencea ,, sudden spurt at the peak of dis-
1 see the last column of Appendix Table M-
2see Column 3 of Table 13, Still, ::..t should be noted, that profits remain 
highly respectable between 194-0 and 1948,. and average t,;•1enty per cent of 
production value for the period c1s a ,·Jhole ($L}l. 9 million of yearly profits 
out of $200.3 million yearly sales). 
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1
c:::imination between 194-9 and 1953. Finally, government, in addition to 
artificially reducing the sector's contribution to the country's income 
by overvaluating the exchange rate, neglected to establish an investment 
policy. The government's major aici. apparently uas discrimination of the 
foreign capitalists, and reduction of their share in value added; although 
t:1is objective ,-,as pursued i:1ith a relative success, if the share of foreign 
.f income in total value added is used as a criterion; foreign capitalists 
seern to have escaped with relative few scars, if the return on invested 
ca?ital is used as a criterion. It was the copper sector that became ulti-
,nately the major victim. 
Thus, in its treatment of the copper sector during the first tuo 
?erio0s government shifted from one extreme policy, i.e. complete freedom, 
to another, i. e, every possible discrimination short of confiscation. 
Jju::ing the Third Period) government veered touard a compromise middle-0£­
the-road policy. Tax rates Here reduced, the foreign exchange rate, uhich 
betueen 1940 and 1952 uas fixed at 12 pesos for one dollar, followed more 
closely internal price movements, and depreciation allmrnnces became more 
liberal. 
As a result of the Hew Deal policies the Type A net foreign exchange 
contribution rose to $109. ~ million per annum, and Type B to $214. 2 million. 
Dui."'ing the Third Period sot,1e striking differences arise as compared to the 
Second Period. The contribution, though, on the average higher, is stagnant, 
uhile during the Second Pe;:-iod it had been rising. Three interpretations 
1 
-Fo 0~ a detailed, but not altogether objective, discussion of copper invest-
,:i.ent during 1950-60, see 11ario Vera Valenzuela, La Politica Economica del 
Coore, C?.P...• cJ_t., pp. 129-138. 
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can be given for this stagn.,ition. One, that, for the contribution to be 
uaintained at the high levels of the Second Period, Chile had to, as it did, 
give an increasing share of 3.ross revenue to the fo:i:-eign capitalists; had 
it not done so both gross and r•et contributions l!oul::1 have declined. The 
other, that, the American entrepreneurs had to be given a ten-year 
;;breathing spell" to recover and subsequently boost both the gross and 
net contribution, And a thi::d, the leftist, Ly Ma.:io Vera,· that stagnation 
of the net foreign exchange contribution was predictable because there 
e~dsts no response of the Ccrnpanies to bette:;__· treatment other than a 
hi3ber level of profit repat;:-iation, 
If the government's policy during the Third Period was one of indirectly 
auguenting the net, through a profit-induced increase in the gross foreign 
exchange contribution, it has admittedly not been very successful. Chile 
did :celease an increasing share of the copper resources for nforeign uses" 
but in a new pattern. Yearly repatriated profits (average) rose to $47.3 
million as compared to $.!:.l, 3 during the Second Period; but, most important, 
nou they were sizable ancl stable, while previously they had been declining 
ovez- time, dwindling to almost zero in 1953, 1-Ioreover, legal provisions 
for accelerated depreciation, and the investor's desire for immediate 
capital recovery, boosted the average annual amortization levels frore $7.9 
million during the Second to $17.3 million during the Third Period. Expendi­
tu~es outside Chile, unexpectedly, more than quadrupled in comparison to 
the previous Period. In :.:-etu-rn for all this comparatively favorable 
treatment the exhausted Potrerillos mine is replaced by the El Salvador, 
but little further new investment comes forth. 
The overall picture tlrnt emerges is one where the net foreign exchange 
contribution is strongly affected by the changing pattern of the three 
external flows, that ic ar,10::tization, repat,.-iated p:cofits, and expenses 
ab:coad. The Companies appea:...· uilling, since 1955, to accept "normal n 
profits in exchange for 1ldgb 11 depreciation allm?ances, and also accept, 
for their operational expenditures, a rathe;..· rigid "buy national policy11 
in return for more favo:cable foreign exchange rates. 
:•Je proceed next to t:,e government revenue contributi:m of the coppe;:-
sector. 
3, The government revenue contributio~-io It is the tax contribution 
of the copper sector that has attracted the Chilean Government's most 
explicit and persistent attention. Government recognized that the G:..-an 
1-lineria
/ 
possessed, as a result of its high productivity, a nsurplus 11 that 
could be appropriated for either current or capital expenditures; however, 
aost of this vast resource surplus was trans £erred, up to the early 19L:.0 I s, 
to the American owner-capitalists. In attempt to change this pattern -detr:i.­
mental to Chile, the Govern@ent embarked into a policy of gradually divert­
in3 this"resource flou abroad 11 from the United States towards Chile. This 
policy coincided uith the establishment of the Chilean Development Corpora-
tion, inauguration of a direct public investment policy in all sectors, 
and uas definitely stimulated by the persistent balance of payments crisis. 
The major instruments usecl in pursuing this goal 1-Je:..-e the foreign exchange 
rate and direct taxation. 
Analyzed in the present section is only that part of the process of 
11resource release 11 out of mining which is :i:elated to government revenues. 
The discussion of the "resource allocation processi 1 and the use of resources 
£";)]?1."opriated by government :i.[. found in the last section of the essay. 
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The Government-Company game centered around "mining surplus" and it 
involved its partition between the Chilean Government, on one side, and 
the American Companies and Government on the other. The Government's inter­
est has been eloquently pointed out in the 1965 Senate hearings: 1 
"The resources which the State receives as a result 
of copper sales amount only to 14.8% of the total in­
comes with which the State counts to cover its expendi­
tures." Senado, P• 1. 
"This incidence is larger, if only the capita 1 budget is 
considered, to the financing of which are destined 
by law the resources received from copper exports, and 
amounts to 32.5 per cent of the entries available for 
investment expenditures. 11 Senado, p. 1. 
The revenue contribution has an explicit and an implicit component. 
The explicit contribution is composed of the various taxes paid to govern­
ment which are explicitly recorded in its budgets. These taxes can be 
further subdivided into income taxes and surtaxes. Government has used 
three types of income taxes as instruments in increasing the revenue 
contribution: explicit income, explicit extraordinary income taxes, 
and explicit taxes earmarked for particular projects. We define as im­
plicit revenue contribution the tax pcJid to government as a result of 
sale of foreign exchange at an overvalued rate. This contribution is zero 
whenever there exists no overvaluation of the peso. It is referred to as 
an "implicit" contribution because, even though it exists, it is rarely 
entered as a revenue (and expenditure) in the government's budget. The 
implicit revenue contribution also has two components, one direct and 
another indirect. The direct implicit revenue contribution is defined as 
the amount of resources released to government as a result of the govern-
The relative importance of mining taxes has declined over time and the 
figures mentioned in these hearings under-estimate its earlier importance. 
Furthermore, these revenues have been consistently under-estimated due to 
overvaluation of the Chilean currency. 
1
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ment 's policy of buying dollars from the Gran Miner{~ at a low exchange 
;_·ate and selling them to L,porters at a high ,:-ate. Furthermore, the in-
ca,:-ect implicit revenue coi1tribution is defined as the amount of resources 
released to government above and beyond those released due to the direct 
one as a result of its pol~cy of buyin0 dollars at an overvalued exchange 
rate and selling them at an overvalued rate. In other ,-10rds, the direct 
implicit component is measu;:-ed by the difference between the buying and 
selling rate, and the i.idL·ect implicit component by the difference betueen 
the selling and pa·rity rates. If government buys a dollar from an American-
ouned company in retu:rn fo;:- twelve pesos, and sel:!.s this dollar to an im-
porter for 30 pesos, uhen the parity exchange rate is 50 pesos for one 
dolla~ the direct contribution io equal to lC pesos per dollar traded 
(30 minus 12) and the incH::ect iraplicit revenue contribution is equal to 
20 pesos per ciollar tradeC (50 minus 30). The combined implicit contribu­
tion is equal to 38 pesos per dollar traded (50 ,.linus 12). 
Symbolically, these statements car.. be p;:-esented as follous: 
(5. 0) T = T + T . 
c ce ci 
,;-7he:ce, T, stands fo;:- taxes, c, fo;:- copper, ai.1d, e, ano, i, for explicit 
and implicit respectively. This identity measures the tocal resource re­
lease of the mining sector to government. Furthermore, explicit copper 
taxes are sub<livided into income taxes (T.J and su,:-taxes (T ), that is, 
.L s 
(5. 1) T = T +T 
ce :c s 
arw, the implicit are subdivided into direct (Tf) and indirect ones (Tg
) : 
(5. 2) T . = Tf -:- T • 
Cl. G 
In the remaining part of this section ue will present the statistical 
evi~ence available concerning this contribution and discuss its evolution 
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in ,:elation to grouth. 
A summa:ry of the exp~_icit revenue cont:,_·ibution, excluding surtaxes, is 
presentetl in Table f. 1 Ao can be easily obae:cved that durin3 the First 
Pe;_•iod this contribution is incredibly lm;; lack of any positive action 
leads to a resource ~elease to gov~rnraent of only 5.8 per cent (on the 
average) of the value of p:.:och1 ction. This tax floH, of $8. 1 million 
annually, compares unfavo:cably i·lith the p;:ofit income floH abroad as 
measu:ced by the $30. 5 r,1ill:i.on annual repatriated profits. If ve assume 
that half of these repatriated profits accrued to the United States Govern-
rneP..t in the form of corporate p:cofits, the annual r;surplus" flm·1ing to the 
United States Government, being around $15 fL1illion, is a little more than 
2
double the "mining su:cplus 11 contributed to the Chilean Gove:cnrnent.' 
Table l;. 
Explicit Government Revenue Contribution of Large-Scale Copper i-.1iniu~ 
(In millions u. ~ $) ·-
Explicit Taxes Paid in Chile Excludine 
Surtaxes 
Current 1961 Constant 
Prices Prices 
First 
Pei•iod: 1930-39 Total 35.5 80.3 
.Avera2;e l:-. 6 8. 1 
Second 
Pe:dod: 19l~0-5L:. Total l:-28. 5 557.9 
Average 23.6 37. 0 
ThL·c1 
Period: 1955-6li- Total 909. 1 929.9 
Ave::-age 90. 9 92. ~ 
Note: The magnitude of explicit taxes paid during the 19l:.0-5l:. 
pe:ciod, in constant prices, rises from $37. 0 to l:-9. 7 mil­
lion if miscellaneous local expenditures are included. 
Source: Appendix Tables A and B. 
1
Table Li- includes income and other taxes excluding 11 surtaxes". 
2
To the extent that these Anerican companies :received credit from the United 
States Government fo:r taxes paid in Chile, the mining surplus acczuin~ to 
this government uould be smaller. 
- L;.G -
Early <lu:i:ing the ~:0.conc: Period, and fo:.: the reasons already r,1entionec.1, 
3ove:.:nment proceeded '!:o appropriate a larger s:iare of tbe 11surplus II p::e-
viously enjoyed by the .Ane:_·ican owners. Gove:..:nment suddenly developecl a 
keen inte:.:est in raising the copper secto~•s ta~ contribution anf proceeded 
to use all the tools available in its arsenal to ac~ieve this goal, The 
tax legislation and revenue contribution bear a □p!e evidence of this chan3e. 
Beginning in 1939, one tax afte:~- anothe!: has been imposed on copper 
r'ining. ['ome, clearly ctesi3ned to bit only the .Anerican-ouned large-scale 
. "" . ' t Tl 1· .. . t l 1copper mines, uere c-1sc:t1.rn1na ory. 1e exp 1c1·c 1nccme axes Here comp e-
mented by the explicit e~:t:-..·,w:c0inary income tax.es, ~~-
') 
nnd, once the Chilean 
:C,evelopment Corporation uas established, by the taxes earmarked :for special 
3 uses. 
1
'Ihe copper mines ue,:e fi:...-st affected by the L:-th category tax established 
in Lau No. 6. L:-57, of January 1940, imposin3 a 9% tax on the net tax income 
cle::-ived fror,1 mining or me;:allurgical activities. According to the same 
Lau Ho. 6. '-:-57, an additional 6% tax on profits, sales, or investment in 
c:1ile was imposed on ther.1 as being incorporated outside Chile. A 3% su:c­
charge on both earlie~ texes was introduced in December 194L by Lau No. 
7. ll:.S, uhich inL·oducec1 modifications of Lau no. 6. 457. In Janua:.:y E)l:.l:., 
L,n Ho, 7. 750 established an additional tax, fo:c tuo years, of 1% fo:..· the 
ta:~ of the '-:-th cate[;ory anc: another of 1% for the additional tax. Most of 
the subsequent laHs referring to the explicit income taxes, either extended 
t:1e validity of these earlier laus or converted the additional taxes into 
:..·egular ones. 
2 
T1~e e:rplicit ext~aordinary taxes, which cDnnot be easily distinguished f::om 
the earlier categor~ t~re mainly two. In January of 194Z Law No, 7.160 
established an extraordina,:y copper tex of 50% upon the increased taxable 
iucome realized, by the companies that produce copper in bars, as a result 
of a11y increase in sale price over the basic pricen fixed by the same lau. 
A fu:.:-the:.: extrao:cdinary tm~ of 30% on top of the existing income taxes on 
mining, which uere to be paid in the second semester of 195£:., was imposed 
on August 1'-:, 195l:., by Lau Ho. 11. 575 • 
., 
.JAccording to Lau Ho. 6. 33l: of April lS:39, uhich established the Chilean 
Development Corpo:cation, end uas subsequently amplified by Law Ho. 6. 6'-:-0 
of 19l,1, the Ai-tle,:ican Coppe:c· cor:ipanies ba0 to pay a surcharge of 12% ove:..· 
t:1e tax of the '-rth cate3ory, and one of 3% over t~1e additional to zo 
directly to the Corporation 1 s budget. 
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Surtaxes Here imposed only for a relatively sLort period, startin0 in 
1951 anc up to 1955, uhcn Lau No. 10. 003 declared a surtax, of 3 cents 
per pound, equal to the price increase enjoyed by the copper companies 
since Nay 8, 1951. These surtaxes, uhich a;~e disguised in the Appendix 
Tables under the itera miscellaneous local expenditures, account for this 
itEn I s spectacular rise during the 1952-55 pe:dod. 
The i□pact of this naze of tax le8islation on the minine; sector's 
tax contribution uas spectacular. The importance of taxes paid in Chile, 
1
plus miscellaneous local payments, - fo,: the 1952-5l:. period as a pezcentage 
of the value of procluctio;:i (aluays expressed in 1901 constant prices) rose 
f:,_·oc ll. 5 ,er cent, in 1939, to ll;.. 0 pe:c _cent, in l9l}O, to 22. 5 :)e:: cent iu. 
19l:G, to L:-9. 9 per cent ir: 1S52, an all tittle hich of 63. 5 per cent ii:1 1953, 
to finally fall to 33.6 pe~ cent in 1954. The closing years of the Second 
Pe:~·iod, during ~Jhich the happiness of the Chileans and the unhappiness of 
the Americans in the coppe;.: sector were rising as Hell as matching each 
other, vere as unusual as the earlier laissez-faire years. Both situations 
could hardly reflect a long-run optimum civision of the "surplus II since one 
party uas .aluays takin3 "too much 11 • 
During the Third Period, thQ average annual revenue contribution rose 
uell above that of the previous period to $92. 9 million; still, as a 
pe·,:centa~e of total 1·eve1rn£s, it fluctuated only around 25-30 per cent. 
L: Table 5 we p1.·esent tbe sc:::_:,lus that acc;:ued to sovernment on a ;;lobal 
and per employee basis, 
These local payments ue1·e composed almost totally of the 3 cent per pounC: 




l'!lnl.Df; Surplus Ace ruin''. to Government. 
(1>50-1960, Current Prices) 
1
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of US$) 28.0 35. l 69. l: 1:3. 2 51. 1 1J7. 3 79. 9 '~ •"\~,o, V JC~, /,C ~-.- .... 0 -~ 51. 5 
Source: The global su::plus bas been calculated by a,:dtn~ :.:o t<1xes ::,,=lie: 
in Chile, as these appea:.: ii.1 Appendix Table A, r:1isceEaneous local ex•· 
penclitures for 1950-55, as appearing in t:1e came table. Tbt::1, Chis global 
su::plus uas dividec:i by the number of employees ::;iv2n in tl18 tJb:;.<:: :tef'el::dn3 
to the direct ernployT,1ent contribution and t:1e pe:i.· enp~_oyec surplus uas 
obtained. 
The implicit component of tile copper secto;· 1 s ta·.~ co·:1tribu;:ion pJ.ayec: 
also an important :::-ole in sl1aping the Gove:r::1me:1.t-G:r2n E~.ne~·ir:, rc::..at:i.ons 
and in affecting grouth. .As already mentioned, r,ny deviat:l.cn u£ t:he 
Company foreign exchange :.:ate from the purchasins po,;er parity rate gives 
,:ise to implicit taxes. For the Chilean copper i ri.dustry, it has been 
argued, implicit taxes developed as a result of chron:.i'.r.: inflatiol"'. since 
1939, plus a general rigidity of foreign exchange rates, ~,1d the mult:.ple 
exchange rate system. 
In order to measure, albeit not very accurately, this implicit tax 
cont:ribution \·1e have made use of four foreign exchange rates, Fi:cst of 
all, ue calculated a purchasing power parity exchange rate among the 
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dollar and peso by multiplying the official foreign exchange rate for 1928 
1 . · · d l Tb. .by t~e percentage variation inthe cost of 1v1ng 1n ex. _13 series, 
presented in Appendix T2ble i-1, Column I, will be referred to in the future 
as the parity rate, 
Second, we will use the foreign exchan0e rate employed by CORFO in its 
estimates of the national accounts. This series, which is a weighted ave:L"­
age of the various export and import rates, is presented in Appendix Table 
N, Column 1. It will henceforth be referred to as the CORFO rate. Third, 
l·7e have used the so-called Cbilex and Andex rates which reflect the rates 
at uhich the respective companies have been converting dollars into local 
2cu:;:rency. 
The indirect implicit tax contribution, which is determined by the 
general degree of overvaluation of the Chilean currency, is measured by 
the difference between the parity and CORFO rates. The direct implicit 
o:..1e, which is determined by the overvaluation of the pesos purchased by 
t~1e companies over an.:i above the general overvaluation, is measured by the 
difference between the CORFO and Chile:c-Ances (Company):cate. The total 
ii.11plicit contribution i.s, obviously, measured by the difference betueen 
the parity and Company rates. 
He proceed next to ::eview the statistical evidence. During the First 
Period, the Chilean peso is under-valued as compared to 1928. The parity 
rate is below both the Company and the CORFO rates, with the Company rate 
11n the appendix we present two such parity rates, one obtained by using the 
December to December cost of living changes, and another taking the differ­
ences beti·1een annual averages. There is no indication that use of the 
wholesale price index uouid have markedly changed the results. 
2
The relevant time series information is presented in Appendix Table M, 
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standing between the other tHo. The undervaluation increased slowly 
reaching a peak in 1936, a year in which the "implicit subsidy" received 
by Chilex amounted to 67.3 per cent and that received by Andes to 66.5 per 
cent of the parity rate; the undervaluation, which was smaller for the 
copper exporters than the Chilean importers, was reduced over the ;:-est of 
the period but never fell to zero. Thus, even though the American 
copper companies :received a smaller "implicit subsidy" than importers, 
which has been occasionally construed as discrimination, the generally held 
vieu that they were confronted with overvalued exchange rates for the peso 
finds no empirical support and is unfounded. The implicit subsidies pre-
vailing during the First Period :caised the ,:foreign income and expenditu::e" 
1flmw and adversely affected the 'Lreturne<i revenue" component. 
The peso remained undervalued until 19l:-5 uhen, as a result of the 
relative rigidity of the official exchange rate and domestically rising 
p:dces, the C0RF0 and the parity rates were brought to equality. The 
conversion of the t,·JO :rates has been, except for the already mentioned 
factors, accidental rather than a product of an intentional governmental 
policy. 
During the years follm·1ing 19li-5, the foreign exchange rate was effect­
ively used as a discriminatory device against the Companies in an effort 
to control inflation anci obtain a larger resource release for Chile. The 
1
The official peso exchange rate fell from Ch. $G = US$1, in 1928, to 
32 = 1 in 1933, to 25 = 1 in 1939. The parity rate, on the other hand, 
gradually fell from an O = 1 relationship, in 1928, to 10.51 = 1 in 1933, 




exchange rate for the Gran Hineria remained constant for a remarkably long 
' 1
period of fifteen years bet't'leen 1937 and 1952; the subsidies implicit in 
the pesb undervaluation were slowly reduced and finally disappeared as the 
parity and Chilex-Andes rates reached equality in 1941-1942. Since then, 
the picture has been rev1::rsed with an inc:ceasing amount of implicit taxes 
being imposed on the large-scale copper sector. 
2 
The parity-Company rate 
difference reached, in 1952, a remarkable level of 83.l per cent of the 
parity rate, "'ld of 491. 6 per cent, of the Company rate. 3 Stated more 
clearly in 1952, the ave.:age importer buying dollars paid approximately 
three times as many pesos per dollar4 as the companies received when selling 
a dollar. 5 The overvaluation of the peso for the companies in 1952 by 83.1 
per cent of the parity rate is the best measure that we can offer for the 
copper sector's global implicit ta,~ contribution, Since it has been impos­
sible to determine the exact r:rngnitudr::: of the direct implicit tax contri­
bution, we can say that the peso contribution has aluays fallen short of the 
real one measured by using the parity rate since 19L:.l-42, The indirect 
implicit component has bee,1. present ever since 19L~l-l1.2. 6 
1The Chilex-Andes rate rem£ined fixed at a level of Ch.$19.37 = u.s.$1. 
2
The rate of peso overvaluci;ion steadily rose from 1942 to 1952. 
3
See Tablet~ Column 6, of the Appendix, 
l•. 
"The CORFO rate uas Ch. $66 = US$1, 
5
'l'be Company rate was Ch. $19 "' US$1. 
6
The degree of overvaluation of the peso to the 4merican copper exporters
diminished in 1953, rose in the three subsequent yea:cs, and then slowly 
fell to its lowest value in 1960. The tendency of the implicit tax con­
tribution to decline, which started in the last years of the Second Per­
iod, continued well into the Third Period, but tended to stabilize. Still, 
it remained substantial. In 1964, l'1hen according to the parity rate an 
exporter should receive E0 L~. 3 for a dollar, both American companies were 
:ceceiving only E0 1. 8. The exchange rate uas, nevertheless, uniform to all 
commodity exporters and specific discrimination had disappeared. 
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It is conceptually very difficult to compare the relative and absolute 
magnitudes of the explicit and implicit tax corttributions. During the 
Second Period both components loomed large and, also, there appeared to be 
a substitutability between the tuo. 
The immediate impact of higher explicit and implicit taxes has been a 
rise in the government revenue and/or the net foreign exchange contribution. 
As a result of the increased share of Chile and its government in the mining 
product and surplus, the uelfare position of both increased. The rise in 
the government's explicit tax revenue increased the amount of resources at 
its disposal, even though t:w persistent gove:.:nment deficits .::;uggest that 
the revenue contribution ,ias ::i.ever "enoug:.1 11 · In the last section of this 
essay~ ,-1e will deal uith the use and direction of 11surplus" appropriated 
by government. In the :remaining paragraphs of t~1e present one v1e will touch 
upon certain "groHth a::,pects" of Lhe impl:icit ta:~ contri.bl~:::io.1, or, of the 
overvaluation. 
Perhaps the most important ef fec 1; of ::,eso overvaluation has been the 
1-rising real cost of local inputs, be it labor -:.ir intermediate products. 
But the rising real cost of labor to the Companies only rarely meant 
higher real wages to the employees since it approximately matched internal 
1nuring the First Periocl, when the peso uas undervalued, the share of the 
legal cost of production's total value declined from 50.3 per cent in 1931, 
to 21.5 per cent in 1935, to 17.9 percent in 1937. During the Second 
Pe:::iod when we moved from an under- to an overvaluation, the relative 
importance of this item rose (Table D, Column 6) from 2l:-. 5 per cent in 
194~ to 38.7 per cent in 194~ 42-1 per cent in 194~ to a peak of 67.0 
per cent in 1953. Overall, the share of labor, as measured by the legal 
cost of production, shm-1s a significant and steady rise during the Second 
Period; and this appears to be directly caused by the rising implicit 
tax contribution. 
1 
inflation. S11ppressio:-. - of copper milling, follm,ing ;:he peso overvaluation, 
led to a contLrning, occasionally violent struggle betueen the American 
employer-capitalists anc~ Chilean employees ir:. 1ihic~1 ec•ch participant aimed 
at maintaining his inco~e share. Joth lost. Labor 1 s increased share in 
dollar value added uas not matched by an increased amount of peso value 
added; 2 and, tJOrse, emplo·yment declined sharply as the profit earners 
3
economized both on laboz and capital. And the profit share declined in 
spite of th.;. employers efforts to keep the uage bill under control. Still 
the profit rate was maintained at a positive, if not always satisfactory, 
level through a policy of minimum investment and capital stock and @aximum 
L,_ 
repatriation of profits. · 
With the copper mininr; sector as a definite and the American Capitalists 
a partial loser, and Chilean labor hardly a uinner, the natural beneficiary 
of this clash-induced suppression of mining should have been government. 
But, even so, government does not seem to have uon ,,1hatever the other 
1suppression has been defined as the state of affai:cs where the value added 
of a sector is belou its natural level, o:c, ,-1hat it would have been l'7ith­
ou·;: government inte;,--vention. The Chilean copper sector uas suppressed 
insofar as its value addeC: in pesos fell short of Hhat it uould have been 
hacl there been no ove:..--valuation of the peso. Since the copper firms 
operated to a large extent in dollars, suppression was first experienced 
insofar as the peso-value added component was concerned, that is, the 
"legal cost of production II component of expenditu:ces. By :ceducing the 
11peso-value added 11 value and permitting a rise in the peso costs, govern­
nent automatically reduced the "dollar-value added" component. This 
aspect has been analyzed already in this essay. 
2We have already noted the.ta major sha:ce of the legal cost of production 
consisted of payments to intermediate products and services. 
3The decline in physical labo:c inputs will be documented in the section on 
employment effect. Professor Chipman has also shoun in an unpublished 
study that copper firms have economized on capital as well. 
l•. 
·see Appendix Table o. 
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;_Jarties lost. T:;,.-ue enough, the share of explicit taxes rose substantially 
betueen 1952 and 1955 (as a result of the surtaxes) but before 195~ this 
share increased far less rapidly than the consecutive mining taxes uould 
1suggest. A number of factors contributed to this. Rising peso ove:.:valu­
ation reduced profits and taxe8 paid by raising the legal cost of produc­
tion. He can even advance the hypothesis here that the overvaluation 
. , (implicit taxation) induced reducticn in the profit share forcing govern­
ment to imp;se more and more taxes just to maintain the sector's explicit 
"b . 2tax contr1 ut1on. More important, nevertheless, has been the role of 
implicit taxation uhich le0 to a situation whe:..·c, a fourth party, namely 
buyers of overvalued f,Jreign exchange, ucre the second and, occasionally, 
the first most irr:p.::irtant uinne1'.'s. The ir,1plicit taxes ,·,ere, to a large 
extent,· converted automatic~lly into implicit subsidies on imports. Thus, 
the "resource release 11 :forceJ upon labo:i.·, capita1, anc even government 
in the mining sector led to :-i net g2in of tlw privilegec' group called 
importers. 
This brings us t:J the I2st tPc points of tbir: section. First, it is 
hypothesized here that government ma;' 11 intentionc~llyr 1 trPnsfe:c part of the 
□ ining "surplus 11 to impo::ters if 0• 1 ervaluation of 1:he peso provides it Hith 
the best instrument to r,1mdr,1ize the 1'net foreign e,cchange contribution". 
Policy makers in Chile have been deeply concerned nith the differential 
impact that implicit taxes ~"!ave upon explicit taxes and upon the rest of 
returned revenue.. They knm-! Hell that a decline in implicit taxation uill 
1
An if we exclude the surtaxes for the 1952-55 perio~ this share falls. 
2
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that, in spite of successively 
net! and bigher taxes imposed on copper mining, the share of explicit taxes 
remains relatively unchan3ed between 19l~C ancl 19l:9. 
lo 
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raise profits, consequently augment explicit taxes, and have a positive 
iupact upon returned revenue; they also knou that such a reduction uill 
cause a decline in the legal cost of production, and consequently have an 
adverse impact upon returned revenue. Overvaluation of the peso and im­
plicit taxation can be reearded as an efficient policy instrument only 
insofar as it leads to an optimum net foreig1:. exchange contribution. In 
Chile, devaluation of national currency and the corresponding reduction in 
implicit taxation have normally had an adverse impact upon the net foreign 
exchange contribution because the devaluation-induced rise in profits, 
e~rplicit taxes and investment have been more than compensated by a decline 
in the dollar value of the other local costs. Chilean authorities have 
thus tended to maximize the net foreign exchange contribution by passing 
on to importet·s a share of the "surplus II through overvaluation without 
necessarily maximizing the explicit 3overnraent revenue contribution. 
Houever, and this is the second point made here, such implicit 
taxation is likely to be inefficient in the sense that the gain in foreign 
exchange to the economy is more than eompensated by the loss of control by 
3overnment over the allocation of the minin3 surplus released. If "implicit 
1
taxes" on copper are automatically and evenly converted into "implicit 
subsidies" on all impo:cts, the lack of any ~;:-outh or investment policy 
underlying such a behavior can be detrimental. If implicit taxation is 
not matched by implicit subsidies, that is, foreign exchange rates to 
importers are higher than those received by exporters, the government has 
a revenue source that can be used in favor of capital goods imports and 
• exp1· . taxes t h can 
be offset against Unite~~ States tax liabilities. 
1Am • f er 1c1t. 1.ncone because eyer1can copper compan1e[; ;,ire 
·· SG -
domestically surpliec capita~. formation. As long as the foreign exchange 
rate applicable to irnpo::ters ov•~r value. the local currency, implicit 
subsidies and an elemen-:= of inefficiency, uill be present, The Chi:!.ean 
experience shows that after the midclle fm:-ties implicit subsidies have 
been continually p-::esent and that, even when multiple import exchange 
rates were present, government had no policy of favoring capital goods 
ir.1ports or, for that matte:-:, domestic capital formation. 
As a concluding remark ue can say that the American-owned companies 
have felt as strongly against discrimin,gtory foreign exchange rates as 
they did with respect to discriminatory taxes, They have even gone as 
far as to argue that they do not mind higher taxation as long as a uniform 
(that is, nondiscriminatory) foreign exchange rate applies both to them 
and to all other exporters. The Christian-Democratic Party Copper Plans 
have introduced such a uniform exchange rate. Unfortunatel~ the intro­
duction of a uniform forei3n exchange clause in a Ley-Contrato can have 
detrimental effects on non-copper exports. In order to increase and 
diversify exports, ~ policy of undervaluing the escudo for some exports 
may be an in<lispensible tool. There exists no economic justification for 
offering such a favorable exchange rate to copper exports. The type of 
foreign exchange policy that is likely to be needed in the future cannot 
be foreseen in a manner to permit such advance comnittment. Thus, any 
surrender of policy pouer llith respect to the dete:...nination of the foreic;n 
exchange rate to the American-owned companies is likely to impose in the 
future unanticipated policy constraints that are neither necessary to 
1safegaurd the companies 1 interests no:c harmless to the economy. 
1A ~uarantee that the companies uill aluays be alloued to repatriate up to 
ten per cent of investment as depreciation and up to but not more thzn ten 
per cent as profits on invested capital is, in my personal opinion, the 
best solution. 
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l:.. The capital inflou contribution. The:ce is a third, the capital 
inflow contribution, that bas a resource availability effect. This cont::i­
bution has two facetn. One involves the inflou of capital through the GTan 
1-lineria 
/ 
to be invested in the mining sector itself. This has always been 
accepted as part of the Chilean share in copper output and the foreign 
exchange contribution of the sector. On a broader basis, the copper sector 
can stimulate the inflou of foreign capital to the Chilean economy. The 
state of affairs - the uarmth or coldness - in the relations betueen 
gove::nment and the Companies serves as a barometer of Chilean attitudes 
towards foreign investors and indirectly determines the resource volume 
nade available through the capital inflow. 
Regarding the first aspect, there exists an unusual pattern. During 
the First Per-iod, investment uas extremely lou even thou3h there existed no 
discrimination. The percentage of profits reinvested eives averagean 
p:rnpensity to save out of profits of thirty per cent, for the 1930-31 per-
1iod, but of only around five per cent for 19%-40. Sagging expectations, 
as a result of the depression-induced export collapse, uere the main factor 
responsible for the 10,1 tide in reinvested p:cofits. 2 
During the Second Period, ~-1hen discrimination, overt and hidden, :.:-ose 
uith time, investment remained conspicuousl:7 lo-u, except for a sudden 1:'ise 
betueen 19L}8-53. The avera~e propensity to save out of profits was around 
1 see Table D, Column 1. 
2
The value of investment as a percentage of production value sags from 8.3 
:)e:: cent in 1930 to less than 2. 0 per cent c:Zter 1935. Ibid., Column 5. 
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1
six per cent betueen 1940 and 1947. If 19l:.1 is excluded, investment as a 
percentage of total profits rose to 20. 8 per cent only in 19Li-l. The pro­
pensity to save and reinvest out of profits climbed rapidly from 13,5 per 
cent in 19l:.8, to 93, 8 per cent in 1951, ancl to an impressive 207. 6 per cent 
in 1953; it collapsed, houever, to a dismal 1. l.:. per cent of profits in 
195l:., This apparently er:..·atic ancl will-o 1-the-uisp pattern of invest-
me;.1t changes into a very smooth one once decomposed, 
Investment consistently remained low. Foreign investors displayed, ii 
the national accounts concepts are used, a nesative propensity to save, 
since the large forei~n income repatriation accentuated the deficit of the 
nation on current account, 
However, uhen a rapid reduction in output Has threatened in the 
Chuquicamata mine, buildin[!; of the sulphuric plant raised investment and 
reinvested profits. This replacement investment created the discontinuities 
that give overall investnent the ~1ill-o 1-the-uisp pattern, 
The propensity to save and reinvest out of foreign-earned profits rose 
substantially during the Third Period. Durine:; 1957 and 1958 the inflou of 
capital exceeded repatriated profits. During the other years excluding 
11955, the propensity to save out of profits never fell belou 33 per cent, 
A major part of this investment was clirectecl touan~ opening the El Salvador 
mine, ,·Jhich replaced the defunct one in Potrerillos, and, in that respect 
should be considered as 1·eplacement rather than neu investment, Still, 
some new investment, which uas by no means spectacular, did take place. 
The propensity to reinvest uas slishtly inflated dudng the Third Pe:riod 
1
See Table D, Column 1. 
2
See Table D, Columa 1. 
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because more liberal amortization allm·1ances ,ermitted American investors 
1to repatriate increased ;:-esources uithout necesserily shouing higher profits. 
The copper sector's e.bility to act as e r:1,3311et c;1ttracting forei3n 
capital to the extractive activities ai.1d to the rest of the econcmy has not 
gone unnoticed. In his January 1965 inte:cvieu uith the influential Santiago 
neuspape;:- El Mercurio, ;lat'.il Saez estimated tbe total capital contribution 
of President Frei 's copper projects to be betueen US$200-300 million annu­
ally. Saez correctly stated that: 
11 
••• we must convince ourselves that if Govern­
ment, Congress, c::~1.c1 the People of Chile decide 
that these :resources uill be destined to finance 
only projects included in the extraordinary pro­
gram (of the covernment), these 630 million 
escudos uill be ausmented by external credits 
and national and foreign private capital to give 
us an extraordinary investment effort of around 
1000 million escudos a year. 11 2 
A major fraction of tllis capital inflou contribution uould come 
outside the Chilean economy, uould flm-Y to all econonic sectors, and all 
uould lead to the "Chilean economic miracle" of achieving a 6.5 per cent 
3annual growth, 
This brings us to the second facet of the copper sector's capital 
infla,;•1 contribution, namely non-mining foreign investment, An intir,1ate 
interdependence is assumed to exist betueen the export sector's growth 
and profits and these fo:::eign capital inflous. This interdependence, 
1One way to measure the real propensity to reinvest is to take the rate of 
investment over repatriated profits, and amortization funds. 
2 /
See Raul Saez, Chile y el Cobre, .9.E_· cit., p. 7L:.. At the time this state-
ment uas made, the exchange rate was 3.20 escudos to one dollar. Conse­
E0quentl~ 630 = US$200, and E0 1000 = US$300. 
3Ibic1., p. 7l:.. This hi3b 3routh rate uould be achieved only for the per­
iod between 1970 and 1905, 
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uhich exists, has been changing over time. In the nitrate era, capital 
i:1:.:loHs uere private, er-~ering all econcmic sectors including government 
hondst they ,-1ere a-::tracted by the convertibility, based on an export boor;i, 
anc1 high returns. A lull in capital inflous set in after 1930 lastins until 
1959. Scme infious existec in the interim period but on a much smaller scale 
than during the tHenties. Stagnation of the copper sector, the government's 
gener-11 hostility toua;:ds foreign investors~ and a tendency towards govern­
ment-spo:.1sored ~,rojc:cts financed with public rather than private interna­
tional cssistance contributed to it, There is no doubt, therefore, that 
COU.!O's electrification, iron and steel, pet:coleum, sugar beet and other major 
projects uhich ,vere partially bank;:olled through external credits, Hould 
not have been pursued uithout the explicit repayment guarantee uhich the 
1
doll;:~1: contribution of cop;_)c,~ mining offe.red to foreign investors. Still, 
these predominantly public capital inflows uere aluays project-based and 
never massive. 
A neu e~a in foreign capital inflm1s uas inaugurated in 1959-60. One 
conpo!'.ent uas shori:-term cred:i.ts by overseas suppliers, an item that 
skyrocketed dur:l.ng 19.'i9-62, anci the United States foreign aid, Short-te1."ra 
credits •·1ere literally puchec1 upon Chile to pe:.·Hit an import extravagc.nza 
uhich uas unique in the country's history. ~Jithout a grouing copper sector, 
:foreign creditors ,muld not have easily given in to such a x-apid accuroula-
tion of external debt, The second component, United States foreign aid, 
,muld not have come fo;:-th had the treatment Given to the large-scale 
For further details on this matter see the present author's essay on the 
11'!17enty-five Years, of the Chilean Development Cor;_)Oration,n in Ensayos 
Sabre Planificacioi.1 published by the Instituto de Economia, University 
of Chil~ 1967. -
1
.• (13 
Both types of capital
copper mines ,tot inprcv~d cansiderably
 since '!.955, 
but maybe for the first time,
inflou uere relateci to the copper secto
:r, 
Ever, so, fo;:eign aic1
indirectly and to a smaller degree thaD
 sveL before, 
by the United States seemed to be in'.'e
r.sely linl,ed to the Chile3n govern­
ment's copper p1·ice :JOli.c:' ~fte1: the di
rect involvement in South Vietnam. 
Thus, .:.ven thou•~h ·::h,: existing st.Jtisti
cal evid2nce suggests a ~,tror.3 
1~be u~port sector and the magnitude ofcorrelati0n betHeei·.1. th-2 -:ortunes of 
:i.t is r\ifficult to provide an accm:ate
 ·ir.easure of
gross cap:U:al inflous, 
the size nf th:::3c. i:1£1.ornJ genera·ted by
 copper nn.n1.nt,, F0rei~n capit2l is 
sector since ~bese <lctc~winc the possi
bility of r2p~tri2ting ~rofit3 2nd 
The follouing -~ule of thumb '.'.s theref-;
re sugges':ed: the copper
capital. 
:\.13 equal to
sector 11" reL::t:l_·,1c contdhution in induc
ing .~apita} inflm,is 
total in sc:"c yv:n:c ,L:'.'.'in,7,70 per c2nt of th.: 
I~ ~c lncc~plctR 2conomic system, 
ir. an econor:,y t',at r~occ 11ot ·:.ou:1.ly pr:
,c"l·· 0 Tcoduce".' du··ablcs,
that is, 
It makes 
available to the econony the capital g
o.)af d1c:t c::re no:~ domestically pro-
Coppe,~ mining uac t:l1co per ('Jccellence Chi
lean quasi-capital goods
duced. 
sector, It is conc2.ivablc that ;,:he ,1:
1olc net forei::;n exchange cont.:ibu-
tion could be used to ir:,po:.:t capi":al ::
,oods ancl thus lead to a maximum capi-
The process by which the dollar procee
ds of the
tal goods contribution. 
copper export secto:.:- were converted in
to capital goods is analyzed in the 
last sect~on of th~s essa~, De therefore turn nm1 to a discussion of the 
profitability effect. 
II. The Profitability Effect. 
The profitability effect of the copper sector results from three 
related contributions to overall growth. These are the market size, the 
factor release, and the productivity contributions. 
The market size contribution is a real demand phenomenon and depends 
1 on size, rate of grouth, and horizontal and vertical linkages of the 
copper sector with the domestic economy. Hext to output increase, a maxi­
mum market contribution is the major declared objective of Frei's copper 
policy. The sector has horizontal linkages with other sectors through the 
demand for products of other sectors, generated by its payments to factors 
of production. The vertical linkages arise from the sector's demand for 
intermediate goods and use of its output as an intermediate product by 
other sectors. 
The market size contribution has played a continuous and important 
role in influencing the government-company relationship. Government has 
aluays taken into consideration in its actions the sector's impact upon the 
Norte Grande and the 0 1Hiccins provinces. After all, factor payments and 
denand for intermediate products largely sustain these areas. Furthennore, 
the companies, uell al7are of this dependence, have always pointed out the 
possible adverse effects of any excessive encroachment by government. In 
return, both regions and industries have quietl¼ but effectivel¼ lobbied 
with the central government in favor of the Ame:cican mines. 
Government had two alternatives available to increase the market 
contribution. It could raise the real cost of Chilean labor inputs, or, 
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divert intermediate proc;luct demand from overseas to Chile through a "buy 
national" policy. Up to 1955, only one of these alternatives had been parti­
ally pursued. Still, although the real cost of labor had risen due to tpe 
peso overvaluation, the increase in the local uage bill t1as minor. The rise 
in the percentage importance of the legal cost of production1 throughout the 
Second Period did not necessarily find expression in higher local real demand 
or a broad market for local products since the benefits realized accrued to 
a progressively smaller number of workers. 
A change in the composition of intermediate demand in favor of its 
Chilean component can be measured indirectly, through the behavior of the 
item "expenditure outside Chile", or directly through the local expenditures 
other than labor. Expen~itures outside Chile declined during the First 
Period, reached a bottom in the early forties, slowly rose towards the end 
of the Second Period, and finally reached extremely high levels, as compared 
to the past and as measured by their percenta3e importance in production 
value, during the Third Period. 2 Even miscellaneous local payments, uhich 
in part reflected purchases of intermediate products remained low up to 
1955. 3 But, the intermediate product component of the legal cost of pro­
duction must have risen. iiay ue finally mention that some of the taxes uere 
returned to the copper provinces through subsidies to small and medium-scale 
mining especially at the becinning of the Third Period, although thei~ abso­
lute value seems to have been rather small. 
1See the earlier discussion and Table D, Column L:.• 
2
See Table D, Column 7. 
3 see Table D, Column 8. The readei· is reminded that the spurt in the per­
centage value of this item betueen 1952 anc~ 1955 is caused by the inclusion 
of the transitory coppe~ surtax in this item. 
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The pattern reverses itself after 1955. The zovernment pursued, for the 
first time, a "systematicn copper poli.cy and one of its ingrediento uas a 
11buy Chilean 11 recipe fm.- the Americans. The results were conflicting. 
Although the share of labor costs in output declined, a broad based gain 
in employment and real income had a ma:rket size effect. But, surprisingly, 
expenditures outside Chile, uhich included Tefining, insurance, t::ansporta-
1tion, and general expenditures Tose to unprecendented levels. The result-
ing deterioration in the composition of "intermediate product 11 demand uas 
partially offset by the rising relative importance of local operating 
2expenditures. 
On this matte:;:, ~Jhich uas a source of pride to the Departmento de 
Cobre, the statistical info1111ation uas complete and available. Little 
doubt existed that a buy national policy was successfully used to divert 
the intermediate demand fo:: goods in favor of Chile. However, as pre­
viously mentioned, the intermediate demand for services moved in the 
3't '. t ·opposi e airec ion. This policy uas a subtle way of forcing the Gran 
,, 
Hineria to return an increasing share of its mining revenues to Chile. 
The Andes Copper I'iining Company had been success fully forced to reduce its 
imports for operating neec~s from $7. 5 million in 1956, or 58.1 per cent of 
the total, to $4. 7 million in 196l:., or 30. 3 per cent of the total. Braden 
1 see for the statistical information on a company level, Boletin m.i'm. 21. 773. 
Senado, ~- ill•, pp, 50-53, 
2Ibid., pp. 50-53. Both the item "internaciones" as Hell as its tuo com­
ponents, that is 11operaciones" and "inve:csiones II go down for all three fii''tils 
after 1955. 
3This is one of the paradoxes of Chilean economic development. Y·!hile the 
share of domestic services in both employ1I1ent and value added has been rising, 
the "exportecl 11 or "exportablen component is either stagnant or declining. 
-----
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Copper Company reducec1 its imports for ope:ratin3 needs from 67. 5 per cent 
of the total in 19:~6, to 32. 2 per cent in 196l:. J:ts local operating expen­
ditures rose in the neantine from $6, 2 miUior,. o:.: 32. 5 pe,:- cent in 1956, to 
1$1l:-. 2 million or 67. 8 per cent in 196L:., The follouing table gives an over­
all picture of the 111:uy Chilean" policy of the ~epartamento de Cobre. 
Table 6 
National and l!'lported Acquisitions for Cperating Needs 
~ffected~- b.e Copper 1,~ning Enterprises of the Gran 
Hinerfa 
(In millions of U.S. doll2~s) 
National 1-Iarket Imports·---- Total 
Year Value Incidence Value Incidence Purchases 
1956 2L:., 269 31.J..% 53, 793 68.9% 78, 062 
1957 29, 333 33.9 57, 163 66.1 06, l:-96 
1953 24, 666 L:2. 5 33, L:-03 57.5 58, 069 
1959 26, 3t':.l:. 36.5 L:-5, 316 63.5 12,·160 
1960 33, 00l:. l}l. 5 l:.6, 519 58.5 79, 523 
1961 31, 105 L:6. G 35, 328 53.2 66, l:-33 
1962 '-'.-li, 479 56. 8 33, 79l:. 43.2 7G, 273 
1963 40, 887 51. 6 38, 326 48. l: 79, 213 
196!:. l:-5, 393 55.6 36, 197 44.4 81, 595 
Source: Departamento de Cobre. 
Again, something like joint maximization 11as achieved with the Ameri­
can companies happily buyin3 more Chilean products in return for lower 
taxes, better exchange rates, and more foreign services. 
As a result, after 1955 the market size contribution to the copper 
provinces, local and other industries had been positive and rising. But, 
both before and after 1955 the copper secto~ made its largest market or 
real demand contribution through the resource transfer to Government and 
its preferred sectors. 
see Appendix Table A, 1 
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It is far more difficult to isolate the productivity contribution of 
the copper sector. To the eJctent that it is a technologically advanced and 
dynamic sector, a ciffusion of its state of technology to the rest of the 
economy can be expected insofar as its presence exerts a pressure towards 
emulation. 1·Jhat can be clearly said is that suppression of the sector 
stimulated internal productivity gains in its efforts to survive. Overt 
discrimination tu:med it into the least inefficient sector and shmre<l that 
room for input economizing is almost always available. Very little can 
be said about any spi.llove1· effect on the rest of the economy, either in 
terms of factor proportions or output-input relations. The proclivity 
of the public sector to adopt capital intensive projects may or may not 
have been influenced by the p-::-esence of a saper-moc'iern foreign-owned 
industry. 
Finally1 it is cert3:in that gov(~rnment pressures on the companies to 
11 buy Chilean 11, and the Corapanies insistence upon competitive prices, quality 
and delivery performance, have and will even more so in the future contri­
bute to overall productivity gains in the economy. 
III, Factor Employment Effect:, 
Copper replaced nitrate during the 1930rs as Chile's export industry, 
but failed to become a major source of employT,1ent, 
During the laissez-faire period, the labor employment contribution uas 
1
positive, uith a mild upuarc1 trend. This trencl Has sharply reversed during 
the period of discrimination \1hen total employment first rose from 21. 798 
uorkers in 19l:.0, and 2l:, 770 in 19l:-3, but ,1as then sharply reduced to only 
see c. Reynolds in Coppe1·, Essa~., op. r:i·.:., r, 390. 1 
J.l:-. 320 it.. 19.'ii:'. anci }S. 030 :i.r:. ..1.955. 'l'h:..s mear,"..: a t'eduction in the labor 
employment contributioli by 3l'., :, per cen'.:: betueen 19l}0 and 1954, and by 
1
l}2. 2 per ccat be-:ween 19/:,3 nnd 195l:., Meam1ht::.et labor absorption by the 
medium and sr.-,:;ll•,scalc copp.ar mining ·:·1as -:lose to spec;:acular as govern­
ment proceeded to p:romot£ and subsidize the Chilean-owned modest mining 
• 2operAt::.ons., 
0nc..:o lc,rge••.sc.::ile copper mining WE.S ::estored from a suppressed to an 
equit-::ibly trerited se:tor through New Deal Lau li. 323 of Hay 6, 1955, its 
labor employrnen'.: cont:·:ibut.Lon ;:,e:amt:: one£ more positi'.·e- As illustrated 
by the taole be] ov, the Neu :Jeal~ :i.rJ.duced i:west1:·1ent and 1,roduction boom 
raised employmenr; :i.n 1960 ~c 1,, 085 persor<::::, .:1 fi[;ur-..~ which,, nevertheless, 
still fell short oi t:otal zrnploym2nt; in the early ::ortie.s - the years when 
active r,uppresoion beganr. 
There ir: little or I:o ev::..aer.G.: L.i,:,'.. r,ove:'.."n:nent P-v:...:·. hc:;d an employment 
policy fo::- th:c L::ir;;e 0 Sc1le Sc?pe:i: Htning, '.Jr that it ·was auar"-! of any terms 
Only morE recentl~ 
the potent:,n'l. l.:;bo1; :::mployme.r,: con:: r:,;.bn':.i .)r.. hes be8n duly emphe.sized in 
1 
-see i.1arJ.o Vera Valenzuela, Lr, Politica Economi<:a del Cobre en Chile, 
(Santiago, Chile: Uaiversidad de Chi].e, 1961), ~Tabie 1. p. 22, and 
7!:n th~ ~~~le of ~he presen~ 8~:.tion 
,, 
"'The negative labo1.· er:1ployr.1ent cuntributi.orc of the Gran 2-lineria uas more 
than offset: by the posi'.:iV-'3 labor ccntribuU.on of medium and small scale 
copper mini.1g. Employment in theik: smalle:: nines :no:ce than tripled bet,·1een 
19l:.0, when j_t empi.oyed l:; 29·1 personsj anC: 195l:., ,-,hen employment amounted to 
13, CO"/, and almost quad:rnple:i betue~n 1940 and 1957 {absorbing 16, l:.l}5 per-
sons in the latte,:- year-). See Nario Vera Valenzuela, Ibid., Table 1, p. 22. 
The active promotio~. of nedium and smaE scale copper ~s by ENANI (Em­
p,:-esa Nacional de Mineria) hati been partially responsible fo1.· the surge 
in employment, 
.. .. -
DIRECT EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTION OF THE FOREIGN COPPER MINES AND 2-ELATED
STATISTICS (1950 - 1960) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 195li- 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 19601. Value of For-
eign copper
mining produc-





US$) 64.8 62. 8 90. 7 76.5 57.0 53.2 89.7 106.9 39.D 126.1 135.0
3. Value added
(1-2) (mil.
US$) 107.8 152. 2 187. 6 143.8 162. 1 29l~. 3 268.9 165.3 135. 5 212.8 215.2
l:. Capital 
(r.:il. US$) 183.5 197.l 194.9 202.9 196. 8 206.9 25l~. 4 254.8 275.8 305.0 321. 0
5. Capital Out- -..J
put ~:.atio 1. 7 1.3 l.l 1. 4 1. 2 o. 7 0. 9 1. 5 2. 0 1.4 1.5 
0 





ployed) 69.0 97.0 117. 7 87.5 113.1 197.8 164.6 99,0 70. 4- 122.8 125.9
3. Capital - La-
bo~ r~tio (thou-
sane US$ per
person cimployed) 117,5 125.6 122.2 123.5 137. 4 137. 6 155.8 152.6 159.6 176. 1 187.8 
Note"~ (1) The figures in Rou 1 were pbtained from CORFO, Direc,,cion
I 




(2) Ibid, Pp, 1-2. 
(3) Value added calculateC: oy deducting rou 2 from row 1. 
(l:.) , The capital stock figu:rns were obtainec.i. from Chile, Sena<lo de la 
;:..epubl_ica, Boletin No. 21773 Senado Informe de las Comisiones de Hacienda X. 
i-lineria Unidas, p. 53. The value of capital does not include the value of 
payment for rights and m-mership of the Chuquicamata deposits, which 
amounts to US$ 93, 9 million and appears in the books of Chile Copper Co. 
ouner of Chile Exploration Co. 
(5) Rou 5 is the ratio 0£ rou ~- to rm, 3. 
(6) The figures on labor reflect "total n employed in the foreign, large­
scale copper mines. 'Iuo secondary sources uere utilized to compile this 
series: First, l1ario Vera Valenzuela, La Politica Economica del Cobre en 
Chile (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1961). Table 1, p. 22. 
These figures which cover the periods 19l:.0-19lr3, and 195~--1957, originate 
£:com CORFO 's research depa:ttment and .'3re tbe sum of obreros and emp le ados 
employed. Second, Ciark f.'.eynolds, "Developr.1ent Problems of an Export 
Economy. The Case of Chile and Copper", in H. Mamalakis and c. U. Heynolds, 
Essays on the Chilean Ecor>cmy (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1965), p. 392. 
The latter figures uere obtained directly frcr.1 the companies and whenever 
they ove::J.ap uith the former are very close. 
(7) Rm·J seve".1. is L'w :.:-atio of rou 3 to rou 6. 
(8) The capital - labor :-:atio vas calculetecl ;Jy dividing rou l:. by rou 6. 
(9) The reacle:c should be ,u:rncd that tlK figures on Copper. mininc produc­
tion appearing in rou one are not identical t1ith either the official time 
series' publishe~ in Boleti~ No, 21773 Informe de las Ccmisiones de 
Hacienda y 1'1ineria Unidas or those used by 1;a:rio Vera an<l Clark Reynolcls. 
The production account pre:nu.·ed by CORFO, freq uhich these figures uere 
e::t:.:-acted, refers to the foreir;n copper ente:cprises in toto rather than 
only to their coppe:: production activities. Thus, they include also the 
expo:ct value oE molibdenur,~) gold, and silver uhich fluctuates bet,-1een 
1.5 and 4.0 per cent of these exports. Mainly for consistency reasons 
ue have used the CORFO figures here. After all, taxes, wage payments and 
intermediate product eh'Penditures as used in this Table and as utilized 
by Vera and ~eynolds, refer to total production rather than copper pro­
duction as these ec onor.iists assume. The error, nevertheless, involved. in 
talking about copper rather than copper-gold-silver--molibdenum taxes, pro­
duction, exports, and invectment is not likely to exceed a five per cent 
level. It should be knoun to the reader, nevertheless, that, with the 
exception of the present table, both in this essay and all othe::.:- documents 
used) a comparison is made between figures referring just to copper, such as 
e:cports (uhere separation is easy), and figures referring to copper-molib­
denum-golcl-silve;:-, such as taxes, labor costs and returned value. 
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copper expert, quantifies the future employnent contribution of the recent 
1966 promulgated projects ~s follous: 
"Toe volume of p~·o:jects which uill have to be under­
taken will give employment to a minimum of 10, 000
,vorkers and one or tuo1times this quantity in thesupplyine; industries. 11 
Even if these rather va3ue calculations turn out to be correct and 
the neH copper projects materialize, government planners should not be 
disappointed if the net employment contribution turns out to be meager. 
In this respect, large-scale mining is different from agriculture 
as i'!ell as industry, at least as these sectors are portrayed in current 
cevelopment literature. U:.1like agriculture, it has no redundant or 
disguised labor, even though it possesses a phenomenal output "surplus". 
Thus, any governmental attempts to appropriate part of output neither 
need to be motivate~ by no~ lead to a labor release. Although govern-
rnent discrimination startins in 1939-L:.0, 1·1hich forcec' the companies into 
defensive labor-savin.i:; technological innow1tions, had a negetive employ-
ment effect, approp:::iation of the surplus need not have such an effect. 
The surplus approp1·i.sted 1.·ose between 1950-53, ,-,ith no concurrent labo:..· 
:telease, and also rose betueen 1954-56, and there uas labor absorption, 
Furthermore, a labor release from mining is not desirable in Chile, since 
this labor is not disguisedly unemployed, its release will not increase 
the "surplus" available to governraent, and industry faces no labor bottle­
necks that a labor release from mining can solve. In addition, any induced 
labo4 release gives rise to a Robinsonian disguised unemployment by forcing 
labo:i." out of a high productivity sector into others of loi, ;:iroductivity. 
1 ;
See Raul Saez, Chile y El Cobre (Santiago, Chile: Departamento del Cobre,
1965), p. 72. 
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1-!henever a "product rele2se" ,-Jas accompanied by a "labor release", as in 
the forties, the labor release seems to have been caused by a misguided 
policy of excessive discr .i.minatior:, 
The difference between mining and "classical" industry lies in their 
differential ability to absorb labor. Chilean mining can become a major 
source of income grouth, but still, ss far as the foreign companies are 
concerned, contribute little in terms of di~ect employment. Industr~ in 
contrast, is viewed, in the Leibenstein, Le,1is, Ranis and Fei models as a 
source of productivity as uell as employment gains. The Chilean scene is 
complicated by the fact that industry has tended to contribute little to 
employment since 1950, but a lot to output (through productivity), just as 
did large-scale copper mining. 
Chilean large-scale copper mining has a very lm·1 capital-output ratio. 
It is capital rather than labor intensive but more than anything else it 
has been input-saving over time. Thus, even in the future, its grm,th is 
likely to require small doses of imported capital goods as compared to 
most other Chilean sectors ·while contributing an unmatchable "surplus" to 




The Gran Mineria and the Saving-Investment Process 
The process by which the Chilean copper export sector has affected the 
saving-investment process ic almost completely unknown. This •ection, there­
fore, specifically attempts to describe the mechanism which permits the 
resources made available by it to be converted into investment. 
The major issues related to this mechanism are four. The first relates 
to the role of payments to foreign f.:::ctors of production, principally en-
gaged in copper exploitation) in the saving a:coun': and the "formation 11 of 
national saving, The second c1ea1. s with the nati.:re and growth impact of 
copper mining investment, The ·:'.1 :rd issue relates to the allocation and 
use of the mining sector I s rcver,ue c :.mtribu';ion by the centrc;l government. 
Ancl, finally, the last issue 1elates to the allocation or Lse of foreign 
I 
exchange released by ~he Gran Mineria to the Central Bank. 
A. The Role of Foreign Income }-n th~Determin_~:.:io,E___of National Saving. 
Payments to overseas factors of production affect the saving account in a 
round about way. Insofar as they lec:d to a dcf:cit of the nation on current 
account, which is deducteo from gross domestic saving to obtain gross 
national savin& they contribute to smaller gross national savings. 
If imports plus net factor inccm" paid abroad is smaller than exports, 
national saving exceeds domestic saving. If imports plus factor income 
paid abroad exceeds exports, then tr.e deficit of the nation on current 
account is positive and national saving is smaller than domestic saving. 
The size of factor income paid abroac'. :)lnys therefor,.:.: r-, :.:rncinl role in 
the ietermination of the surplus of nAt:,n oc rxterr-l a~cau~-. 
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Interestingly enoug~ factor income paid abroad was very high in the 
forties but both these payments as well as those arising from imports were 
financed out of export revenues. As a result, there developed no deficit of 
the nation on external account. In contrast, permanent deficits of the 
nation on external account developed since the early 1950 1s, as a result of 
the economy's rising appetite for imports and the government's and Central 
Bank's willingness to satisfy the~ even though factor income paid abroad 
uas meanwhile declining. There apparently exists no di:r.ect relationship 
between the level of income paid abroad and the difference between gross 
domestic and national saving. 
These payments diminished both national income and wealth and the supply 
of resources potentially convertible into investment. This leakage was 
the aftermath of the heavy reliance on foreign resources to promote overall 
and specifically mining growth. 
B. Investment in Large-Scale Copper Mining. Measured by almost any 
standard this investment has been low. The pattern is not, nevertheless, 
consistant. Investment is high in 1930, 19L:-l, 1952-55, and 1957-59. There 
exists no continuous flow of investment into the mining sector. The very 
low flow during the Second Period was interrupted at the peak of discrimina­
tory treatment (1952-55), and during the Third, the sudden rise in invest­
ment was as short-lived as the earlier one (1956-58). In short, suppression 
and equitable treatment had almost the same impact on investment, the 
first failing to eliminate it, and the second to raise it. 
Curr,,.nf: 1961 Constant 
?-'.'."·~~Ce S -~·~- ·-- Prices 
First 
Period: 19':10-39 Total 12. 9 27.0 
Average L3 2. 7 
Se..::ond 
Period: 1~40-5l: Total 160.9 189.5 
Average 10. 7 12. 6 
Third 
P0riod~ 1955-M. Tot.J 1 251. 1 253.3 
Average 25, 1 25 3 
Sou::-ce ~ Append ·x ~ables A and B. 
The lack of & smootl,, large, and continuous investment flow can be 
attributed to various factors, 7irst, risk and uncertainty, even after 
the New Deal Law of 1955, remained high. Past experience did not preclude 
future discrimination and the Frei-Allende encounter of 1964 reinforced 
past fears about long-run uncertainty. It can be said that practically 
all investment between 1930 and 1965 has been of a short-term nature in 
the sense that it committed little capital and capital recovery was close 
to immediate. The desire of the Companies to enter into Ley-Contrato 
agreements with the Chilean government are an expression of the high risk 
and uncertainty of the past and could for the first time attract long-term 
investment by both reducing and stabilizing these. After all the threat 
of~ iure nationalization was always hanging ove~ their heads and 
changing taxes, fo'!:'eign exchange rates, and administrative regulations 
l·Jere the other half of the Democlean sword, Second, replacement invest-
ment, when no :1LW investment took i:1lace, came in a discontinuous pattern 
which accounted £or the sudden risea. Third, the capital-intensity of 
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, 
large-scale mining operations, if measured by the capital-output ratio, has 
been extremely low in spite of the diminishing quality of copper ores. 
Thus, even increases in output could be achieved in the future without capi­
tal commitments that would be exhorbitant in terms of output obtained. 
Fourth, the succession of a major world depressio~ war-induced copper­
price fixing, and heavy discrimination made the sector an unfortunate 
and unwilling partner in the economic and power game played between the 
Colossus of the North and Chile and prevented it from controlling its own 
destiny. Finally, it should be mentioned that a sound copper investment 
policy leading to a joint maximization solution has yet to be developed. 
As a result of the above factors, and the often forgotten truth 
that Americans invested in copper to make money and not for charity, the 
pi:opensity to reinvest out of profits, whether these uere high or lou, was 
low ,1ith a few exceptions. These exceptions, i_n 1930, 1949-53, and 1956-64, 
failed to make e majo1· dent in the outflow of foreign-earned income from 
Chile. For fourteen years the propensity to reinvest has been below one 
per cent. 
Before concluding this section, I would like to raise two more issues. 
Investment in the copper mines has two components: foreign supplie:1 and 
internally supplied capital goods and complementary products and services. 
One peculiarity of copper investment is that a major component is internally 
supplied but externally financed. All economists that have analyzed the 
copper industry have made, in my opinion, the erroneous assumption that 
"national saving" is low and that "external savings" were, therefore, 
indispensable. 
Two issues are involved in this argument. One refEn: to the internal 
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availability of the ingredients necessary to produce investment goods in 
Chile. The other concerns the income release (saving) by nationals to 
finance the production of these investment goods. It is argued here that 
both the availability and saving are substantially higher than what they 
are normally believed to be. 
As regards the first point, a major segment of capital formation in 
mining is internally supplied. For example, ~·Jhen Andes Copper Mining Co. 
submitted its investment budget for the '1El Salvador" mine, the internally 
1
supplied component was estimated to be 62 per cent of the total; and 
analysis of the various investment items indicates that it could be even 
higher. Foreign investment uas, insofar as the availability aspect is 
concerned, only necessary for 38 per cent of the capital formation. Chile 
possessed the real resources needed for the remaining part of investment. 
On the second issue, which is the center of controversy, the ansHer 
is more complicated. Hay I first point out that Chilean writers express 
a desire of maximum el~ternal financing of internally supplied capital 
formation. Mario Vera, using Departamento de Cobre statistics argues 
that out of total investment 73 per cent refers to imports and "the rest, 
as little as 27 per cent, to sale of foreign exchange for the aquisitions 
~'lithin the country. 11 
2 The naive argument that Chileans are not willing or 
capable to save 3 implies that Chileans have been given a choice and are 
1 see Rep~blica de Chile - r-1inisterio de Mineria. Santiago, 2- de Agosto 
de 1958. Decreto N° 132. D.O. de 12 de Septiembre, 1958. 
211ario Vera, Pol:i.tica Economica, ~- cit,, p. 130. 
3This argument, which is generally accepted but not supported either by 
theory or statistical evider1ce, has been questioned by Markos Mamalakis 
in Public Policy, Essay~, .££_• cit., 71 ff., l 76 ff. 
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not u:;.lling to give up consumer in favor of cepital goods proJuction. Ex­
ternal financing for the internally-supplied component of capital formation 
is aecessary because it makes available the consumer goods required to feed 
those employed in capital goods production. 
There are a number of flaws in this argument. First of all, Chileans 
have neve:..· been given a choice for "saving
11 in the Gran Mined.a de Cobre. 
The Companies did not want it and Government, victim of the "low saving" 
concensus, did not consider this alternative. Secondly, even if the 
, a small fraction only ofhousehold sector could 11ot provide this 
11saving 11 
tl,e Social Security System Revenues or the government subsidies to the 
State Railroad system would ·oe sufficient to cover all the "external 
financing 11 that has taken place. Government never seemed to balance its 
expenditures in terms of social costs and benefits and consequently this 
possibility has been neve: considered. Third, the Departamento de Cobre 
has an obsession with the balance of payments bottleneck and considers 
maximum "external financing 11 to be the best tool to augment foreign 
exchange balances. This short-term "balance of payments" argument ignores 
I 
the bitter truth that the arrangements with the Gran Mineria force the 
country to return betueen 3-10 units of foreign exchange for every unit 
of foreign-financed but internally-supplied capital formation. Thus, it 
appears that for a small amount of present consumption Chile is willing 
1
to give up a large amount of future. I would, therefore, argue that 
there exist significant ·economic factors making Chilean participation in 
copper investment desirable and feasible. The latest copper projects are 
I 
are the first ones with "joint participation. n 
1see Table entitled Total Investment. 
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We may finally mention that the ratio of profits to investment has been 
exceptionally high for all three periods under consideration. 
1 
were 
used to purchase both externally and domestically supplied capital goods. 
The copper tax contribution affected the imported component of capital 
formation in a number of ways. First, part was directly used to import 
capital goods for investment purposes. The Central Government had a 
segment of its budget expressed in dollars and used it to cover the foreign 
exchange needs of itself and the autonomous public institutions. Part of 
these revenues here directly channeled to CORFO, the Universities, and the 
mining provinces, presumably to facilitate imports of necessary goods. 
Quite often copper funds are earmarked for development projects, 
2 such as 
education, which do not augment capital but increase productivity through 
investment in human capital. Second, the copper usurplus" has been used 
to cover service and amortization payments of the public sector. It also 
directly served as a guarantee for all CORFO sponsored international 
borrowing and as such acted as its stimulant. Third, part of these 
revenues were converted into local currency to be used for local invest­
ment. Since conversion uas normally at a below-parity-rate level, local 
capital formation suffered. But even more important, part of these 
revenues have been used for consumption rather than investment purposes. 
c. Allocation of Copper Tax Revenues. The Copper tax revenues 
1The excess of repatriated profits over investment for most of the years 
suggests that Chile(ans) have been giving up both present and future con­
sumption uithout any important compensation. 
2m1en Chile raised its copper price from 62 to 70 cents per pound on June 14, 
1966, the El Mercurio quoted Sergio Molina, the Minister of the Treasury as 
saying that the increased revenues of $20 nillion 'will be employed to 
amortize short and medium term debts and to cover extraordinary invest­
ments." See 11Precio del Cobre Chileno Fue Elevado a Setenta Centavos 
11 
El Mercurio, June 15, 1966, p. 27. 
) I 
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As ue have already seen the surplus appropriated by government has been 
phenomenal and its proper use could have led to a substantially higher 
capital formation. 
We may mention here that the resource transfer necessary to cover the 
deficit of the State Railroads during 1960-6l.• absorbed between 60-30 
1 
per cent of the copper nsurplus 11 • This shous that unless a higher deg:cee 
of efficiency is achieved in various branches of the public sector :1ighe:r 
tax revenues are likely to contribute little to growth. Raul Saez confi::ms 
this inefficient state of affairs when he writes: "I wish .such a substantial 
increase in fiscal resources could be used in a high proportion for capital 
fot,nation and production of export goods precisely in order to reduce Chile's 
. . . . ,.2
dependence on 1.ts copper act1.v1.t1.es. · 
D. Allocation of Copper Foreign Exchange :;zevenues of the Central Bank. 
The allocation of t:1ese dollars released to the Central Ban:c estao­
lishes the size of the copper .sector's capital goods cont:dbution outside 
the government sector. As p::·ev:i.01_,s ly mentj_oned mining perfo::ms as c1 quasi-
capital goods s~cto:r by mc:l~ing available to the economy the machinery and 
equipm~nt that. is not dor.1esticalJ.y produced, 
What proportion of these dolh::r earnin3s will be used fo::- cepital goods 
imports is determined by tl1.e country's impo;:t policy, as this is fonnulated 
by the Central Bank. Rega:'.'ding the externally supplied component of 
capital formation this impo:.:t policy is tantamount to an investment policy. 
1 
see Appendix Table B, Column 6, the Chilean National Accounts information, 
and the present author's k_Teoria de los Cheques Entre Sectores {Santiago, 
Chile: Institute de Economia, Universidad de Chile, 1966) p, 32n. 
2
Ra61 Saez, ££_• cit., p. 13. 
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On.:(. ... , ::;nport policy has been fixed, an independent investment policy is 
inf~asible, For the same reaso~ any changes in the copper policy will 
hav~ no impact on the investment policy unless they operate throu~h the 
in:port policy. All the economists who have dealt with the problem 
identify copper with the investment policy instead of .:ecognizing that 
the lmport policies determine part of investment and that the copper and 
import (i.e. investment) policies have ra:cely or never been coordinated. 
A key structural bottleneck that has restricted Chilean economic 
growth has been its "socially oriented" import policy. It has either 
maintait1ed the status ~ insofar as capital goods imports were concerned, 
o.: favored cc·:.sumption, The import policy in Chile was a major factor 
::l'n determining the allocation of dollar funds betueen future (investment) 
and present concumption, and has tended to favor the second alternative. 
This brings us back to the relationship betueen the resource distribu­
tion and resource allocation process. The distribution of mining income 
between Chile and the rest of the world has been determined by the terms of 
trade between local and foreign factors of production. Government was able 
to change these terms of trade in favor of Chile and thus transfer an 
increasing 11 surplus"to Chile. Resources were transferred out of mining 
in the same manner as if they had been transferred out of agriculture. 
The resource release condition, a necessary one for growth, was satisfied. 
But since Chile was an incomplete economic system, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for growth was a resource release and allocation into 
imported producers durables. The rigid import policy did not permit the 
sufficient condition to be satisfied and the "allocation" process was 
intercepted, 
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ThPe, :i.n an inccnplet6 syGtem such as Chile I s, it cnnnot be assumed 
1
that the reEource rele~se and alloc~tion processes are integrated. Rather 
attention should be focused o~ the allocation process because a resource 
release that exceeds the nee,.:";s of any given allocation policy can place 
further ,onstr:-oints or: such a policy by, e.g., increaseing tbe country's 
needs for imported consumer goods. 
He may, conclude this section by pointing out that in an economy such 
as Chile 1s a '1resouJ:"ce sm:plus n does exist. This 11s urplus II can be released 
rather easil~ but its use for development purposes nay be blocked by 
the absence of a proper 11 allocation process 11 or-policy. Therefore,. no 
matter how successful government might be in raising the sector's foreign 
e~~change and/or government revenue contribution, it cannot succeed in 
promoting growth unless it pursues a correct allocation policy. 
1This is the basic assumption of the Labor Surplus model by Ranis and Fei, 
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Table A. 
Value of Production and its Components in Large-Scale Coe12er Mining
(In miilions of u. s. $, current prices) 
1 2 3 4 5
Value of Expendi-
Production Value of Yearly .Amorti- tures Out-
Mill. u. s. $. Investment Profits zation side Chile1930 59.1 4.9 17.5 5.4 3. 01931 28.6 • 6 1.8 3.8 2. 01932 15.5 -6.4• 8 3.4 l. O1933 22.5 . 1 -1.9 3.6 1.71934, 33.6 .6 6.5 4. 2 2. 6\ 1935 45.9 10.6 5. 1 3. 5
1936 41. 8 • 5 12,9 4.1 2. 9
1937 99.9 1. 9 48.2 5.5 lf, 8
1938 74.1 1.2 26.9 5.2 l:.. 2
1939 71.9 1.3 21. 4 4. 7 t,_., l~
1940 85.1 1.2 29,5 5. 1 5, l:.
1941 101.1 6.6 31.6 6.7 2. 11942 117. l:. 1. 1 32. 4- 6. 1 1. 2
1943 116. 8 27, 11.3 5.6 1. 21944 122. 0 2.0 25.4 6.7 1. 3
1945 106. 7 1. 3 18.8 6.0 1.8
1946 109.6 1. 5 21. 6 5.6 2. 0
1947 159. 4 2.0 35,0 5.6 5.7
1948 215,5 6. 6 li8, 8 5.8 8.3
1949 155.3 22,4 26.5 4. 7 6.4
1950 168.5 24,7 30,2 4.5 7. 3
1951 196, 2 38.8 39. 2 4.3 7. 1
1952 199. 9 30,9 35,4 5.3 6. 2
1953 113, 9 20. 2 9. 7 2. 7 7, 3
1954 220. 8 o. 3 19. 1 2. 7 8. 2
1955 301,5 2. 3 54.8 2.5 15. 0
1956 332.1 26. 7 75.8 8.4 20. 1
1957 262.3 46.3 37.9 12.5 28.0
1958 232.9 54,2 27,2 12,7 25. 7
1959 315.8 39, 1 55,9 20. 5 31. 4
1960 335.0 16,1 l+7, 8 25.9 35.8
1961 .......• 301. 0 17, 2 35.4 14.6 33. 1
1962 324.5 14,6 43,5 21.6 35·. 2
1963 327.0 18,7 39.3 27.4 34. 6
~64 363.5 15.9 48,1 26.7 36. 61930-3 Total 492. 9 12,9 137. 6 45.2 30.1
Average 49.3 1. 3 13. 8 4.5 3.0
19li-0-54 Total 2188.2 160,9 430.7 77.S 67.2
Average llf5. 9 10. 7 28.7 7, 7 4;5
1955-64 Total 3095.6 251. 1 465.7 172, 8 295.6






Value of Production and its Components in Large-Scale Copper Mining 
(In millions of u.s.$, current prices) 
6 7 8 9 10 
Miscel- Net Foreign Net Foreign 
Taxes Legal laneous Exchange Exchange 
paid in Cost of Local Contribution Contribution 
Chile Production Payments A= 6+7+8 B = 9 + 2 
1930 3. 3 23.3 • 1 26,7 31.6 
1931 o.s 14.4 . 0 14.9 15.5 
1932 o. 5 6. 2 • 0 6,7 7.5 
1933 o. 8 1. 0 • 0 7. 8 7.9 
193L:. 1. 5 9.9 • 0 11.4 12. 0 
1935 1. 5 9.9 • 0 11.4 11.4 
1936 2. 8 10.3 . 0 13. 1 13. 6 
1937 11. 0 17.9 . 0 28.9 30. 8 
1938 5.3 19. 2 • 1 24.S 25.7 
1939 8. 3 18.8 . 1 27. 1 28.4 
19L:-0 11.9 20.8 • 1 32.8 34-, 0 
19L:-l 17. 4 25.7 • 1 l:-3. 2 49.8 
19l:-2 25.3 34.2 . 8 60. 3 61. 4-
19l:-3 22.8 43.8 • 9 67.S 68.8 
19L:.L:. 22.8 44. 7 1. 0 68.S 70. 5 
1945 18. 1 43. 1 1. 0 62.2 63.5 
19l:.6 17.5 42.4 1. 0 60. 9 62. l; 
19/:.7 37.4 so. 8 1. 3 89.5 91. 5 
19lii3 lf8. 7 70.4 1. 8 120,9 127,5 
19l:-9 26.1 65. 4- 1. 6 93.1 115.5 
1950 42.2 64-. 2 1. 8 108.2 132.9 
1951 47.1 70. 2 o. 0 125.3 164. 1 
1952 43.0 75.1 57.6 175.7 206.6 
1953 17.5 76.3 53.5 147.3 167.5 
195l:. 30. 7 69.7 4-3. 5 143.9 lL:-4. 2 
1955 121. 0 59.6 40.3 220.9 223.2 
1956 130. 6 67.8 3. 2 201. 6 228.3 
1957 76.9 69.4 5. 1 151. 4 187.7 
1958 53.2 60.0 6.8 120. 0 17lf, 2 
1959 85.5 80. 6 5.5 171. 6 210.7 
1960 83.2 98.0 6.2 192.4 208. 5 
1961 72.9 99.0 8.2 180.1 197.3 
1962 89.3 107.5 9.6 206.4 221. 0 
1963 86.4 99.4 7.9 193.7 212. L:. 
196lf 105. 1 119. 8 10.0* 234.9 250. l} 
1930-39 Total 35.5 136.9 • 3 172. 5 184.4 
Average 3. 6 13. 7 . 03 17. 3 18.4 
19L:-0-54 Total 428.5 796. 9 174.0 1399.3 1560. 2 
Average 28.6 53. 1 11. 6 93.3 104.0 
1955-64 Total 909.1 861. 3 102.8 1873.0 2113. 7 




Value of Production and its Components in Large-Scale Copper Mining 
NOTES: * Estimate 
SOURC~; Bolet(n Nlm. 21. 773, Senado, Info;~me de las Comisiones de Hacienda yl'lineria, Uni.das, op. cit., Table 2c, p. 3l:-, for column 1; Table 2a, p. l:.8, for
column 2; Table 2h, pp. L:-5-46, for column 3; Table 2d, pp. 46-l.•7, for columnl:.; Table 2f, pp, 4l:--l~5, fo1.· column 5; Table 2e, pp. L'.:-1-42, for column 6;
Table 2g, pp. 43-4l:., and c. aeynolds, p. 367, in N. Marnalakis and C, Reynolds,
op. cit., for column 7; C, Reynolds, Ibic, p. 369 and, Senado, on. cit., p. 53- - -- J -=- --(sum of columns under Descuentos (Art. 26 + Descto le. dol electrolit.)) for
column 8; Expenditures outside Chile for the yea1.·s 1930-31-32 were estimated
by the present author to be equal to 3.0, 2.0, and 1.0, million u.s. $ respec­tively. 
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Value of Pro<luctio·,1 2.-,d ita: Various Cc11()0;Jer'.tS ir. Lari:rc:S~~le Coppe:: l:iining 
·,·1 ~-~ C"'"'----,-., 1.• c,~;,,v -1 , .: ,.--,ct c.1.~1·1t ~ ~ ..,_ ....,...,__ .1. ... vl..o 
($ u.s. Millions) 
I 2 3 4 5 
Value of Expendi-
P:;_:-oduction Value of Yearly Amorti- tures Out-
($ u.::-;. __ r::.ill) ~~vestnent Profits zation side Chile 
37, 2 6. l;.1930 125.5 10. l;. 11. 5 
1931 71.8 1.5 4-. 5 9.5 5,0 
1 • 1932 43.S -18.0 9. 6 2.8 
1933 62.5 o. 3 -5o3 10.0 4. 7 
1934 82. 1 1.5 15.9 10. 3 6. l} 
1935 1')5.0 2l.h 3 11. 7 8. 0 
1936 9l:.• 7 1.1 29.3 9.3 6. 6 
1937 212.1 4.0 102.3 11. 7 10. 2 
1938 172. 7 2. 8 63.2 12.1 9. 8 
1939 170. 7 3. 1 50. G 11. 2 10.5 
1940 198.3 2. 8 68.3 11.9 12. 6 
1941 21L 9 13.8 66.2 14.0 
19l}2 218.2 2. 0 60. 2 11. 3 2. 2 
1943 207. l.} 2. 3 l.:-8. 1 9.9 2. 1 
19l:-4 215.1 3. 5 l+4. G 11.8 2. 3 
1945 18l}, 6 2. 2 32.5 10. ,~ 3. 1 
1946 166.3 2. 3 32.G 8.5 3. 0 
1947 197.0 2.5 43.3 6.9 7. 0 
1948 246.0 7.5 55.7 6.6 9,5 
1949 185.6 26.9 31. 9 5.6 7. 7 
1950 194-. 7 28.5 3L:.• 9 s.2 
1951 203.5 40. 2 4-0. 7 L:.• 5 7. l.;. 
1952 213.3 32.9 37. 8 5,7 6. 6 
1953 123. 2 21. 8 10.5 2. 9 7. 9 
8. 91954 238. l:. 0.3 20.6 2.9 
1955 32l:-., 5 2.5 59.0 2. 7 16. 1 
195& 346.2 27.8 79. 0 8.8 21. 0 
1957 265.7 46.9 38. 4 12. 7 28, l} 
1958 235,7 54. 8 27.5 12.9 26.0 
1959 3ll:.• 8 39.0 55.7 20.4 31. 3 
1960 333. 7 16. 0 47,6 25,8 35,7 
1961 301. 0 17.2 35.4 14. 6 33. 1 
1962 323.5 14.5 43. l.:. 21.5 35. 1 
1963 327.0 18.7 39.3 27.4 JL,,. 6 
1964 362. 0 15.9 L.,s. o 26.6 36.5 
1930-39 Total 1140. 7 27.0 30l:.• 2 106.9 70.5 
Average 1llh l 2. 7 30. L,t 10,7 7. 1 
19l}0-54 Total 3004.5 189.5 628. 8 118.1 93.1
7,9 6.2Average 200. 3 12. 6 4-1. 9 
1955-64 Total 313Lh 9 253. 3 l.:-73. 3 173, 1.:- 297,8 




Value of Production nnd its Various Ccmponents in Large-Scale Copper Mining 
I::t 1%1, constant p;~ices 
($ u. s. Hill ions) 
6 7 u n 9 10 
Miscel- Net Foreign Net Foreign 
Taxes Legal laneous Exchange Exchange 
paid in Cost of Local Contribution Contribution 
Chile P,:oduction Payments A = 6+7+8 B = 9 + 2 
J' 1930 7. 0 49.4 . 2 56.7 67. 1 i I 1931 1. 3 36.1 • 0 37.4 38. 9 
1932 1. L: 17.5 • 0 18. 9 21. 1 
1933 2.2 19.4 • 0 21. 7 21. 9 
193L:. 3. 7 24.2 • 0 27,9 29.3 
1935 3. L:. 22.6 • 0 26. 1 26. 1 
1936 6. 3 23. 3 . 0 29.7 30. 8 
1937 23, l: 38.0 • 0 61.4 65. l.:-
1938 12. 4 l.;.L,. 7 . 2 57. 1 59.9 
1939 19.7 lfl.:. 6 • 2 61'.1-.4 67.5 
1940 27.7 lf8. 5 • 2 76.5 79, 3 
1941 36.5 53,9 . 2 90.6 104, l:. 
1942 42.4 63.6 1.5 112. 1 Ill~. 1 
1943 l.:-0. L:. 77,8 1., 6 119. 9 122. 2 
19L:.l:. l.:-0. 2 78.8 1.7 120. 8 124.3 
1945 31. 3 74.6 1.7 107.8 109.9 
1946 26.6 64.3 1.5 92.4 9lf, 7 
1947 39,7 62.8 1.6 110.6 113. 1 
1948 55,5 80.4 2. 1 138, 0 1Li5. 5 
1949 31. 3 78.6 1, 9 111.9 138. 8 
1950 48.7 74,2 2. 1 125.0 153. 6 
1951 48,9 72, 8 8. 3 129.9 170. 2 
1952 lf5. 0 80.1 61. L:. 187.5 220.4 
1953 18.9 82. 6 57.9 159.4 181. 2 
1954 33. 1 75.3 46.9 155.6 155,7 
1955 131. 0 62.2 l;.3.3 237,7 2l.:-O. 2 
1956 141. 0 70,8 3. 3 210. 2 238.5 
1957 77. 9 70. 3 5. 2 153.3 190, 1 
1958 53.8 60. 7 6. 9 121.4 176,3 
1959 85.2 80. L+ 5.5 171. 1 210.0 
1960 87,8 97.6 6. 2 191. 6 207, 7 
1961 72, 9 99.0 8. 2 180.1 197.3 
1962 89.0 107.2 9.6 205.8 220.0 
1963 86.4 99.4 7,9 193.7 212. l:. 
1964 104.9 119. 6 10.0 234.4 249.9 
1930-39 Total 80. 8 319.8 • " u 401.3 lf28. 0 
Average 8. l 32.0 . 1 40.1 li-2. 8 
19l:-0-54 Total 557.9 1063.3 190.6 1838.0 2027. 6 , ..., ~
Average 37. Cl 71.2 J.-<-, I 122.5 135.2 
1955-64 Total 929. 9 £367, 2 106. l 1899.3 21~-2. l:. 
Average 92.9 86. 7 10. 6 189.9 214. 2 
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Table c. 
Indices (1930 = 100) 
Value of Expendi-
Production Value of Yearly Arnorti- tures Out-
($ u. s. mill.) Investment Profits zaticn side Chile 
1930 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 
1931 57.2 14.4 12. 1 82.6 78,1 
1932 34,7 22. 1 -48. 4- 83,5 43.8 
1933 49,8 2. 9 -lL}. 2 87.0 73.4 
193Lr 65.4 14,4 42.7 89.6 100.0 
1935 83. 7 65.3 101. 7 125.0 
1936 75.5 10,6 78.8 80.9 103. 1 
1937 169.0 38.5 275.0 101. 7 159.4 
1938 137 .. 6 26.9 169.9 105. 2 153.1 
1939 136.0 29.8 136.6 97.4 164. 1 
19l:-0 158.0 26,9 18l:-. 9 103.5 196. 9 
19l:-l 168.8 132. 7 178.0 121. 7 68.8 
19L:-2 173. 7 19.2 161. 8 98.3 34.4 
19Lf3 165.3 22. 1 129.3 86.1 32.8 
1944 171. 4 '33. 7 120.4 102.6 35.9 
1945 147.1 21. 2 87. I..;. 90.4 48.4 













19l.t9 148. 7 258, 7 85.8 48. 7 120. 3 
1950 155.1 274,0 93.8 45.2 131.3 
1951 162.2 386.5 109. L: 39, 1 115.6 
1952 170. 0 316. 3 101. 6 Li-9.- 6 103.1 
1953 98.2 209-6 28.2 25.2 123.4 
1954 190.0 2.9 55. /+ 25, 2 139. 1 
1955 258.6 24.0 158.6 23.5 251. 6 
1956 275.9 267.3 212. /+ 76.5 328. 1 
1957 211. 7 451. 0 103.2 110.4 443.8 
1958 187.8 526.9 73.9 112, 2 406.3 
1959 250. 8 375.0 14-9. 7 177. 4 489.1 
1960 265.9 153,8 128. 0 224.3 557.8 
1961 239.8 165.4 95.2 127.0 517. 2 
1962 257,8 139.4 116. 7 187.0 548.4 
1963 260. 6 179.8 105.6 238.3 540. 6 




Indices (19:;0 = lOO) 
Miscel- Net Foreign Net Foreign 
Taxes Le3al laneous Exchange Exchange 
Paid in Cost of Local Contribution Contribution 
Chile Production Pavments A= 6+7+8 B = 9 + 2 
1930 100.0 lJO.O 100.0 rno. 0 100.0 
1931 18.6 73. 1 0 65.9 58.0 
1932 20.0 35. l:. 0 33.3 31.4 
1933 31.4 39.3 0 38.3 32.6 
193( 52. 9 49.0 0 49.2 43.7 
1935 4-8. 6 l..-5. 7 0 46. 0 38.9 
1936 90.0 Lt7. 2 0 52.4 45.9 
1937 334. 3 76.9 0 108.3 97.5 
1938 177, 1 90.5 100. 0 100.7 89.3 
1939 281.4 90.3 100.0 113. 6 100.6 
19l:.O 395.7 98.2 100.0 134-. 9 118. 2 
19lfl 521.4 109. 1 100.0 159.8 155.6 
19lf2 605. 7 128.7 750. 0 197. 7 170. 0 
1943 577.1 157.5 800.0 211. 5 182.1 
19l:.l:. 574.3 159.5 850.0 213. 1 185.2 
1945 447.1 151. 0 850.0 190. 1 163.8 
1946 380.0 130.2 750.0 162.9 141. 1 
1947 567.1 127.1 800.0 195.1 168.5 
1948 792. 9 162.8 1050. 0 243. 4 216.8 
1949 447.1 159.1 950. 0 197.4 206.9 
1950 695.7 150. 2 1050, 0 220.5 228.9 
1951 698.6 147. 4- 4150.D 229. 1 253.7 
1952 642.9 162.1 30700. 0 330. 7 328.4 
1953 270.0 167.2 28950.0 281. 1 270.0 
195l:. 472.9 152. 4- 23450.0 274.4 232.0 
1955 1871. 4 125.9 2165.0 419.2 358.0 
1956 2014.3 llf3, 3 1650.0 370.7 355.4 
1957 1112.9 142.3 2600.0 270. 3 283. 3 
1958 768.6 122. 9 3450. 0 214.1 262.7 
1959 1217.1 162.8 2750.0 301.8 313. 0 
1960 1254.3 197. 6 3100.0 337.9 309.5 
1961 1041. 4 200.4 4100.0 317.6 294.0 
1962 1271. 4 217. 0 4800.0 363.0 327.9 
1963 1234.3 201. 2 3950.0 341.6 316.5 
196l:. 1498.6 242.1 5000.0 413. 4 372. 4 
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T.::,ble IJ. 
Percentage Importanc_<:_of Components o~ the Value of Production in Copper Min
ing 
4 51 2 3 
Col. 2 ofCol. 2 of Col. 4 of Col- f1 o.: Col. 7 of
Table B Table BTable B _1=1ble B___ ----·--·Table B - Col.Col, 3 0f Col, 1 of Col. 1 of Col. 1 of 1 of 
Table B Table D Table B Table B Table B 
Value :if Amortization 'T'axes paid Legal cost of Value of 
Invest, % as% of Value in Chi:!.e as froduction as% Invest. 
of Yearly of Production % o[ va}.ue of value of Value of 
Profits of 'Product Product Product-5.-6- 39.4 8.31930 28,0 9.2 
2. 1
1931 33. 3 1_3. 2 1.8 50. 3 
3.2 40.11932 -1::::. 8 22.0 
1933 -:,.7 16,0 ·~, s 31. 0 
193l} 9 4 12 5 1-;., s ?..9, S 
r.1 r:-­
L .L1935 (2L; 3) L.. l 3. 2 _> 
6. 6 2i,. b 1.21936 3. 8 9,8 
1 1 1 : 7. <: 1.93,9 5. 5 .,:_.;..o ~1937 
7, 2 25, ~· 1.61938 4.4 7. 0 
}6. j_ 1.8
1939 6,.1 6. 6 lL 5 
i4. 0 2Lf, :;19L,.0 I,. 1 6. 0 
6. 5
19L:-l 20,8 17 2 
c· '"' 29~ .L 919L:-2 3.3 
~9- 5 37.S l. ...19l:.3 4.8 
18 ..19.'}4 ~:. j ~-- 6
i,C. I+ 1.219l}5 6.8 3, (j 17.0
16.0 38.7 1.. 419L:-6 7. 0 
'} C: :_:, 1. 9 1.3
190 5. 8 -· . ..) :o.: 
1948 13.5 22.6 32-7 3
. 1 
] G,. C 1:-2. 1 ll:.• 41949 84.3 
25- Cl 38.1 14. 71950 81. 7 
98.8 ?.. 2 2Li- 0 3.'.l. 8 19.81951 
21. 1 37.6 15.S1952 87. 0 1.. 7 
17. 7
1953 207"6 2, l+ 15. 3 67. 0 
195l.t 1. 5 13.9 31. g . 1 
4. 7. o. 8 40,4 19.2 . 81955
1956 35.2 2,5 40.7 20. 5 8
.0 
26.5 17. 71957 122"1 lf. 8 29.3 
1958 199.3 5.5 22.8 25.8 23
.5 
25.5 12,41959 70.0 6.5 27,1 
1960 33.6 7, 7 26,3 29.2 4.8 
32. 9 5. 71961 48.6 4,9 24 2 
1962 3:·,. 4 6.6 27.5 33. 1 
4.5 
30. l, 5.71963 47,6 8 l,. 26. Li 
7,, 3 29, 0 33.0 4. l+196L:- 33.1 
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Table n. 
Pe~centage Importance of Components of the Value of Production in Copper Mining 
6 7 8 9 10 
Col. 3 of Col. 5 of Col. 8 of Col. 9 of Col. 10 of 
Table B Table B Table B Table B Table B 
Col. 1 of Col. 1 of Col. 1 of Col. 1 of Col. l of 
Table B Table B Table B Table B Table B 
Yearly Expendi- Misc. Net Foreign Net Foreign Exchange 
Profits ture Out- Local Exchange (Taxes (Value of Invest~ & 
Value of side Chile pa~ents paid in Chile, Taxes Paid in Chile, 
Product Value of Value of Legal cost of Legal Cost of Produc­
Product Product Production, & tion & Misc. Local 
Misc. Local Payments 
-- Payments 1930 29. 7 5. 1 o. 02 45.1 53,5 
1931 6. 2 7. 0 • 0 52, 0 54.2 
1932 -41, 3 6. 5 • 0 l:-3.0 48.4 
1933 -4.0 7. 6 • 0 34. 7 35,1 
193li- 19.3 7. 7 • 0 33.9 35.7 
1935 23. 1 7.6 .o 25. 3 24.9 
1936 3Cc9 6.9 • 0 31. 3 32.5 
1937 48,2 4.8 • 0 28.9 30, 9 
1938 36. 3 5.7 o. 01 33. 1 24.7 
1939 29.8 6. 1 o. 01 37.6 39,5 
19l:-0 34.7 6.3 0.01 38.5 39.9 
19l:-1 31- 3 2. 1 0.01 42.7 49. 2 
19l:-2 27.6 1.0 o. 1 51~ 3 52.2 
19t,,3 23,2 1. 0 o. 1 57,7 58.9 
194l:- 20.8 1.1 0. 1 56.1 57.7 
19l~5 17. 6 1.7 o. J. 58.3 59.5 
1%6 19,7 1. 8 o. 1 55·. 5 56.9 
l9l:.7 22. 0 3. 6 o. 1 56~ 1 57.4 
1948 22. 6 3.9 o. 1 56.1 59,1 
1949 17. 1 4. 1 1. 0 59.9 74.3 
1950 17.9 4. 3 1.1 64.2 78.8 
1951 19.9 3. 6 4. 1 63.9 83.6 
1952 17, 7 3 • .1 28.8 87.9 103.3 
1953 8.5 6.4 48.2 129.3 147.0 
195l1 8.6 3.7 19.7 65.2 65.3 
1955 18.2 5. 0 13,4 73. 2 74.0 
1956 22.8 6. 1 1.0 60.7 68.7 
1957 14.4 10.. 7 1.9 53,9 71.5 
1958 11. 7 11. 0 2. 9 51. 5 74,7 
1959 17. 7 9. 9 1.7 54.3 66.7 
1960 14.3 10. 7 1.9 57.4 62.0 
1961 11,8 11. 0 2. 7 63. 7 65.5 
1962 13.4 10. 8 3. 0 59.8 68.1 
1963 12. 0 10. 6 2.4 59.2 64.9 
196l:. 13. 2 10.7 2.8 64.6 68.9 
.,_ 
Table E 
Production Account of Foreign-Owned Copper Enterprises 
(in thousands of u.s.$) 
Production Expenditures 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
1. Purchases of intermediate goods and services 64,806 62, 83.5 90, 740 76, 54l:. 57, 785 53, 171 
1.1 Purchases in the country (1) 38, 658 23, 191 52, 568 42, 283 27, 217 20, 167 
1.2 Foreign purchases (2) 16, 800 28, 300 26, 800 20, 900 ll:, 700 21, 500 
1.3 Foreign expenditures (4) 9,438 11, 344 11, 372 13, 371 15.868 11, 504 
2. rremuneration to wage earners 17, 042 21, 109 16, 732 27, 417 33, 383 28, 933 
2.1 Hages (3) 9, 806 11, 991 10, 234 15, 823 llf, 416 14, 051 
2.2 Salaries (3) 4,606 5,496 3, 930 7, 362 11, 965 9, 832 
2.3 Contributions to Social Security System (3) 617 786 601 1, 331 2, 336 2,430 
2. l:. Contributions of Private Employee 
Security Fund (3) 2,013 2, 836 1,967 2, 901 4,666 2, 620 
3. Interests (5) - - - 5, 600 4-, 500 13, 000 
L:.. Indirect 1axes 
L:.• 1 Custon duties (5) 4,000 4,300 5,100 5,400 2,800 1, 600 
l,.)5. Allowance£ for the consumption of fixed capital 
\0 
5.1 Depreciation (6) 4,500 4,300 5, 300 8,300 9,400 10, 400 
6. Resoucce Eurplus (7) 82, 269 122, 466 160, 433 97, 044 112, 036 240, 381 
Total Costs of Production 172, 617 215, 010 278, 305 220, 315 219, 904 347, 485 
Value of Production 
7. Sales of goods or services 172, 617 215, 010 278, 305 220, 315 219, 904 347, 485 
7.1 Gross exports of Copper (11) 163, 600 182, 900 258,000 185, 900 226, 300 325, 300 
7.11 ~et foreign sales (8) 155, 700 169, 400 l8l1, 600 119, .500 169, 500 264,600 
7.12 Increase of foreign stocks (5) 
7.13 furplus that benefits the government (5) - 3, 700 63, 800 54,800 42,400 41, 100 
7.14 Foreign expenditures once the value of 
exported gold and silver has been 
deduced (5) 7, 900 9, 800 9,600 11,600 14,400 9, 700 
7.2 Exports of Molibdinum (10) 2, 679 2,566 2,933 2, 4Mi-, 2, 636 3, 481 
7.3 Exports of the gold and silver included in the 
blister copper (9) 1,538 1,544 1, 772 1, 771 1,468 1,804 
8,500 25, 900 14, 100 12, 500 16, 000 22, 300 7.4 Local sales (5) 
2, 100 1,500 17, 700 -26, 500 -5, 4007.5 Increase in local stocks (5) -3, 700 
215, 010 220, 315 219, 904 347,485Total Value of Production 172, 617 278, 305 
Table E 
Production Account of Foreign-Owned Copper Enterprises
(in thousands of U.S.$) 
Production Expensitures 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
1. Purchases of intermediate goods and services1.1 Purchases in the country 
89, 478 106, 942 89, 8l,,2 126, 135 135, 025(1) 48,549 50, 9881.2 Foreign purchases (2) 
35, 606 57, 450 69, 77126,300 34, 9001. 3 Foreign expenditures (lf) 
30, 500 36,300 31, 30014,629 21, 0542. Remuneration to wage earners 27, 736 32, 385 33, 95427,2512.1 Wages (3) 
29, 812 33, 094 36,550 l:2, 92913, 4162.2 Salaries (3) 
13, 789 16, 158 16, 373 20, 2508,744 10, 368 10, 765 13, 1772,3 Contributions to Social Security System 14,586(3) 2, 1602. I, Contributions of Private Employee 
2,234 2, 618 2, 652 3, 280
Security Fund (3)
3. Interests (5) 
2, 931 3,421 3,553 4,348 4,813
5,800 2,300 1,4004. Indirect Taxes 2,500 2,600
l:.l Custom duties (5) 
\05. lllowances for the consumption of fixed capital5.1 Depreciation (6) 
~ 
13,500 16,6006. Resource Surplus (7) 17, 200 24,400 26,400220, 529 116,492 83, 726 149, 341 ll!J, 234Total Costs of Production 356,558 272, 146 225, 262 338,926 350, 188 
Value of Production 
7,. Sales of goods or services 356,558 272, 146 225,262 338, 926 350,1887.1 Gross exports of Copper (11) 332,700 255,300 206,400 297, 1007.11 Net foreign sales 322, 000(8) 311,200 235,800 177,800 260,300 288, 7007.12 Increase of foreign stocks (5) 9, 100 500 6,900 6,800 1, 5007.13 Surprice that benefits the government (5)7.14 Foreign expenditures once the value of
exported gold and silver has been
deduced (5) 12,400 19, 000 21,700 30,000 31,8007.2 Exports of Molibdinum (10) 3, 229 3, 792 2,426 6,041 6,4347.3 Exports of the gold and silver included in the




Production Account of Foreign-Owned Copper Enterprises 
NOTES: (1) This figure was obtained by deducting from the "legal cost of 
the wagesproduction" and "various" published in the Balance of Payments, 
and salaries paid by the companies. 
(2) Item obtained from the Balance of Payments where it appears 
under the denomination "imports with own fo:.eign exchange". 
(3) Wages were obtained by converting into dollars at the banks 
exchange rate the product of the average wage in escudos/and the blue­
collar employment as indicated in the Anuarios de :Mineria del Servicio 
de Minas del Estado. Sala.des were calculated as the difference between the 
total of wages and salaries published in aforementioned Anuarios, and the 
wages. Contributions to the Social Security Systen were estimated by 
applying the respective rates to the wage and salary figures. 
(4) This figure was obtained as the sum of the expenditures 
abroad resulting from refining, transportation, insurance and so forth, 
which are taken into account in the Balance of Payments, and those expendi­
tures which are not registered and accounted for in the Balance of Payments 
because they correspond, according to the Central Bank, to exports of 
gold and silver contained in blister copper which are also not registered. 
(5) Data obtained from the Balance of Payments. 
(6) The depreciation reported in the balance of payments is con­
sidered as equivalent to the depreciation in replacement value. 
(7) Difference betHeen the value of production and total production 
expenditures.
(8) Sales abroad after deducting transport, refining~ and insurance 
expenditures according to Balance of Payments information. 
(9) This data is included, since it is official, in the present 
table even though they curiously imply a 301.d and silver content in blister 
of foreign-owned miming ,-1hich is very much lower to that of national mining. 
(10) D.etailed information is obtained from the Central Bank Bulletins. 
(11) Sum of items 7. 11, 7. 12, 7. 13 and 7. ll:.• 
Direccion de Planificacion, Departamento de InvestigacionesSOURCE: CORFO 
I I 
Cuenta de Producci6n de las Empresas Extranjeros Dedicados a laEconomicos,. -
Explotocion de Cobre. Cuenta de dolares, G--·upo 122 (Santiago, Chile: 
CORFO, 1964) Pp, 1-2. Himeo. 
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Table F 
Value of Components as Percentages of Total Value of Production, 1950-1960. 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 
1. Purchases of Intermediate 
Goods and Services 37.5 29.2 32.6 34.7 26.3 15.3 25. 1 
1. 1 Purchases in Country 22.4 10,8 18. 9 19.2 12.4 5.8 13.6 
1. 2 Foreign Purchases 9,7 13. 2 9.6 9.5 6. 7 6. 2 7. 4( ( 
J 
1. 3 Foreign Expenditures 5.5 5.3 Li-. 1 6. 1 1. 2 3. 3 4. 1 
2. Renumeration of I.Jage 
Earners 9.9 9,8 6. 0 12.4 15,2 8. 3 7.6 
2. l Wages 5.7 5.6 3. 7 7. 2 6. 6 4. 0 3. 8 
2. 2 Salaries 2. 7 2. 6 1.4 3. 3 5.4 2. 8 2. 5
2. 3 Contribution to Social 
Security System (SSS) o. 4 o. 4 o. 2 o. 6 1. 1 0 • .,I o. 6 
2. 4 Contributions of Pri-
vate Employees to SSS 1.2 1.3 o. 7 1.3 2. 1 0.8 o. 8 
3. Interests 2. 5 2.0 3. 7 1. 6 
4. Indirect Taxes 
Lh 1 Custom Duties 2.3 2. 0 1.8 2.5 1.3 0. 5 
5. Allowances for Consumption 
of fixed Capital 1.2 1.2 o. 7 2. 4 
5.1 Depreciation 2.6 2.0 1.9 3.8 4.3 3. 0 3. 8 




Value of Components as Pe:ccentages of Total Value of Production, 
1957 1958 1959 1960 Total 
1. Purchases of Inte:.:-mediate 
Goods and Services 39,3 39,9 37. 2 38.6 355. 7 
1. 1 Purchases in Country 18. 7 15.8 17.0 19,9 174.5 
1. 2 Foreign Purchases 12.8 13. 5 10. 7 s. 9 108.2 
1.3 Foreign Expenditures 7, 7 12.3 9.6 9, 7 7l;, 9 
2. Renumeration of ~-Jage 
Earners 11.0 14,7 10. C 12.3 118.0 
2. 1 Wages s. 1 7. 2 L:.• 8 5.8 59,5 
2. 2 Salaries 3. 8 4.8 3.9 l:. 2 37. l.: 
2. 3 Contribution to Social 
Security Syste0 (SSS) 0.8 l. 2 0.8 o. 9 7. 7 
2.4 Contributions of P:~i-
vate Employees to sss 1.3 1.6 1.3 1. l:. 13.8 
3. Interests 0.8 0.6 c. 7 o. 7 12.5 
L:.• Indirect Taxes 
4, 1 Custom Duties 10.4 
5. Allowances for Consumption 
I:. ,··.
of fixed Capital 4.6 5.6 0. \.i 7.l: 29. 1 
5.1 Depreciation 6. 1 7,6 7,2 7. 5 49.8 



















Balance of Payments Effec.::, 1952-1964-. 
(In thousands of U.S. dollars) 
Index
! , 
Year (L sf + ~ If) ( ·1,' + i + k) 61 ::=, 100 
1952 218, 663 40, 681 = 177, 982 68. 21 
1953 121, 875 12, 396 = 109, 479 41.96 
1954 205, 705 21, 876 = 183, 829 70. l~6 
1955 284, 795 57, 318 = 227, 477 87.19 
1956 343, 0ll 84, 122 = 258,889 99.23 
1957 303, 318 50,461 = 252, 857 96.92 
1958 270, 783 39, 927 = 230, 858 88. 4-8 
1959 329, 489 76, 437 = 253, 052 96. 99 
1960 342, 554- 73, 735 = 268,819 103. Ol~ 
1961 310, 939 50, 052 = 260, 887 100.00 
1962 330, 869 65, 020 = 265,849 101. 90 
1963 335,947 66, 655 = 269, 292 103.22 
1964 334, 065 74, 809 = 259, 256 99.37 
NOTE: Sf, stands for foreign sales, and If, ·Tr, i and k, for foreign' 
investment, profits, interest payments and capital amortization 
respectively, 
Table H 
Taxes on Copper Ente~prises.
(in millions of pesos) 
Year Total Income Ta:~ Difference from salec of Foreign Exchange
Extra- Tax on L.8.055
ordinary Profits Law 9. 311
Tax L7160 Surprice 7.144 8.320
Income 8,758 and Law on copper and 8.406 Law
Total Tax 111' 137 11. 828 sales Total 8.283 and 6.159
- ~24 
1925 8.3 8. 3 a. 3
1926 12.6 12.6 12.6
1927 26.0 26.0 26.0
1923 28.0 28.0 28.0
1929 49.0 l,,9. O 49.0
1930 53.1 53.1 53.1
1931 21.6 21. 6 21. 6
1932 lf. 3 Lt-. 3 4.3 - \0
\01933 o. 6 o. 6 o. 6 
- - - - - -
193L!- 25.6 25.6 25-6
1935 35.5 35.5 35.5
1936 60. 5 60. 5 60. 5
1937 79. 7 79,7 79.7
1938 287.2 287.2 287.2
1939 465.8 341. 0 341.0 - - - 12L:.• 8 - - 124.8
19lf0 424.1 264.9 264.9 - - - 159.2 - - 159.2
19l:-1 564.3 368. '-:- 368.4 - - - 195-9 - - 195.919L}2 518.5 490.1 401.6 88.5 - - 28. 4 - - 28.4
1943 1,494.3 731. 3 331. 2 400.1 - - 363.0 363.0
19li.l: 1, 049. 4 647. L:. 253.8 393,6 - - 402.0 402. 0
19l:-5 1, 286. 3 6'-:-7. 6 245.5 402.1 - - 638.7 409.1 229.6
19lr6 950. 9 534.8 173,4 361. l,t - - l:-16. l 297.9 118. 2 
Table H 
Taxes on Copper Enterprises, 













Total Income Tax Difference from salec of Foreign Exchanse 
Extra- Tax on 1. 8. 055 
ordinary Profits Law 9. 311 
TaJc 17160 Surprice 7. 141: 8.320 
Income 8,758 and Law on copper and G.406 Law 
Total Tax 11. 137 11. 828 sales Total 8.283 and 6.159 
8.524-
2, 160. 0 1, 453. 8 87.5 1,366.3 - - 706,2 303. 5 402. 7 
4,108.4 1, 626. 0 30. 3 1, 595. 7 - - 2, l:-82. 4 1,937.3 545.1 
2,114.3 1, 030. 6 13. 9 1, 016. 7 - - 1, 083. 7 746. l: 337.3 
2,019.3 878.6 s. 2 873. l:. - - i, 140. 7 643.3 l,97. l:. 
3,664.4 1, 311. 2 6. li- 1, 304. 8 - - 2, 353, 2 1,135.7 1, 217. 5 
6, 287, 8 3,307.3 9.6 1, 200. 3 - 2, 096. 9 2, 980. 5 1, 077.1 1,903.4 
t-'
l:., 64l.l. 9 1, 881. 5 7. 9 530. l:. - 1, 343. 2 2, 763. 4 1,341.2 1, 1.22. 2 - 0 
10, l1l0. 8 7, 052. 2 12. 9 3, 161. 5 - 3,877, 8 3,358.6 2, 067. 9 1, 290. 7 0 
23, 085. 2 21, 03l~. 6 10. 1 2, 9l:-l, 7 14, 143. 7 3, 939. 1 2, 050. 6 1, 661. 0 
52,067.6 37, 911. 7 - 732.8 37,127.1 1. 8 14, 155. 9 12, 965. l:. - 1, 190. 5 
46, 378. 8 43,378.8 - 346.8 42, 976. 3 - 3, 055. 7 2, 7li-9. 2 - 306. 5 
[OURCE: Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, Departamento de Estudios Financieros, Cuentas 
Fiscales de Chile 1925-1957 (Santiago, Talleres Grafien "La Naci-efn", S.A., 1959) 
p. 37 Table 30 for 1925 to 1957, 
---
Table I 
Taxes Levied on CopEer. 
(In millions of Chilean pesos, current prices) 
19l:-0 1941 19L:.2 19l:-3 194L:- 1945-
1. Extraordinary Tax on Copper L.7160 - - 88,530 l}00, 110 393, 600 l:-02, 120 
Taxes L.8798 
Surcharge 20% L. 11137 
Total extraordinary tax - - 88, 530 l:.00, 110 393, 600 l:-02, 120 
2-.:.': 3 Category: 
2% L 633l:- (CORFO) 19,560 22, 790 2b., 3~0 20, 100 15, l:-20 ll:., 910 
10% L 6334 840 113, 910 121, G:JJ 99, 750 76, 350 70, 890 
12% L 5580 (Caja Amort.) 156, l}00 131, 700 lt:-6, 010 120, 660 92, 690 89, 520 
Total tax. 4th Cat. 1"/6, 800 21;3, 3GO 292, 92:J 21:-0, 510 13L:-, 260 ]_78, 320 
3, Additional: 
3% L 633l:. 29, 310 34,170 36, 510 30, 210 23, 160 22, 410 
6% L 5590 58,650 65, 320 73, 050 60,390 46, 290 L:-4, 820 I-' 0 
Additional Total G7, 960 99, 990 109, 560 90, 600 69, 450 57, 230 I-' 
l:. Otiier Taxes 
r~es. 20% L 8918, 8938 and 9311 
Surprice L. 10. 003 
Sur?rice on copper sales L 10.255 
Total 264, 760 368,370 L:-90, 110 731,220 647, 310 6l:-7, 670 
r:evenues due to difference from 
foreign exchange sales - - 62, 3l:-2 130, 801 321, 965 797, 351 
Table I 
(continued) 
Taxes Levied on CoEEer. 
(In millions of Chilean pesos, current prices) 
1946 1947 19l:-8 1949 1950-· 
1. Extraordinary Tax on Copper L.7160 361, 367 4li2, 556 30,665 260,400 285, 052
Ta,,es L.8798 - 790, l:3G 1, 2l:.l:, 567 756, 307 588,342
sm~charge 20% 1. 11137 
Total extraordinary tax 3(;-1-;-367 "I;232, l:94 1, 592, 222 1, 016, 707 873, 394 
2-4a Category: 
2% L 633li- (CORFO) 10, 509 5, 301 
10% L 6334 52, 51l:- 26, l.;.7l} 
12% L 5580 (Caja Amort.) 63, 023 31, 775 
Total tax. 4th Cat. 12G, 046 63, 550 12, 121 11,123 5,250 
3. Additional: ....
3% L 633l~ 15, 779 7,967 0- - l'.J-
6% L 5590 31, 558 15, 903 
AdC:itional Total l:.7, 337 23, 870 6,386 
l}. Other Taxes 
r,cs. 20% L 8918, 8938 and 9311 133, 362 3, l:.72 
Surpricc 1. 10. 003 
Surprice on copper sales L 10. 255 
Total 53!;., 750 1, 453, 776 1, 61!:-, 201 1, 027, 830 878, 64l: 
Revenues due to difference from 
foreign exchange sales 638, 242 75l:-, 53l} 1, 264, 625 1, 190, 521 1, 140, 760 
Table I 
(continued) 
Taxes Levied on Copper. 
(In millions of Chilean pesos, current prices) 
1951 1952 1953 
1. Extraoniinary Tax on Copper L. 7160 130,665 l:-2, 237 
Taxes L. 3798 1, 174, 196 1, lSC, Sl:-7 326, 6ll:. 
Surcharee 20% L.11137 203, 75l;. 
Total extraordinary tax l, 30lf, 321 l, 200, 7Gl:- 530, 36:} 
2-l:.a Category: 
2% L 633l:. (CORFO) 
10% L 6334 
12% L 5530 (Caja Amert.) 
Total ta:ic. l~th Cat. 6, 3 Hi --9, 605 7, 901 
;a 
I-'
3. Additional: 0 
I.,.) 
3% L 633l:. I 
6% L 5590 
Additional Total 
l:.. Othe:;..· Taxes 
~es. 20% L 8918, 8938 and 9311 
Surprice L.10.003 500,674 
Surprice on copper sales L 10. 255 1, 596, 312 1, 343, 193 
Total 1 311 i'ii 3, 307, 375 1, 881, l:.62' ' 
Revenues due to difference from 
foreign cxcha"!)ge sales 2,728,258 2,990,867 2, 763,l:-7l:. (Z) 
SOURCE: (1) The figures covering the period between 1940 and 1948 have been obtained 
from the Internnl Revepue Office (Impuestos Internos). Since 19491 the series were 
obtained from Internal Revenue and the Controller's Office (Contrelor{a). 
(2) These figures correspond to the legal costs of copper, nitrate and iron. 
Table J 
Income Taxes of the CoEEer Firms.
(in millions of pesos) 
Year Total CORFOS' Fourth Cateeory AdditionalShare 
Total 2% L/6, 33l:. 10% L/6.334 12% L/5.580 Total 3% L/6. 331:. 6% L/5.580(Corfo) (Corfo) Amortization Amortization













1933 o. 6 - - - - - i2





1939 341.0 - 2lI8, 5 20, 1 100.5 127.8 92,5 30. 2 62.319l}0 264.9 - 176. 9 19,7 0.8 156,4 88.0 29.3 58. 7 
19l~l 368.4 - 263.4 22.8 113.9 131. 7 100. 0 34.2 65.8 
' 
19l:-2 401.6 - 292. 0 24,3 121. 7 146.0 109.6 36.5 73. 119l~3 331. 2 - 240.6 20.l 99.8 120.7 90. 6 30. 2 60.4
194l:- 253.8 - 184-, 3 15,4 76.4 92.5 69.5 23,2 46.3
19l1.S 245.5 - 178. 1 14.9 73,9 89.5 67. 2 22. l.i.- 44.8
1946 173. 4 - 126,1 10.5 52. 5 63.0 4-7.4 15.8 31. 6
19l:.] 87.5 - 63.6 5.3 26.5 31. 8 23.9 8.0 15.9
l 9l:-8 30. 3 10.9 12.1 - 7.3 2. 9
19L:9 13. 9 4. 3 5,7 - - - 3.9 
4. 4 
1950 5. 2 2. 1 2. 6 - - - o. 5 
Table J" 
(continued) 
Income Taxes of the Copper Firms. 
(in millions of pesos) 
Year Total CORFOS' Fou:ci:h Category AddiU_oi:.al 
Share 
Total 2,~ L/6. 33l:­ l O~s L/6. 33l:. 12% 175.580 Total 3% L/6. 35!: 6~.-L.'5- 58:J 
(Corfo) (Corfo) Amm:tization l mar:: i;,." ~ icn 
Bank Bc:dk 
1951 6.4 L l~ 2. 9 2. 1 
1952 9. 6 4. O s. 6 
1953 7.9 2. 6 5,3 
195l:. 12. 9 11.3 1. 6 




SOURCE: Rep~blica de Chile, Minlsterio de Hacienda, Departamento de Estudios Financieros, 
Cuentas Fiscales de Chile (1925-,1957) (Santiago, Talleres Grafieo ''La Nacion", S. L., 1959) 




Types of Taxes Paid hi the Gran Mineria. 
(In thousands of u.s. $) 
19l:2 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 19l}8 1949 195C 1951 1952 
1. Copper Tax A. Copper Taxes 
ExLt&ortin1ry 1ax 
L,:m 875E 

































a) l: 2 C_ategory 
2% 1. 6334 
10% L 533:, 































3% L. 6334 





























a) Segun Impuestos 
Intcrnos 

























Legal Cost. 34,900 43.800 44.730 43.150 42.425 49.875 82. l~00 54.255 55.700 44.295 53.358 





Jypes of Taxes Paid by the Gran Mincria. 
(In thocsands of u.s. $) 
195219l:.2 19!:3 19l;l1 19~:5 19Li6 1947 l 9l':-8 1949 1950 1951--..-·---
B- Nitrate Taxes 
Governments'' 
".. 88lf 4,287 5.13D Li.• 921 3.7462. 792 2. 637 2. 030 2. 852 3.641 3.483share 
35.079 36.190 37. 712 32.000 47.39215.267 14.126 14.646 n. 795 31.571 31. 631Le3al Cost 
--- 35. 114 39.983 l:-0. 477 42. 8l:-0 36. 921 51.138
TOTAL 18. 059 16.762 16,676 25. 6l., 7 35.212 
C, Iron Taxes I..... 
45 l:-8 42 635 886 
--.J
IL 108 723 1.240 3. 377 
0 
Taxes L.,69 28 
350 869 1. 440 1. 975 2.574 2. 17C 2.325 1. 568Legal Cost 483 240 350 
3.682 2.89.3 3. 565 4.945398 911 2. 075 2. 861TOTAL 952 268 395 
Total Taxes Paid 
by the Gran Mineria 136.383 238.523
86. 211 84. 614- 92. 007 97.665 136.953 149. Lf9.I_ 125.66
2 133. 805
(A -:- P + C) 71. 326 
Letter b) of Total Tax was added with legal coct 
of production.
1) In accordance to the Central Bank. 
Informe del Departarnento de Estudios Financie:rnc 
sabre La
SOURCE: Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, 2954)
Periodo 1940-1953 (Santiago, Editorial Universitada s. A.,Experiencia Fiscal Chilena. 
pp. 39 and lf0. 
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Table 11 
Dif:'.-:eren.ces bet,·Jeen the Companies Exchange Rate 
ant the ~e~ Dollar Price SeJ:ies.,-•-------
(in pesos) 
New 
Dollar Chilex Di£fe:c- , Andes Diffor•• 
Year Price .. Rate enc~~ A Rate ence B 
192R 8.C0 8. 23 -0, 23 8.32 -0.32 
1929 8. 12 8. 26 -0. ll/- 8.26 -0. l4 
1930 8,. 02 8,26 -0. 24- 8.26 -C.24 
1931 7,. 96 8. 29 .. o. 33 8.27 -0. 31 
1932 8. 1+8 12. 39 -3. 91 12.J9 -3,91 
1933 10.51 16.55 -G. OL:. 16.55 -6. 0.!f 
193l:- 10. 52 16.55 -6. 03 16.55 -6.03 
iO. 73 iG.55 -5.82 16.55 -5.821935
1936 11. 63 19. l/-6 -7.83 19. 37 -7. 74 
J3, 09 19.37 -6.28 19.37 -6.281937
1938 13.25 19.37 -6.12 19.37 -6.12 
1939 13. 42 19. 37 -5.95 19.37 -5,95 
19!f0 15, 12 19.37 -4. 25 19. 37 -4.25 
1941 17, 40 19.37 -1, 97 19. 37 -L 97 
1942 21.85 19. 37 2.48 19. 37 2.48 
19lf3 25,38 19.37 6.01 19.37 6.01 
1944 28. 3l:. 19~37 8.97 19.37 8,97 
19l~5 30. 83 19.37 11,46 19.3i 11.46 
194-6 35. 70 19.37 16.33 19.37 16.33 
19lf7 47. 70 19.37 28.33 19. 37 28.33 
1948 56.23 19.37 36.86 19.37 36.86 
19l~9 66.74 19.37 47.37 19. 37 47.37 
76. 81 19.37 57. lfl:. 19.37 57.441950
1951 93.86 19.37 74,49 19.37 74.49 
114. 60 19. 37 95.23 19.37 95.231952
1953 143.60 66. 18 77. l:-2 66. 1G 77.42 
1954 247.56 64-. 68 182.88 64-. 63 182.88 
1955 433.47 109.79 323.68 109.79 323.68 
1956 675, 77 17 3. 12 502.65 25L:.• 84 420. 93 
1957 899.42 365.82 533,60 367.47 531.95 
1958 1, 079, 30 611. 02 468.28 613.16 466.14 
1959 1, 493. 90 788.35 705.55 775, 66 718, 2lf 
1960 1,667.20 1, 0l:-5. 42 621. 78 1, Ol:-5. 42 621. 78 
1961 1, 795, 57 1, Olf9, 00 746.57 1, 049. 00 746,57 
1962 2, 046. 94 1, Ol:-9. 00 997. 9l:. 1, Oli-9. 00 997.94 
1963 2, 953, 73 1, 224. so 1,729.23 1, 224. 50 1, 729. 23 




Differences between the Companies E~cchange Rate
and the New Dollar Price Series.
(in pesos) 
Difference A Diffe:cence A Di££e:~ence E Diffe1·ence B-~-·---Yea;: Parity Rate Chilex · Rate Parity Rate Andes Rate 
1928 2.87% 2.79% l:.• 00% 3.84%
1929 1. 72% 1. 69% 1. 72% 1. 69%
1930 2.99% 2.90% 2.99% 2.90%
1931 4-.14% 3.98% 3.89% 3.74%
:i.932 46.10% 31.55% 46.10% 31. 55%
1933 57.46% 36.l;9% 57.46% 36.49%
193l:. 57.31% 36.43% 57.31% 36.43%
1935 54.24% 35.16% 54.24% 35.16%
1936 67.32% l.,,O. 23% 66.55% 39.95%
1937 47.97% 32.42% 47.97% 32.42%
193/J 46.18% 31. 59% 46.18% 31.59%
1939 44.33% 30.71% 44.33% 30.71% 
19l:.O 28.10% 21. 94% 23.10% 21. 94%
194-1 11. 32% 10.17% 11.32% 10.17%
19l:.2 11. 35% 12. 80% 11. 35% 12.80%
19l:-3 23.68% 31.02% 23.68% 31. 02%
19l:l:- 31.65% 46.30% 31.65% 46.30%
19l:-5 37.17% 59.16% 37.17% 59. 16%
19l:-6 45. 7l~% 84.30% L:-5. 74% 84.30%
194-7 59.39% 146.25% 59.39% 146.25%
1948 65.55% 200.61% 65.55% 200.61%
19l:-9 70.97% 244.55% 70.97% 244.55%
1950 74.78% 296. 54% 7l:.• 78% 296. 54%
1951 79.36% 384.56% 79.36% 384.56%
1952 83.09% 491.63% 83.09% 491.63%
1953 53.91% 116. 98% 53. 91% 116.98%
195l: 73.87% 282.74% 73.37% 282.74% 
1955 74.67% 294.81% 7li.67% 294.81%
1956 7L,,. 38% 290.34% 62.28% 165. 17~~
1957 59.32% 145.86% 59.14% 144.76%
1958 43.38% 76.63% L,,3, 18% 76.02%
1959 t,..7. 22% 89.49% 48. 07% 92.59%
1960 37.29% 59.47% 37.29% 59.47%
1961 41.57% 71. 16% 41.57% 71. 16%
1962 48.75% 95.13% 48.75% 95.13%
1963 58. 5".-% 141. 21% 58. SL:-% 141.21%
196l:. 58.84% 142.95% 58. 8l:-% 142.95% 
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Table N 
(continued) 
Difference between the Companies Exchange Rate 
and the New Dollar Price Series. 
(in pesos) 
SOURCE: The New Dollar price o:r, parity i~ate Has calculated with the 
formula: Pt = Pt-l +Pt-:!. X percentage val:iation between yearly averages 
of the cost-of-living inde,~. The Chilex and Andes Rates are the foreign 
exchange rates at llhich the respective companies could convert dollal:"s 
into pesos and have been obtained from the Companies. THo addition.:l 
parity exchange rc,tes taldn[:; into account both Chilea:i and American 
price changes at the retail and wholesale level have also been calcu­
lated and the series obtained have values substantially below the nei:-J 
dollar price reported he:i:e. I still prefer to use the iineu dolla:: price" 
of the present table since there exists ample evidence that Chilean 
inflation is not fully recorded in the price indices. 
- 111 -
Table 1'1 
Dollar Index New Dollar Difference A Difference B 
Year Price (1961=100) Price C~rfo's Jollar Corfo's Dollar 
Rate Rate 
192G 8 o. 8 8.00 2.37% 4.00% 
1929 3 O. G 8.12 1. 75% 1. 75% 
0-1930 u 0.3 8. 02 3.00% 3.00% 
1931 8 o. & 7. 96 (. 12% 3. 87% 
1932 lb.- 1. 3 8.48 27.92% 27.92% 
1933 32 3. 1 10. 51 18. 87% 1[;, 07% 
193l: 32 3. 1 10,52 18.84% 18,34% 
1935 24 2.3 10. 73 24.25% 2L:-. 25% 
1936 24 2. 3 11. 63 32. 627., 32.25% 
1937 25 2. L, 13. 09 25.12% 25.12% 
2.l:- 13. 25 2l:.• L:.8%193G 25 
1939 25 2. l: 13. 42 23.80% 23.80% 
19l:0 25 2. L;. 1.'.i. 1.2 : 7. 001~ 17.00% 
19l:l 30 2.9 1,. :\J 6.56% 6.56% 
19l:-2 30 z. 9 2L 85 J, 26'½ 
19!;.3 30 2.S 25.3J 20.03% ?O.C3% 
19l:.l:. 30 2. 9 28. JL: 29. 90;~ 
19l:-5 30 ~~. 9 30.83 38., 20J~ 33. 20% 
19l:-6 30 2~9 . 35. 70 SL:.• L:-3?~ 5~r. L:3'1~ 
J.90 32 3.1 47. 70 88.53% 
19L:-C 36 56 • .23 102, 33;~ 1')2. 33~{, 
19l:-9 38 3. 6 66.7L J_ 2L:.. 55/~ 12L;.. 65'i:­
1950 51 !:-. 9 ~1 S. Cl ll?. 62% J 12. 62% 
1951 57 9_). 8~ 130. 68o/: 
1952 66 ~ l~·. GO iM:-. 2G% 
1953 76 7.2 lLd. sn 101. 86% 101. 86% 
195l:- lOL:. 9. '.) 2l.7.56 :.75. 8l:% 175. Git-% 
1955 181 17.3 lf.'.:.3. lf7 178.82% 
1956 351 33• .5 675. 77 1.L:3. 2'.J/,, 119. 92% 
1957 624 59.5 899.42 35.51% 85. 2l:-% 
1958 715 63. 2 1,079.30 65. l:-9% 65.19% 
1959 1, 049 100. 0 1, 1+93. 90 67.25% 68.46% 
1960 1,049 100.0 1. 667. 20 59.27% 59.27% 
1961 1, 049 1,795.57 71. 14-% 71. l~-% 
1962 1, 15.3 2, 046. 94 86.55% 86.55% 
1963 1,800 2, 953. 73 96.06% 96. 06% 
lf, 312. l:4 
NOTE: The New Dollar Price column was calculated 1-1ith the formula: 
Pt = Pt-l + Pt-l . % Varietion bet,-Jeen yearly averages of the cost of 
Living Index. 
SOU~CE: CORFO Direcci~n <le Planificacion Departamento de Investigaciones 



































































Investment and P:rnfits. 
(in thousands of u.s.$) 
Andes 







30, 950.0% 880 
9, 250. 0% 537 
4, 461,, 9% 1, 085 
1, 141. 0'% 
1, 130. 7% 035 
2, 257. l1% :;.6[~ 
~· .-, n3, 629.t.,% ,.Ju 
993.5% 
J., 045. 0% G61 
21, mo. o~~ 57":'. 
20, 350.0% L:.15 
63L. 
82! 
l.-5, 227. 2% 1, OSL: 
732.5% 1, 519 
2,311 
4,839.2% 1, (Jl;.3 
70, 200. 0% ~. 396 
1, 488. 5% 2,559 
858.3% 27l: 
1,091 
22.2% 3, 39G 
3, 5l;.[, 
2, 189 
0.2% 2, 608 
36.9% 2, 940 
34. 810 9, 905 
159.9% L:., 790 
81.6% 4, l,37 







2, L~ll. 8% 
720. 3% 
73L;.. 2% 
::_, 242. ~!~ 
1_. 890. l,~ 
982. 7% 
2, 35G. 7~, 
/, C,l:2. 7',~ 
J: .-·.03. Ci~~ 
:; :: l:.G u.. ~,ll,:~ 
j, ?.L,6. 7% 
602 .. 5~-~ 
J., 316. I.:% 




















Investment and Profits. 
(in thousands of U.S.$) 
Chilex Total Total Investment 
Investment * Profits Investment Total Profits 
Investment 
1930 1, 271 588.1% 4,939 35l:-.5% 
1931 liO 238.0% 600 293.5% 
J 1932 689 84L1 
1933 76 
193l:- 650 1, 004-. 6% 
1935 882 1, 203. 1% 
1936 5L}7 2, 356.3% 
1937 748 2, 996. 5% 1,954 2, L:.61. 8% 
1938 938 1, 330. 3% 1, 163 2, 315. 1% 
1939 230 4, 619. 5% 1, 297 1, 653. '~}% 
19l:.O L:-99 2, G56. 3% 1, 155 2, 556. L:-% 
19L:-l 6, 3l+7 264-. 2% 6, 6'.)5 479.0% 
194-2 817 2, 332. 4-% 1, C96 2, 958. 0% 
19L:-3 405 3, %5. 6% 1, 329 2, OL:-2. 8% 
19l:.l;. 1, 447 1, 027. 7% 2, 037 1, 24-9. 2% 
19l:.S 886 1, L:.97. b.-% 1,303 1, 4L:.6. 5% 
19l:.6 906 1, 802. 9% 1,541 1, lf0i:.• 5% 
19l:-7 1, 166 1, 921,L}% 1, 993 1, 755.6% 
19Li8 5,588 l:-i-:-0. 3% 6,653 73L:. 1% 
19L:-9 20, 640 74, l,,-% 22, 363 118. l}% 
1950 22, 4l;6 75.9% 24, 757 122.0% 
1951 37, 715 54,8% 38, 792 101. 1% 
1952 28, 520 51.6% 30, 921 114. l;% 
1953 17, 583 26.8% 20, 179 48.1% 
195l:- 323 5,923. 5% 
1955 1, 217 2, 607.8% 2,309 2, 374-. 8% 
1956 11, 933 412.9% 26, 690 283.8% 
1957 ll,,, 077 i3L:-, 6% 46,332 81.8% 
195G 10, 275 116. 2,~ 54, 181 50. 2% 
1959 14, 086 247. 7% 39, 095 142.9% 
1960 10, 080 211. G% 16, 119 296. 5% 
1961 5, 571 L:-58, 3% 17, 203 205.8% 
1962 G, 461 369.1% lli, 584 297.9% 
1963 9, 807 298.3% 18,685 210.3% 
196L;. 7, 207 L,76. 0% 15, 877 302.9% 




TotH 160. 9 
Average 10. 7 
Total 251. 1 
Average 25. 1 




Investment and Profits. 
(in thousands of U.S.$) 
NOTE: These figures are substantially different from the ones released 
to the author by El Departamento Jel Cobre. As a whole, these figures 
do not differ much, without being indentical, from the inforr:1.ation 
presented by Clark Hinton Reynolds, "Development Problems of an Expo:".'t 
Economy. The Case of Chile and Copper". in Essays on the Chilean 
Economv. ~- ill· 
SOT.Jr.CE: Chile, Senado de la P.epublica. Bolctin No, 2J.. 773, Inforr.1e de 
Recaido en e1Br6yecto delas Comisiones de Hacienda y Mineria, Unidas, 
ley de la Honorable Comal'.'a C:e Diputados, quc. Establc:ce Uon1as Sohre,, 
Parte Fin2l. (Santiaro,Produccion, Manufactura y ::omercio de Cobre. 




















Copper Production of Foreign Ownecl Nines, by Type, 1950-1963. 
Chile Exploration Co. Andes Cop-per Co. Braden Coppe;:- Co. 
Electro- Fire-
lytic Blister Total Blister Total Refined Blister Total 
ll:3, 240155,820 155,820 l:-5, 937 l}5, 937 143, 248 
163, 505 163, 505 41, 307 l:-1, 307 155, 342 155, 3l.l2 
151, 196 8,059 159,255 47, 035 !+7, 035 167, 655 167,655 
89,421 67, 292 156, 713 41, 083 l,l, 038 121, 195 6, 127 127, 322 
109, 852 75, 992 185,844 38, 530 38, 530 67,563 30, 4l:3 %, 011 
128, 907 82, 101 211, 008 lf0, 680 l:-0, 680 113, 100 28, 371 ll: l, l:-71 
140, 051 101, 66£~ 2l,l, 715 39, 356 39, 356 100, 372 62, l:01 162, 773 
155, 916 84, l}lu 2l:.O, 33l} 39P 458. 39, l:58 66, 276 89, 841 156, 117 
128, 302 8l,, 757 213, 059 32, 805 32, 805 58, 006 113, 663 171, 659 
176, 930 101, Ol;O 277, 970 54, 925 Sl:-, 925 82,634 81, 971 16l, 605 
146,939 3l:, 135 231, 074 79, 191 79, 191 78, 565 90,651 169, 216 
153, 431 96, 187 2l:-9, 618 72, 920 72, 928 62, 285 96, 639 158, 92l: 
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